The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of Brian Dean Curran and Joann Schrock, who coauthored the earlier edition of Mauritania: A Country Study. Their work provided the organizational outline for the present volume as well as substantial portions of the text. The authors are also grateful to those individuals in various public and private agencies who contributed photographs, research materials, and invaluable time and expertise to the production of this book.
The authors wish to thank members of the Federal Research Division staff who contributed directly to the preparation of the text. Thomas Collelo edited drafts, photographs, and maps; Richard F. Nyrop reviewed all drafts and provided guidance; Barbara Auerbach, Sharon Costello, Barbara Dash, and Ruth Nieland edited the manuscript; Andrea T. Merrill performed the final prepublication review; and Shirley Kessel prepared the index. Marilyn L. Majeska managed editorial production. Also involved in preparing the text were Gwendolyn Brown Batts, Barbara Edgerton, and Izella Watson. Diann Johnson of the Library of Congress Composing Unit prepared the camera-ready copy, under the supervision of Peggy Pixley.
Lending timely and invaluable graphics support were Thomas Collelo, Carolina E. Forrester, and David P. Cabitto, who reviewed draft maps from which Greenhorn and O'Mara and Harriett R. Blood prepared the final maps. Additional thanks are due also to David P. Cabitto, who designed the cover artwork and the illustrations on the title page of each chapter and who, assisted by Sandra K. Cotugno and Kimberly A. Lord, prepared charts and graphs.
The authors also wish to thank several individuals who provided research and operational support. Meridel Jackson was instrumental in adapting software to the authors' word-processing needs. Naomi Greer helped prepare bibliographies and, with Patricia Rigsbee, assisted in research.
Finally, the authors thank Madam Turkia Ould Daddah, cultural affairs officer of the Embassy of Mauritania in Washington, D.C., for providing photographs used in the text and for sharing her expertise.
Mauritania: A Country Study replaces the edition published in 1972, twelve years after Mauritania became independent. Between 1960 and 1972, Mauritania struggled to achieve political unity and economic independence. It also suffered a drought and an attendant economic dislocation that lasted through the 1970s. In the period between 1972 and 1987, intermittent drought, desertification, and the war in the Western Sahara further exacerbated Mauritania's political and economic problems.
Like the earlier study, this edition seeks to provide a concise and objective account of the history and dominant social, political, economic, and military aspects of contemporary Mauritania. Sources of information included scholarly monographs and journals, official reports of governments and international organizations, periodicals, and foreign and domestic newspapers. Measurements are given in the metric system.
The authors have spelled place-names in accordance with usage established by the United States Board on Geographic Names. In transliterating personal names, they have followed standard usage in official Mauritanian sources.
CONTEMPORARY OBSERVERS OF MAURITANIA, like the French colonizers of an earlier century, often have described the country as a bridge linking North Africa and West Africa. Certainly individual groups within Mauritania have maintained strong cultural and economic ties with their neighbors--to whom they were often related--in both regions. Yet although the country served as a geographical bridge, crisscrossed by merchants transporting gold, salt, and slaves between the northern and southern edges of the Sahara, it also marked a cultural boundary between sedentary farmers of sub-Saharan Africa and the nomadic Arab-Berber herders from the Maghrib. Throughout Mauritania's history, the interaction between the two cultures has been charged with social and political conflict that has defined and will continue to define Mauritanian politics. Even Islam, to which virtually the entire population adhered after the ninth century, provided but a veneer of unity.
The character of present-day Mauritania's population reflected the waves of immigration from north and south that had begun in the third century A.D. The first wave, Berbers from the north, migrated into what is now Mauritania in the third and fourth centuries and later in the seventh and eighth centuries. Local populations either became vassals in service to the Berbers or migrated farther south. In the ninth century, three Berber groups--the Lemtuna, Messufa, and Djodala--formed a loose confederation in order to better control the easternmost trans- Saharan trade route. The Sanhadja Confederation, as it came to be called, monopolized trade between the ancient empire of Ghana and the city of Sijilmasa. The historically important towns of Koumbi Saleh, Aoudaghast, Oualâta, Tîchît, and Ouadane flourished during this epoch.
In the eleventh century, following the breakup of the Sanhadja Confederation and a period of unrest and warfare among the Sanhadja Berbers, a small group of Sanhadja zealots established a religious center from which they preached a doctrine of Islamic reform and holy war. By 1090 the empire of the Almoravids--as the fundamentalist revolutionaries came to be known--extended from Spain to Senegal. Within forty years, however, the fervor and zeal of the original Almoravid reformers waned, and, at the same time, their foes to the north and south grew stronger.
The black Sudanic kingdoms of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai eventually expanded over the next six centuries into what had been Berber strongholds and constituted the second wave of immigration. A third wave, again from the north, saw various Yemeni Arab groups infiltrating southward, pushing the Berbers and Africans before them. By the late seventeenth century, one Yemeni group, the Bani Hassan, came to dominate all of what is now Mauritania. As the Berbers moved south, they forced the blacks toward the Senegal River Basin.
Mauritania's social structure in the late twentieth century dated from the late seventeenth century, when the Bani Hassan defeated a Berber force seeking to expel them. The nomadic Arab warrior groups subsequently dominated the Berbers, many of whom became clerics serving the Arabs. At the bottom of the social pyramid were the black slaves. All three groups spoke one language, Hassaniya Arabic, and became known as Maures. Meanwhile, free blacks, culturally related to Africans in the south, settled in the Senegal River Basin.
Europeans became interested in Mauritania only in the second half of the sixteenth century. French traders at Saint Louis in what is now Senegal purchased gum arabic from producers in southern Mauritania. Until the mid-nineteenth century, and then for only a short period when French forces occupied the Trarza and Brakna regions in southern Mauritania, Arabs and Berbers paid little heed to the Europeans. At the start of the twentieth century, French forces under Xavier Cappolani moved back into Mauritania and through brute force and co- optation pacified refractory Arab chiefs. But in contrast to its colonial administration elsewhere in West Africa, the French administered Mauritania indirectly, relying on existing Arab- dominated institutions. This laissez-faire attitude persisted until the 1940s. Following World War II, at a time when other French colonies were agitating for independence or at least substantial reform, there was only minimal political activity in Mauritania. France nonetheless implemented changes that corresponded to reforms demanded and accorded elsewhere in francophone West Africa.
The new political freedom touched perhaps 10 percent of the population; yet even among this group, sharp divisions persisted and threatened the political independence of the colony. Some Arabs and Berbers with strong family ties in Morocco favored union with Morocco, while black Africans in the south wanted to join the nascent Mali Federation, which joined Senegal and Mali. Only by co-opting the country's traditional leaders with vague promises was Mauritania's leading political figure and first president, Moktar Ould Daddah, able to achieve the pretense of unity as Mauritania celebrated its independence on November 28, 1960.
During the first decades of independence, Mauritania remained deeply divided. Southern (non-Maure) blacks resented Maure domination of the political process, which led, among other things, to the disproportionate representation of Maures in the bureaucracy and officer corps of the armed forces, the imbalanced allocation of development funds, and the imposition of Hassaniya Arabic as the language of instruction in all secondary schools. With the support of students, the Mauritanian Workers Union (Union des Travailleurs Mauritaniens--UTM), Mauritania's first trade union, protested a salary scale by which some West European expatriates received wages almost 1,000 times higher than their Mauritanian counterparts. Finally, Mauritania's costly involvement in the Western Sahara conflict was part of a Maure agenda and held little for southern blacks, who made up the bulk of the fighting force and suffered most of the casualties.
In 1975 Mauritania allied with Morocco against the Polisario guerrillas of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), ostensibly to obtain Tiris al Gharbiyya. But by 1978, after several surprise attacks by the Polisario guerrillas against Nouakchott and the iron ore mines at Zouîrât, it had become apparent that Mauritania's military was no match even for the smaller guerrilla forces. Nonetheless, the government continued its costly involvement, in part to stave off a possible invasion by Moroccan troops should Mauritania curtail its effort and in part to satisfy the Maures who saw the annexation of Tiris al Gharbiyya as the first step toward a rejuvenated Greater Mauritania (see Glossary). Mauritania's blacks in particular opposed the war on several counts. First, it siphoned off scarce resources that might otherwise have supported greater agricultural development in the south; second, it paved the way for military officers, most of whom were Maures, to insinuate themselves into the civilian government; and, finally, the majority of the enlisted men were black, although most officers were Maure.
Pointing to the debilitating costs of the war and the subsequent political dissension in Mauritania, a group of military officers staged a coup in July 1978 that brought Colonel Mustapha Ould Salek to power as prime minister. Salek proved unable to extricate Mauritania from the conflict, and in April 1979 Colonel Ahmed Ould Bouceif and Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla seized power. Shortly thereafter, Bouceif was killed in airplane crash, and Haidalla became prime minister.
Ruling through the Military Committee for National Salvation (Comité Militaire de Salut National--CMSN), Haidalla arranged a cease-fire with the guerrillas and pledged to remain neutral in the Western Sahara conflict, although his government later accorded diplomatic recognition to the SADR. Meanwhile, Polisario guerrillas continued to transit Mauritanian territory with impunity, inviting cross-border reprisals from Moroccan troops.
In response to alleged corruption in government and a discernible and apparently unwelcome political tilt toward the SADR, Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Ould Taya staged a palace coup in December 1984. Proclaiming itself reformist, the Taya government was as anxious to institute the forms of democracy as it was to deflect responsibility for its inability to implement necessary economic and political changes and to defuse ethnic conflict. Taya pledged to hold elections for municipal offices in thirteen cities (which he did in December 1987), free political prisoners, uphold civil rights, and end corruption. A second round of elections, this time for approximately 500 town councillors (consillers) across the country, took place in December 1987 and January 1988. As important as the elections were to Mauritanians, they did little to reduce the ethnic tensions interfering with development.
In the late 1980s, Mauritania had six major ethnic groups: Maure, Toucouleur, Fulbe, Soninké, Wolof, and Bambara. The Maures included the white Arab-Berber descendants of the original Maghribi immigrants and blacks called harratin (sing., hartani), former slaves of white Maures who had assimilated Maure culture. The other ethnic groups consisted of black Africans, who lived in the south along the Senegal River or in cities. Given the large number of black Maures, the significant cultural distinction in Mauritania was not white versus black but rather Maure (white and black) versus black. But even black Africans had divergent responses, often class linked, to Maure hegemony.
The relative size of each group was in dispute both because census data were deficient and because the Maure-dominated government, to preserve its prerogatives, pretended to eschew ethnic labeling. According to Mauritanian government figures, however, Maures constituted 70 percent of the population, while blacks were said to be overrepresented in the bureaucracy and schooling. Others reported that blacks formed at least half the population but were intentionally undercounted and were underrepresented in high-level positions in the government. In any case, Maures openly discriminated against the black population, which, well into the twentieth century, was considered a source of slaves.
The most outspoken and resentful opponents of the Maure- dominated government were the Toucouleur. They constituted the leadership of the African Liberation Forces of Mauritania (Forces de Libération Africaine de Mauritanie--FLAM), an outlawed antigovernment organization based in Dakar, Senegal. In September and October 1986, the government arrested between thirty and forty suspected FLAM members, including thirteen prominent Toucouleur who were charged with sowing "hatred and confusion" and thereby "undermining the values and foundations of . . . society." Partly to protest those arrests as well as continued Maure domination of the government, a group of Toucouleur, some of whom had high-ranking positions in the military, reportedly plotted to overthrow the Taya government in October 1987. In all, 51 persons were brought to trial for the plot, although FLAM claimed that the government detained more than 1,000 people. Three of the defendants, all army lieutenants, were found guilty of attempting to overthrow the government and were executed on December 3, 1987. Subsequently, students in Nouakchott reportedly demonstrated to protest government racism, and violent clashes between supporters and foes of the government occurred in the capital and in Kaédi and Bogué.
A more immediate cause of the disturbances concerned landownership along the Senegal River. By permitting the government to cede otherwise fallow land to those committed to improving it, the 1983 Land Reform Act seemingly accorded Maures preference in acquiring irrigated land. Most blacks, and especially the Toucouleur, believed that wealthy Maures from Nouakchott or Nouadhibou would appropriate land along the river, displacing blacks whose families had lived in the area for generations. Complicating the issue was the fact that some wealthy black landowners living near the river supported the government's attempts to assemble large tracts of land for capital-intensive farming, even if the reforms dispossessed less fortunate blacks.
In the late 1980s, as other sectors of the economy stagnated or faded, irrigated agricultural land became extremely valuable. World prices for iron ore, long Mauritania's principal export, remained low. Fishing, which by 1983 had supplanted iron ore as the chief foreign exchange earner, appeared to be tapering off following years of overfishing by foreign fleets. Finally, as the worst effects of the drought attenuated, the government targeted agriculture for development. With encouragement and support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government raised producer prices by 40 percent and then expanded irrigation and flood control programs to bring more marginal land into production.
To finance its domestic investment, Mauritania relied on foreign assistance, which between 1980 and 1985 amounted to approximately US$170 per capita. Mauritania's principal benefactors included wealthy Arab states, France, and Japan. By 1985 Mauritania's foreign debt amounted to US$1.8 billion, or nearly 250 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), making Mauritania one of the most deeply indebted nations in the world.
One of the reasons for its dependence on foreign funding was the size of the military budget. As in many other Third World countries experiencing domestic turmoil, the military absorbed a disproportionate share of the budget--25 percent in 1985. Military spending distorted the economy by diverting funds from economic development. At the same time, however, the military provided personnel with technical and administrative expertise that could be transferred elsewhere within the government. The military also participated in road building, public health campaigns, and disaster relief. Meanwhile, the hope that the armed forces might foster a sense of national unity transcending ethnic peculiarities proved illusory because most of the officers were Maure, whereas most recruits were black. The attempted coup in October 1987 aggravated that disparity; in its aftermath, approximately 500 noncommissioned officers, most of whom were blacks, were dismissed from the army.
Mauritania in the late 1980s held little promise for its citizens. By 1987 desertification, perhaps Mauritania's greatest enemy, had claimed over 90 percent of the land that had been arable at independence. Competition for increasingly scarce resources--which might include land, education, or slots in the bureaucracy--intensified, pitting Mauritania's non-Maure blacks against Maures. In spite of its reformist intentions, the Taya regime perforce relied increasingly on coercion to maintain order. Only the prospect for a negotiated settlement between Algeria and Morocco in the Western Sahara afforded even the possibility of positive economic change. The redeployment of Moroccan troops from positions just north of Mauritania's border with the Western Sahara and the removal of SADR refugee camps from Tindouf in extreme western Algeria would allow Mauritania to reduce the size and cost of its military, thereby freeing additional funds for economic development. The savings would probably be slight, however, and the net effect unimportant. Only an end to desertification, over which Mauritania had little control, would allow resources to expand to meet the needs of all Mauritanians, both Maures and blacks.
In early April 1989, a minor border dispute involving Senegalese farmers and Mauritanian herders escalated by the end of the month into the slaughter in Nouakchott and Dakar of hundreds of citizens. The rioting in Senegal, in which hundreds of small neighborhood shops belonging to Mauritanian retailers were also looted, followed a period of inflation, rising unemployment, and strikes, all of which aggravated discontent. The violence in Mauritania appeared to be one more chapter in the longstanding conflict between Maures and black Africans, many of whom farmed in the valuable irrigated lands along the Senegal River. To quell the violence, several countries, including France and Morocco, arranged an airlift to repatriate nationals from the two countries back across their respective borders.
Subsequently, Mauritania repatriated or expelled as many as 100,000 people, many of whom had been born in Mauritania and had never lived in Senegal; Senegal repatriated a similar number that also included Maures, mainly the small shopkeepers, who had never lived in Mauritania. The elimination of the mauritanian retailers was expected to exacerbate economic hardship among poorer Senegalese. Among those leaving Mauritania were perhaps, 5,000 or more farmers and herders, all nominally Senegalese, who had been living for generations on the flood plain on the Mauritanian side of the river (which, according to a French colonial document dating from 1933, belonged to Senegal). According to reports, their villages were burned and their assets confiscated. Presumably their lands will be appropriated by Maures. Observers speculated that the government of Mauritania--or elements within the government--were taking advantage of the situation to expel blacks, Toucouleur in particular, in order to obtain valuable agricultural land and at the same time eliminate the clamor of those seeking equal rights for blacks. It was all the more ironic that the government used harratine to carry out operations against the southern blacks.
The early history of the west Saharan region is largely unknown. There are some written accounts by medieval Arab traders and explorers who reached the important caravan trading centers and Sudanic kingdoms of eastern Mauritania, but the major sources of pre-European history are oral history, legends, and archaeological evidence. These sources indicate that during the millennia preceding the Christian Era, the Sahara was a more habitable region than it is today and supported a flourishing culture. In the area that is now Mauritania, the Bafour, a proto-Berber people, whose descendants may be the coastal Imraguen fishermen, were hunters, pastoralists, and fishermen. Valley cultivators, who may have been black ancestors of the riverine Toucouleur and Wolof peoples, lived alongside the Bafour. Climatic changes, and perhaps overgrazing and overcultivation as well, led to a gradual desiccation of the Sahara and the southward movement of these peoples.
In the third and fourth centuries A.D., this southward migration was intensified by the arrival of Berber groups from the north who were searching for pasturage or fleeing political anarchy and war. The wide-ranging activities of these turbulent Berber warriors were made possible by the introduction of the camel to the Sahara in this period. This first wave of Berber invaders subjugated and made vassals of those Bafour who did not flee south. Other Berber groups followed in the seventh and eighth centuries, themselves fleeing in large numbers before the Arab conquerors of the Maghrib.
One of the Berber groups arriving in Mauritania in the eighth century was the Lemtuna. By the ninth century, the Lemtuna had attained political dominance in the Adrar and Hodh regions. Together with two other important Berber groups, the Messufa and the Djodala, they set up the Sanhadja Confederation. From their capital, Aoudaghast, the Lemtuna controlled this loose confederation and the western routes of the Saharan caravan trade that had begun to flourish after the introduction of the camel. At its height, from the eighth to the end of the tenth century, the Sanhadja Confederation was a decentralized polity based on two distinct groups: the nomadic and very independent Berber groups, who maintained their traditional religions, and the Muslim, urban Berber merchants, who conducted the caravan trade.
Although dominated by the Sanhadja merchants, the caravan trade had its northern terminus in the Maghribi commercial city of Sijilmasa and its southern terminus in Koumbi Saleh, capital of the Ghana Empire. Later, the southern trade route ended in Timbuktu, capital of the Mali Empire. Gold, ivory, and slaves were carried north in return for salt (ancient salt mines near Kediet Ijill in northern Mauritania are still being worked), copper, cloth, and other luxury goods.
Important towns developed along the trade routes. The easiest, though not the shortest, routes between Ghana and Sijilmasa were from Koumbi Saleh through Aoudaghast, Oualâta, Tîchît, and Ouadane. These towns along the route grew to be important commercial as well as political centers. The eleventhcentury Arab chronicler, Al Bakri, describes Aoudaghast, with its population of 5,000 to 6,000, as a big town with a large mosque and several smaller ones, surrounded by large cultivated areas under irrigation. Oualâta was a major relay point on the gold and salt trade route, as well as a chief assembly point for pilgrims traveling to Mecca. Koumbi Saleh was a large cosmopolitan city comprising two distinct sections: the Muslim quarter, with its Arab-influenced architecture, and the black quarter of traditional thatch and mud architecture, where the non-Muslim king of Ghana resided. Another important Mauritanian trade city of the Sanhadja Confederation was Chinguetti, later an important religious center. Although Koumbi Saleh did not outlive the fall of the Ghana Empire, Aoudaghast and particularly Oualâta maintained their importance well into the sixteenth century, when trade began shifting to the European-controlled coasts.
By the eleventh century, Islam had spread throughout the west Sahara under the influence of Berber and Arab traders and occasional Arab migrants. Nevertheless, traditional religious practices thrived. The conquest of the entire west Saharan region by the Almoravids in the eleventh century made possible a more orthodox Islamization of all the peoples of Mauritania.
The breakup of the Sanhadja Confederation in the early eleventh century led to a period of unrest and warfare among the Sanhadja Berber groups of Mauritania. In about 1039, a chief of the Djodala, Yahya ibn Ibrahim, returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca bringing with him a Sanhadja theologian, Abdallah ibn Yassin, to teach a more orthodox Islam. Rejected by the Djodala two years later, after the death of Ibn Ibrahim, Ibn Yassin and some of his Sanhadja followers retired to a secluded place where they built a fortified religious center, a ribat, which attracted many Sanhadja. In 1042 the al murabitun (men of the ribat), as Ibn Yassin's followers came to be called, launched a jihad, or holy war, against the nonbelievers and the heretics among the Sanhadja, beginning what later become known as the Almoravid movement. The initial aim of the Almoravids was to establish a political community in which the ethical and juridical principles of Islam would be strictly applied.
First, the Almoravids attacked and subdued the Djodala, forcing them to acknowledge Islam. Then, rallying the other Berber groups of the west Sahara, the Almoravids succeeded in recreating the political unity of the Sanhadja Confederation and adding to it a religious unity and purpose. By 1054 the Almoravids had captured Sijilmasa in the Maghrib and had retaken Aoudaghast from Ghana.
With the death of Ibn Yassin in 1059, leadership of the movement in the south passed to Abu Bakr ibn Unas, amir of Adrar, and to Yusuf ibn Tashfin in the north. Under Ibn Tashfin, the Berbers captured Morocco and founded Marrakech as their capital in 1062. By 1082 all of the western Maghrib (to at least present-day Algiers) was under Almoravid domination. In 1086 the Andalusian amirates, under attack from the Spanish Christian king Alfonso and the Christian reconquest of <"http://worldfacts.us/Spain.htm">Spain, called on Ibn Tashfin and his Berber warriors to cross the Strait of Gibraltar and come to their rescue. The Almoravids defeated the Spanish Christians and, by 1090, imposed Almoravid rule and the Maliki school of Islamic law in Muslim Spain.
In Mauritania, Abu Bakr led the Almoravids in a war against Ghana (1062-76), culminating in the capture in 1076 of Koumbi Saleh. This event marked the end of the dominance of the Ghana Empire. But after the death of Abu Bakr in 1087 and Ibn Tashfin in 1106, traditional rivalries among the Sanhadja and a new Muslim reformist conquest led by the Zenata Almohads (1133-63) destroyed the Almoravid Empire.
For a short time, the Mauritanian Sanhadja dynasty of the Almoravid Empire controlled a vast territory stretching from Spain to Senegal. The unity established between Morocco and Mauritania during the Almoravid period continued to have some political importance in the 1980s, as it formed part of the basis for Morocco's claims to Mauritania. But the greatest contribution of the Sanhadja and the Almoravids was the Islamization of the western Maghrib. This process would remain a dominant factor in the history of the area for the next several centuries.
Although the Almoravids had substantial contacts with the Maghrib, influences from the black Sudanic kingdoms of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai played an important role in Mauritania's history for about 700 years--from the eighth to the fifteenth century. Ghana, the first of the great West African Sudanic kingdoms, included in its territory all of southeastern Mauritania extending to Tagant. Ghana reached its apogee in the ninth and tenth centuries with the extension of its rule over the Sanhadja Berbers. This large and centralized kingdom controlled the southern terminus of the trans-Saharan trade in gold, ivory, and salt.
The capture of Koumbi Saleh in 1076 by the Almoravids marked the end of Ghana's hegemony, although the kingdom continued to exist for another 125 years. The Mandé, under the leadership of the legendary Sundiata, founded the second great Sudanic kingdom, Mali. By the end of the thirteenth century, the Mali Empire extended over that part of Mauritania previously controlled by Ghana, as well as over the remaining Sahelian regions and the Senegal River Valley. Sundiata and his successors took over Ghana's role in the Saharan trade and in the administration and collection of tribute from vast stretches of the Sudan and the Sahel.
The slow decline of the Mali Empire that started at the end of the fourteenth century came about through internal discord and revolts by the inhabitants of vassal states, including the Songhai of Gao. By the end of the fifteenth century, the Songhai Empire had replaced the Mali Empire and extended to Mauritania and the upper Senegal River Valley. At the end of the sixteenth century, a large Moroccan force defeated the Songhai, bringing to an end the seven centuries of domination of the western Sudan (and a large part of Mauritania) by strong, centralized black kingdoms.
Beginning with the Arab conquest of the western Maghrib in the eighth century, Mauritania experienced a slow but constant infiltration of Arabs and Arab influence from the north. The growing Arab presence pressed the Berbers, who chose not to mix with other groups, to move farther south into Mauritania, forcing out the black inhabitants. By the sixteenth century, most blacks had been pushed to the Senegal River. Those remaining in the north became slaves cultivating the oases.
After the decline of the Almoravid Empire, a long process of arabization began in Mauritania, one that until then had been resisted successfully by the Berbers. Several groups of Yemeni Arabs who had been devastating the north of Africa turned south to Mauritania. Settling in northern Mauritania, they disrupted the caravan trade, causing routes to shift east, which in turn led to the gradual decline of Mauritania's trading towns. One particular Yemeni group, the Bani Hassan, continued to migrate southward until, by the end of the seventeenth century, they dominated the entire country. The last effort of the Berbers to shake off the Arab yoke was the Mauritanian Thirty Years' War (1644-74), or Sharr Bubba, led by Nasir ad Din, a Lemtuna imam. This Sanhadja war of liberation was, however, unsuccessful; the Berbers were forced to abandon the sword and became vassals to the warrior Arab groups.
Thus, the contemporary social structure of Mauritania can be dated from 1674. The warrior groups or Arabs dominated the Berber groups, who turned to clericalism to regain a degree of ascendancy. At the bottom of the social structure were the slaves, subservient to both warriors and Islamic holy men. All of these groups, whose language was Hassaniya Arabic, became known as Maures. The bitter rivalries and resentments characteristic of their social structure were later fully exploited by the French.
Despite the Almoravid domination of Spain in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, there seems to be little evidence of contact during that time between Mauritania and Europe. The inhospitable coastline of Mauritania continued to deter voyagers until the Portuguese began their African explorations in the fifteenth century. Lured by legends of vast wealth in interior kingdoms, the Portuguese established a trading fort at Arguin, southeast of Cap Blanc (present-day Ras Nouadhibou), in 1455. The king of Portugal also maintained a commercial agent at Ouadane in the Adrar in an attempt to divert gold traveling north by caravan. Having only slight success in their quest for gold, the Portuguese quickly adapted to dealing in slaves. In the midfifteenth century, as many as 1,000 slaves per year were exported from Arguin to Europe and to the Portuguese sugar plantations on the island of S#ao Tomé in the Gulf of Guinea.
With the merger of the Portuguese and Spanish crowns in 1580, the Spaniards became the dominant influence along the coast. In 1638, however, they were replaced by the Dutch, who were the first to begin exploiting the gum arabic trade. Produced by the acacia trees of Trarza and Brakna and used in textile pattern printing, this gum arabic was considered superior to that previously obtained in Arabia. By 1678 the French had driven out the Dutch and established a permanent settlement at Saint Louis at the mouth of the Senegal River, where the French Company of the Senegal River (Compagnie Française du Sénégal) had been trading for more than fifty years.
The Maures, with whom the Europeans were trading, considered the constant rivalries between European powers a sign of weakness, and they quickly learned the benefits of playing one power against the other. For example, they agreed simultaneously to give monopolies to the French and the Dutch. The Maures also took advantage of the Europeans whenever possible, so that when the French negotiated with the amir of Trarza to secure a monopoly on the gum Arabic trade, the amir in exchange demanded a considerable number of gifts. Thus began the coutume, an annual payment expected by the Maures for doing business with a government or a company. By 1763 the British had expelled France from the West African coast, and France recovered control only when the Congress of Vienna in 1815 recognized French sovereignty over the coast of West Africa from Cap Blanc south to Senegal.
Before the nineteenth century, the European powers in West Africa were interested only in coastal trading; they attempted no important inland exploration and established no permanent settlements (except Saint Louis). The European mercantile companies on the coast were charged with making the highest possible profit. Four such French companies enjoyed an official French-government monopoly of the Senegal River trade from 1659 to 1798. Contact with the Maures and the black inhabitants of the valley came about only in the course of trade. From the beginning, French influence, competing with traditional trading partners north and east of Mauritania, came through Senegal.
In 1825 the new amir of Trarza, Muhammad al Habib, sought to reassert his sovereignty over the French-protected Oualo Kingdom to the south of the Senegal River by marrying the heiress to the kingdom. This action, which French authorities viewed as a hostile threat, combined with the amir's efforts to sell gum arabic to the British, brought a strong French reaction. Although the Maures were able to lay siege to Saint Louis, a large French expeditionary force defeated the amir's forces. The French concluded that to secure the continuing profitability of the gum arabic trade, they would have to forcibly occupy the northern bank of the Senegal River.
Implementing this new policy was Louis Faidherbe, the French governor of Senegal from 1854 to 1861 and from 1863 to 1865. In 1840 a French ordinance had established Senegal as a permanent French possession with a government whose jurisdiction extended over all settlements then effectively under French control, including those in Mauritania. By undertaking the governance of these Mauritanian settlements, French rulers directly challenged Maure claims of sovereignty. Under orders from the new government of Louis Napoleon to end the coutume, to secure the gum arabic trade, and to protect the sedentary populations of the southern bank from Maure raids, Faidherbe conquered the Oualo Kingdom. He then turned his attention to the amirates of Trarza and Brakna that had united against him. The Maures attacked Saint Louis in 1855 and almost succeeded in reclaiming the settlement, but they were repulsed and defeated a year later, north of the Senegal River. The treaties ending the war extended a French protectorate over Trarza and Brakna, replaced the coutume with a 3 percent annual rebate on the value of gum arabic delivered, and recognized French sovereignty over the northern bank of the Senegal River.
In addition to his military ventures, Faidherbe sponsored an active program to undertake geographic studies and establish political and commercial ties. In 1859 and 1860, Faidherbe sponsored five expeditions, including one that mapped the Adrar, to all areas of western and southern Mauritania.
Faidherbe's successors were content to maintain his gains and did not embark on further military ventures. French colonial policy at this time can best be characterized by the warning given by the Colonial Ministry to the governor of Senegal in the late 1870s, "Let us not hear from you." With France's virtual abandonment of Senegal, the relative calm created in the Chemama and southern Mauritania through Faidherbe's efforts came to an end. The Maures resumed their traditional practices of internecine warfare and pillaging villages in the Chemama. In virtual control of the colonial administration, the commercial companies of Saint Louis sold arms to the Maures, while at the same time outfitting French punitive missions. Scientific expeditions into Mauritania became increasingly subject to attack, and their European leaders were killed or held for ransom. The obvious weakness of the French and their distraction with events elsewhere in the region emboldened the amirs to demand and secure the reinstatement of the coutume.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, after 250 years of French presence in Mauritania, the situation was little changed. The endemic warfare between different Maure groups may even have increased as French merchants made arms readily available, and colonial forces defended camps north of the Senegal River against Maure pillagers. Though formally under the "protection" of the French, the Maures were as fiercely independent as ever.
In 1901 the French government adopted a plan of "peaceful penetration" for the administrative organization of areas then under Maure suzerainty. The plan's author was Xavier Coppolani, a Corsican brought up in Algeria, who was sent to Mauritania as a delegate from the French government. Coppolani set up a policy not only to divide, weaken, and pacify the Maures but also to protect them. Although he served in Mauritania for only four years (1901-05), the French called Coppolani the father of the French colony of Mauritania, and the Maures knew him as the "Pacific Conqueror" of the territory.
During this period, there were three marabouts of great influence in Mauritania: Shaykh Sidiya Baba, whose authority was strongest in Trarza, Brakna, and Tagant; Shaykh Saad Bu, whose importance extended to Tagant and Senegal; and Shaykh Ma al Aynin, who exerted leadership in Adrar and the north, as well as in Spanish Sahara and southern Morocco. By enlisting the support of Shaykh Sidiya and Shaykh Saad against the depredations of the warrior clans and in favor of a Pax Gallica, Coppolani was able to exploit the fundamental conflicts in Maure society. His task was made difficult by opposition from the administration in Senegal, which saw no value in the wastelands north of the Senegal River, and by the Saint Louis commercial companies, to whom pacification meant the end of the lucrative arms trade. Nevertheless, by 1904 Coppolani had peacefully subdued Trarza, Brakna, and Tagant and had established French military posts across the central region of southern Mauritania.
As Faidherbe had suggested fifty years earlier, the key to the pacification of Mauritania lay in the Adrar. There, Shaykh Ma al Aynin had begun a campaign to counteract the influence of his two rivals--the southern marabouts, Shaykh Sidiya and Shaykh Saad--and to stop the advance of the French. Because Shaykh Ma al Aynin enjoyed military as well as moral support from Morocco, the policy of peaceful pacification gave way to active conquest. In return for support, Shaykh Ma al Aynin recognized the Moroccan sultan's claims to sovereignty over Mauritania, which formed the basis for much of Morocco's claim to Mauritania in the late twentieth century. In May 1905, before the French column could set out for Adrar, Coppolani was killed in Tidjikdja.
With the death of Coppolani, the tide turned in favor of Shaykh Ma al Aynin, who was able to rally many of the Maures with promises of Moroccan help. The French government hesitated for three years while Shaykh Ma al Aynin urged a jihad to drive the French back across the Senegal. In 1908 a Colonel Gouraud, who had defeated a resistance movement in the French Sudan (presentday Mali), took command of French forces as the government commissioner of the new Civil Territory of Mauritania (created in 1904), captured Atar, and received the submission of all the Adrar peoples the following year. By 1912 all resistance in Adrar and southern Mauritania had been put down. As a result of the conquest of Adrar, the fighting ability of the French was established, and the ascendancy of the French-supported marabouts over the warrior clans within Maure society was assured.
The fighting took a large toll on the animal herds of the nomadic Maures, who sought to replenish their herds in the traditional manner--by raiding other camps. From 1912 to 1934, French security forces repeatedly thwarted such raids. The last raid of the particularly troublesome and far-ranging northern nomads, the Reguibat, occurred in 1934, covered a distance of 6,000 kilometers, and netted 800 head of cattle, 270 camels, and 10 slaves. Yet, except for minor raids and occasional attacks-- Port-Etienne (present-day Nouadhibou) was attacked in 1924 and 1927--the Maures generally acquiesced to French authority. With pacification, the French acquired responsibility for governing the vast territory of Mauritania.
From the time of the French Revolution in 1789, the two main characteristics of French colonial policy in West Africa were the quest for international prestige and the cultural assimilation of indigenous populations. France's efforts to build a colonial empire may be considered a reaction to British imperial successes: colonies were a necessary burden the French took on to maintain their international stature. These efforts were always subordinate to the considerations of continental politics. As a result, little attention was paid to the political, social, and economic development of the overseas territories.
The policy of assimilation had its origins in the French Revolution, when the Convention in 1794 declared that all people living in the colonies were French citizens and enjoyed all republican rights. Under Napoleon and the Consulate (1799-1804), the law was soon repealed. In 1848, at the outset of the Second Republic, citizenship rights were again extended, and representation in the National Assembly was provided for the four communes of Senegal (Saint Louis, Dakar, Rufisque, and Gorée). Although these rights were retained by the Senegalese, they did not apply to Mauritania or other French territories in West Africa. Elsewhere in West Africa, although assimilation was the theoretical basis of administration, a policy evolved that shared elements of British colonial practice. For example, Africans were subjects of France, not citizens, and had no political rights or rights of representation. The centralized and direct administration embodied in the doctrine of assimilation was maintained, however, and a functional collaboration between French rulers and an assimilated indigenous elite developed. Although by World War II colonial policy was still labeled assimilationist, only a very few Africans were assimilated. For the majority of Africans, the realities of French colonial policy were far from the spirit of French egalitarianism.
Mauritania, a long-time appendage of Senegal, was not considered worth the expense necessary to pacify and develop it until Coppolani succeeded in changing the attitude of the French government. In 1904 France recognized Mauritania as an entity separate from Senegal and organized it as a French protectorate under a delegate general in Saint Louis. With the success of the first pacification attempts, the status of Mauritania was upgraded to that of a civil territory administered by a commissioner of government (first Coppolani, later Gouraud). Although formally separate from French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française--AOF), which had been created in 1895, Mauritania was closely tied to its administrative structure and had its annual budget appended to that of the AOF. On December 4, 1920, by a decree of the Colonial Ministry in Paris, Mauritania was officially included in the AOF with the six other French West African territories--Senegal, the French Sudan, Guinea, Ivory Coast (present-day Côte d'Ivoire), Dahomey (present-day Benin), and Niger.
The AOF was organized pyramidally under a centralized federal structure in Dakar. Directly appointed by the president of the French Republic, the governor general of the AOF came to have a great deal of power because of the instability and short duration of Third Republic governments in Paris. The governor general was the head of a centralized administrative bureaucracy consisting of a lieutenant governor for each territory, the commandant of a cercle (a colonial administrative subdivision), and chiefs of subdivisions, cantons, and villages. The key figure in the system was the commandant in each cercle, who was almost always a European and who was closest to the indigenous population in his duties of collecting taxes, overseeing works projects, maintaining peace and security, and carrying out administrative decrees. Generally, the subdivisions subordinate to the commandant were manned by Africans. For these positions, the French relied to a great extent on the traditional hierarchy of chiefs or their sons. In keeping with their policy of direct, centralized rule, the French made it clear that these African chiefs exercised authority not by virtue of their traditional position but by virtue of their status as modern colonial administrators.
Before 1946 no legislative bodies existed in the AOF. The governor general was assisted by the Grand Council in Dakar, Senegal, which since 1925 had represented the federation's major interest groups (military personnel, civil servants, and businessmen). But the council had only consultative status, and its members were all appointed by the governor general. Similar administrative councils advised the lieutenant governors in all of the territories except Mauritania and Niger.
Mauritania's administrative structure conformed generally with that of the rest of the AOF territories. There were, however, some very important differences. Unlike the other territories (with the possible exception of Niger), most of the cercles still had military commandants because of the late date of the territory's pacification. The resultant conflicts between military and civilian authorities caused frequent administrative changes and reorganizations, including shifts in boundaries that tended to create confusion.
The importance of the role of the traditional Maure chiefs in the administration was the most significant difference between Mauritania and the other AOF territories and has probably had the greatest continuing impact. The extent to which administrative practice in Mauritania contradicted the French policy of direct rule and resembled British indirect rule is noteworthy. From the time of Coppolani, the administration had relied heavily on the marabouts for support and administration. In recognition of the support given by Shaykh Sidiya of Trarza, the French placed the school of Islamic studies at Boutilimit under his control. Traditional administrators of Islamic justice, the qadis, were put on the French payroll without supervision, and administrative appointments of chiefs were subject to the approval of the traditional jamaa.
In an effort to maintain order throughout the turbulent territory, the French co-opted the leaders of certain warrior groups to serve the administration. Notable among these were the amirs of Trarza, Brakna, and Adrar, the three most powerful men in the colony, who were aided by 50 heads of smaller groups and the more than 800 chiefs of factions and subfractions. Although there was extensive French interference in the operations of the traditional authorities, the traditional social structure of Mauritania was maintained and thrust into the modern world.
With the outbreak of World War II in 1939, France's African territories were called upon to supply troops and provisions for the war effort. After France fell in 1940, Vichy gained control of the AOF and replaced the official policy of assimilation with a policy of racial discrimination in shops, trains, and hotels. Existing democratic institutions were repressed, and the administrative councils were abolished. Elements of French colonial policy, such as the indigénat and forced labor, were abused. The chiefs, on whom the Vichy government in Dakar relied, were increasingly seen as collaborators by their people as war-related demands for agricultural production and forced labor besieged them. Sporadic resistance to these abuses was met with summary punishment.
In recognition of the suffering of the people of the AOF territories during the war and of the AOF's contribution to the war effort of the Free French (at one time more than half the Free French forces were Africans), Free French officials convened a conference in Brazzaville, Congo, in June 1944 to propose postwar reforms of the colonial administration. The conference favored greater administrative freedom in each colony, combined with the maintenance of unity through a federal constitution. It also recommended the abolition of the indigénat and forced labor, the establishment of trade unions, the rapid extension of education, and the granting of universal suffrage. The conference was firmly opposed, however, to any concept of evolution outside the French bloc and called for the full application of the assimilationist doctrine. The Brazzaville Conference was the beginning of great political and social change that was to sweep Mauritania and other French African states to independence in less than seventeen years.
Only slightly developed and long neglected, Mauritania played no role in the rising nationalism in the AOF after World War II. The 1946 constitution of the French Fourth Republic established the former colonies of the AOF as overseas territories of France integrally tied to the French Union. The French administration in Saint Louis retained jurisdiction in criminal law, public freedoms, and political and administrative organization; the Colonial Ministry could still rule by decree, if the decree did not violate a statute. The indigénat and forced labor were abolished, and French citizenship was extended to all inhabitants of French territories willing to renounce their local legal status.
Elective representation existed on three levels: territorial, federation (AOF), and national (French). A General Council (renamed Territorial Assembly in 1952) was established in each territory with extensive controls over the budget, but with only consultative powers over all other issues. The Mauritanian General Council comprised twenty-four members, eight elected by Europeans and sixteen elected by Mauritanians. Each territory had five representatives, elected from its General Council, on the AOF's Grand Council in Dakar, Senegal, which had general authority over budgeting, politics, administration, planning, and other matters for all of the AOF. Each territory also sent representatives to the National Assembly, the Council of the Republic, and the Assembly of the French Union in Paris.
The franchise created by the 1946 French constitution was small and restricted to government officials, wage earners, veterans, owners of registered property, and members or former members of local associations, cooperatives, or trade unions. Consequently, in the Mauritanian elections of 1946, there were fewer than 10,000 qualified voters. In 1947 individuals literate in French and Arabic were added to the electorate, and in 1951 heads of households and mothers of two children were made eligible. By 1956 suffrage had become universal.
Before 1946 the territory of Mauritania formed one electoral unit with Senegal, which was represented by a single senator in the French Senate. The 1946 constitution, however, separated Mauritania from Senegal politically, giving it a deputy to the French National Assembly. At the same time, the bicameral General Council, which was reorganized into the unicameral Territorial Assembly in 1952, was established in Mauritania. Nonetheless, political activity in Mauritania was minimal. The territory's first party, the Mauritanian Entente, was headed by Horma Ould Babana, who served as the first Mauritanian deputy to the French National Assembly.
The Mauritanian Entente was founded in 1946 under the auspices of Leopold Senghor and Lamine Gueye of the Senegalese section of the French Socialist Party. Formed specifically for the 1946 election, the Mauritanian Entente was neither well organized nor mass based. Yet on a platform calling for movement toward independence and elimination of chiefdoms, Babana easily defeated the candidate of the conservative French administration and the leading clerics. The new deputy, however, spent most of his five-year term in Paris, out of contact with politics in Mauritania. As a result, on his return for the 1951 elections, Babana was defeated by the Mauritanian Progressive Union, led by Sidi el Moktar N'Diaye and supported by the colonial administration and its allies, the traditional Maure secular and clerical ruling classes, who feared the Mauritanian Entente's "socialist" program. In the 1952 election for members of the Territorial Assembly, the Mauritanian Progressive Union won the twenty-two of the twenty-four seats.
The reforms of 1956, or Loi-Cadre (see Glossary), were even more sweeping than those of 1946. In the face of growing nationalism and the development of a political consciousness in the AOF, the Loi-Cadre ended the integrationist phase of French colonial policy and bestowed a considerable degree of internal autonomy on the overseas territories. Universal suffrage and the elimination of the dual college electoral system led to the creation of district and local representative councils and a great enlargement of the powers of the territorial assemblies. Each territory could now formulate its own domestic policies, although the territories continued to rely on France for decisions concerning foreign affairs, defense, higher education, and economic aid.
The most important provision of the 1956 Loi-Cadre was the establishment of a council of government to assume the major executive functions of each territory that until that time had been carried out by a Paris-appointed colonial official. The councils were composed of three to six ministers elected by the territorial assemblies on the advice of the dominant party. Each minister was charged with overseeing a functional department of government. The head of the ministers became vice president of the council and, in effect, if not in title, prime minister. In Mauritania that person was Moktar Ould Daddah, the country's only lawyer and a member of a prominent pro-French clerical family.
Mauritania's first government was invested in May 1957 and symbolically chose as its new capital Nouakchott, which by design was situated almost exactly between the Senegal River Valley, populated primarily by black farmers, and the Maure stronghold in Adrar. The choice represented a compromise between these two competing areas. It also set the tone for Daddah's approach to Mauritania's political conflicts: compromise and conciliation for the sake of national unity.
The greatest challenge to national unity was Mauritania's heterogeneous population. As in all the Sahelian states, Mauritania's southern regions were inhabited mainly by peasants who belonged racially and culturally to black Africa, while the population of its northern regions were desert nomads who identified with the Arab world. At independence, Mauritania's estimated 1.5 to 1.8 million people could be divided into three groups: one-third of the inhabitants were both racially and ethnically Maures; another third, although racially black or mixed Maure-black, were ethnically Maures (this group of black Maures was essentially a slave class until 1980, when slavery was abolished); and the remaining third were racially and ethnically black, resembling in many respects the populations in neighboring Senegal and Mali.
Achievement of national unity was impeded by the desires of some Maures, mostly from the northern sections of the country, to unite with Morocco, and the countervailing wishes of many blacks to secede from Mauritania and join the Mali Federation. The defeat of the Mauritanian Entente and Babana by the Mauritanian Progressive Union in the elections of 1951 and 1956, which established the Mauritanian Progressive Union's dominance, led Babana and several of his followers in the summer of 1956 to flee to Morocco, where Babana became head of the National Council of Mauritanian Resistance. With the support of many Maures inside Mauritania, this group supported Morocco's claims to Mauritania and, by extension, Morocco's opposition to Mauritanian independence.
To counterbalance the pro-Moroccan sympathies of many Maures, southern minority groups formed a regional party, the Gorgol Democratic Bloc, committed to the prevention of a Maghribi union and to the maintenance of close ties with black African countries. Intellectuals from various black minorities met in Dakar, Senegal, in 1957 and created the Union of the Inhabitants of the River Valley to fight for minority rights against Maure domination.
Further impeding national unity was the inclusion of French officials in the key ministries of finance and economic planning. Daddah was educated in France and, having just returned to Mauritania to form the government, had not been involved in the rivalries and struggle for power. His consequent congeniality toward the French alienated the Association of Mauritanian Youth, an important group advocated total independence and strict anticolonialism.
In this atmosphere of increasing fragmentation and political instability, Daddah, with the strong support of France, called for unity among all factions. At the Congress of Aleg in May 1958, the Mauritanian Regroupment Party was formed in a merger of the Mauritanian Progressive Union, elements of the Mauritanian Entente that had expelled Babana, and the Gorgol Democratic Bloc. This party was headed by Daddah as secretary general and Sidi el Moktar as president. Its platform called for Mauritania to join the French Community (francophone Africa) and to reject both Morocco's claim to Mauritania and a 1957 French proposal to unite Mauritania with francophone Saharan states in the joint Frenchdominated Common Saharan States Organization. The platform also proposed the systematic organization within the country of local party committees to involve all sectors of the population in the party. The party's program reflected the three main themes of Mauritanian unity: the rejection of federation with Mali or Morocco under any terms, the principle of balance between Maures and blacks within the party and government, and the preeminence of Daddah as the only person capable of holding the country together.
The Mauritarian Regroupment Party represented a union of modern and traditional elements as well as a balance between north and south. The dominance of traditional elements favoring close ties with France led, however, to the end of unity. Progressive youth leaders, excluded from decision making at the party congress convened at Nouakchott in July 1958, defected and formed a new opposition party, the Mauritanian National Renaissance Party (Nahda) with Ahmed Baba Ould Ahmed Miske as secretary general. The Nahda platform called for total and immediate independence from France and a rapprochement with Morocco. Although the program was designed to rally diverse opposition to the traditional Mauritanian Regroupment Party, the call for rapprochement with Morocco caused Nahda's opponents to label it a Maure party, which cost it the support of the black minorities. But former Mauritanian Entente members, including Babana, supported Nahda. Its anticolonial nationalist platform also attracted many young Maures.
The political crisis in France that saw the birth of the French Fifth Republic in 1958 necessitated a new French constitution. Also adopted by the people of Mauritania in a referendum in September 1958, this new constitution provided for a French Community whose members would be autonomous republics. But status as an autonomous member of the French Community quickly lost its appeal as Mauritania witnessed the wave of nationalism sweeping the African continent. As soon as the Islamic Republic of Mauritania was proclaimed in October 1958, the Territorial Assembly changed its name to the Constituent Assembly and immediately initiated work to draft a national constitution; the document was unanimously adopted by the Constituent Assembly in March 1959 in place of the French constitution, and on November 28, 1960, Mauritania declared its independence.
The molding of a new political entity was a challenge in a country in which the gradual breakdown of a well-entrenched tribal hierarchy and its authority was still under way. Also, Mauritania's predominantly nomadic society did not lend itself to the establishment of administrative agencies; consequently, numerous political parties formed around those leaders who already exercised tribal authority. Most of the population, who observed democratic nomadic traditions--in which influence did not always pass directly from father to son, land was not owned by individuals, and material wealth was widely distributed rather than concentrated in a few hands--eventually accepted a centralized government.
With the advent of independence, party leaders recognized the need to consolidate to ensure the establishment of a strong and independent government that also represented Mauritania's regional and ethnic diversity. Consequently, there was a tendency on the part of some to try to put aside their differences. Daddah was able gradually to gain the support of numerous opposition parties because of his demonstrated willingness to include in his government those who previously had opposed him. Thus, even after Daddah charged Nahda with corruption, banned the party from participation in the elections to Mauritania's first National Assembly in May 1959, declared the party illegal, and placed five of its leaders under arrest, Nahda still responded to Daddah's urgent appeal to preserve unity and independence.
In a new election, held in accordance with provisions of the new constitution in August 1961, Nahda campaigned for Daddah, who won the election with the additional support of the black party, the Mauritanian National Union. The new government formed in September 1961 included representatives of both Nahda and the Mauritanian National Union in important ministries. This electoral, then governmental, coalition was formalized in October 1961 with the consolidation of the Mauritanian Regroupment Party, Nahda, the Mauritanian National Union, and the Mauritanian Muslim Socialist Union into the Mauritanian People's Party (Parti du Peuple Mauritanienne--PPM). On December 25, 1961, the PPM was constituted as the sole legal party. Its policies included a foreign policy of nonalignment and opposition to ties with France.
In accordance with the new government's objective of acquiring support from blacks, Daddah included two blacks in his cabinet. Also, the National Assembly, headed by a black, comprised ten blacks and twenty Maures. As a final development in the emergence of a dominant single party, Daddah, the party's secretary general, further concentrated power in his hands. The PPM proclaimed Mauritania a one-party state in 1964, and the National Assembly passed a constitutional amendment in 1965 that institutionalized the PPM as the single legal party in the state. Organized opposition was henceforth restricted to channels within the party.
Tight control of political life by the PPM reinforced the highly centralized system. The imposition of single-party rule over a highly diverse population caused underlying tensions to emerge, especially among the southern black population, who feared Arab domination. Their fears were exacerbated by the 1966 decision to make the study of Hassaniya Arabic compulsory in secondary schools and the decision in 1968 to make Hassaniya Arabic, as well as French, an official language. Differences over linguistic and racial issues subsequently caused strikes and demonstrations by students and trade unionists in 1968, 1969, and 1971; all demonstrations were harshly repressed by the government, which in 1966 had banned discussion of racial problems. Other tensions existed among black Maures, who were still considered members of a slave class even though slavery had been outlawed under the French and by the Mauritanian Constitution.
Political divisions within the trade union movement also erupted, causing the movement to split in 1969 into two factions, one favoring integration into the PPM and the other lobbying for an independent form of trade unionism. The PPM, ignoring the latter faction, integrated the trade unions in 1972. Their action followed a series of strikes in late 1971, including a two-month shutdown of the iron mine operated by the Mauritanian Iron Mines Company (Société Anonyme des Mines de Fer de Mauritanie-- MIFERMA). Soon after the integration of the trade unions, an unofficial trade union movement was formed, and in 1973 a clandestine leftist political party, the Mauritanian Kadihine Party, was created. Another clandestine group, the Party of Mauritanian Justice, was formed in 1974 and called for more political freedom.
In 1969 following Morocco's official recognition of Mauritania, the government pursued a more radical political agenda to reduce its economic dependence on France. The first major step toward this aim was taken in 1972, when the government announced that it would review the agreements signed with France at independence and would sign new, more stringent agreements on cultural, technical, and economic cooperation in 1973. New agreements on military and monetary cooperation were pointedly eliminated, and Mauritania soon declared its intention of leaving the West Africa Monetary Union and its Franc Zone and introducing its own currency, the ouguiya, with the backing of Algeria and other Arab countries. In 1974, MIFERMA, which was controlled by French interests and provided 80 percent of national exports, was nationalized and the name changed to National Mining and Industrial Company (Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière-- SNIM). Also in 1974, Mauritania joined the League of Arab States (Arab League). Finally, during the August 1975 congress of the PPM, Daddah presented a charter calling for an Islamic, national, centralist, and socialist democracy. The charter was so popular that both the Mauritanian Kadihine Party and the Party of Mauritanian Justice withdrew their opposition to the Daddah government.
In the early 1970s, the Daddah government made some progress toward achieving national unity and economic independence. These gains, however, were more than offset by the economic hardship caused by a Sahelian drought that lasted from 1969 to 1974. Thousands of nomads migrated to shantytowns outside the cities, increasing urban population from 8 percent of the total population to 25 percent between 1962 and 1975. But other problems forced Mauritania's leaders to shift their focus from internal to external events: the decolonization of the neighboring Western Sahara at the end of 1975; the subsequent occupation of that former Spanish territory by Morocco and Mauritania; and the liberation struggle of the indigenous people of the Western Sahara, which embroiled Mauritania in a long and costly war.
Until the late nineteenth century, the Western Sahara, a land inhabited by the nomadic Sahrawi people, had remained largely free of any central authority. But when competing European colonial powers embarked on their division of Africa, Spain claimed the Western Sahara. Spain historically had had an interest in the territory, primarily because it lay near the Spanish-owned Canary Islands. In 1884 Spain occupied the Western Sahara and remained until 1976.
For the first fifty years after the occupation, intermittent Sahrawi resistance to Spanish rule in what was then called the Spanish Sahara effectively forced the Spanish occupiers to limit their presence to several coastal enclaves. It was not until the 1950s, following the discovery of vast phosphate deposits at Bu Craa, that Sahrawi nationalism developed. For the first time, the Spanish Sahara appeared valuable to the indigenous population as well as to the governments of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. The discovery of the deposits also renewed the historic rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, both of which encouraged Sahrawi aggression against the Spanish occupiers. In 1973 a number of indigenous Spanish Sahara groups formed an organization called the Polisario, the purpose of which was to secure independence from Spain.
By the mid-1970s, the government of Spain appeared willing to relinquish the territory, which was becoming more costly to administer. In addition, the sudden collapse of Portugal's empire in Africa and the ensuing liberation of Mozambique and Angola had strengthened the determination of the Polisario to shake off Spanish colonial rule, and attacks on Spanish settlements and forts had become more intense. Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria also orchestrated international opposition in the United Nations to continued Spanish occupation. The Spanish government finally terminated its claim to the Spanish Sahara in February 1976 and bequeathed the territory--renamed the Western Sahara--jointly to Morocco and Mauritania, both of which consented to allow Spain to exploit the Bu Craa phosphates. Spain excluded Algeria from the withdrawal agreement, largely because Algeria intended to prevent Spain from exploiting the Bu Craa deposits, a decision which contributed considerably to the growing discord in an already troubled area.
Mauritania's role in the Western Sahara conflict was heavily influenced by perceived and real threats of Moroccan expansionism. In the 1950s, Morocco advanced its concept of Greater Morocco, which included all Mauritanian territory, based on an historic (if currently moribund) allegiance to the Moroccan sultan as a political and religious leader. To make matters worse, most of the Arab League states, the Soviet Union, several progressive African states, and groups within Mauritania, as well, supported that position. For example, Mauritanian Entente leader Babana had claimed that a union with Morocco would protect the rights of the Maures from encroachments by the black population.
Even after Morocco finally had recognized Mauritanian independence in 1969--nine years after it had been granted by France--and had withdrawn its claim to Mauritanian territory, the Daddah government remained suspicious of Moroccan intentions. Thus, Mauritania favored using the Western Sahara as a buffer between it and Morocco, either by controlling all or part of the Western Sahara or by creating an independent state.
From independence until the mid-1970s, Mauritania's policy on the Western Sahara vacillated as the government sought to balance its own interests against those of a more powerful Morocco. Until 1974 the Daddah government supported self-determination for the Western Sahara, to be exercised by means of a referendum, under the assumption that the Sahrawis would choose to join with Mauritania. This assumption was reasonable: there were close ethnic ties between the Sahrawis and the Maures; a large number of Sahrawi nomads had migrated into Mauritania; and many Maures were living in the Western Sahara. During the period from 1974 to 1975, however, after Morocco had made clear its intention of occupying the Western Sahara, Mauritania pursued policies fraught with contradictions. To please the international community, on which Mauritania depended for economic aid, Daddah continued to support policy of self-determination for the Sahrawi population. But to please the dominant Maures of Mauritania, the government reintroduced the concept of Greater Mauritania (see Glossary), asserting the country's rights over all of the Western Sahara. A third policy, acknowledging the reality of Moroccan power, called for a partition of the Western Sahara, which led Mauritania into a long and costly guerrilla war with the Polisario.
The Mauritanian campaign to annex Tiris al Gharbiyya (the southern province of the Western Sahara) did not have much support within Mauritania. Some Mauritanians favored instead the full integration of the Western Sahara, while others, who identified themselves as Sahrawi refugees, supported independence. Adamantly opposing absorption was Mauritania's southern black population, which viewed the resultant increase in the number of Maures as a threat. To the blacks, the Western Shara conflict was an Arab war.
In early 1975, both Morocco and Mauritania agreed to abide by the decision of the International Court of Justice on the status of the Spanish Sahara, but when the court ruled in October 1975 that neither country was entitled to claim sovereignty over the territory, both governments chose to ignore the decision. In November 1975, they concluded the Madrid Agreements with Spain under which Morocco acquired the northern two-thirds of the territory, while Mauritania acquired the southern third. The agreement also included the proviso that Spain would retain shares in the Bu Craa mining enterprise. Mauritania acquiesced to the agreements under the assumption, probably correct, that Morocco, with its superior military power, would otherwise have absorbed the entire territory.
In 1976, when Mauritanian troops occupied the Western Sahara province of Tiris al Gharbiyya, as per terms of the Madrid Agreements, they were immediately challenged in fierce fighting with Polisario guerrillas. The fighting would drag on for two years, draining an already improvised economy, provoking ethnic conflict, and causing large numbers of casualties. The direct cost of Mauritania's colonial venture proved exorbitant. Mauritania rapidly increased its armed forces from only 3,000 at the beginning of 1976 to about 12,000 at the beginning of 1977; by mid-1978 the Mauritanian armed forces numbered between 15,000 and 17,000. Between 1975 and 1977, the government's expenditures increased by 64 percent, most of which was allotted for defense. This military buildup placed a heavy burden on the weak economy and diverted funds badly needed development projects. Further alienating the population was a special defense tax, which the government levied against the entire population; despite the tax, the country was on the verge of bankruptcy by late 1977. Moreover, as the war progressed, the power of the Mauritanian military grew, contributing to internal disunity and a weak civilian government unable to solve the problems of nation buildings.
Having more than 6,400 kilometers of undefended borders with Mali and Algeria, Mauritania was highly vulnerable to attacks by Polisario guerrillas, who were armed and supported by Algeria. The government's inability to protect Mauritania's major towns, even Nouakchott, which was attacked in June 1976, raised fears that Moroccan troops would move into Mauritania, ostensibly to interdict the guerrillas but also as an expansionist vanguard. There was also fear of a possible plan on the part of Morocco's enemy, Algeria, to replace the Daddah government with a puppet regime.
For their part, Polisario strategists sought first to remove Mauritania from the conflict and then to direct their efforts against the far stronger Moroccan forces. In mid-1977 the Polisario launched a general offensive against Mauritania to cripple its economy and incite internal opposition to the war, hoping thereby that the government either would withdraw from the conflict or would be overthrown by one more sympathetic to the Polisario cause. In May Polisario guerrillas attacked the SNIM operations at Zouîrât, killing two French technicians and capturing another six. The remaining expatriates at Zouîrât immediately left, and Mauritania promptly requested aid from Morocco. In June 1977, Morocco's military command merged with Mauritania's in the Supreme Defense Council, and 600 Moroccan troops arrived to protect Zouîrât. Following further attacks against the railroad linking the SNIM iron ore mines with the port at Nouadhibou, the Mauritanian government reversed an earlier position and requested--and received--military aid from France. In December 1977, French aircraft, in their first action, attacked Polisario guerrillas returning from raids into Mauritania.
Several wealthy Arab oil-producing states, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi, also provided Mauritania with significant aid to contain the revolutionary fervor advocated by the Polisario. Between 1976 and 1978, Saudi Arabia, in particular, provided funds amounting to twice Mauritania's annual budget.
In spite of the military aid it received, Mauritania was not able to prevent the Polisario from bombarding Nouakchott for a second time, in July 1977. The rocket attack against the capital stunned Daddah, who immediately reorganized both the army and the government, appointing for the first time a military officer to the post of minister of defense. Daddah previously had resisted bringing the military into his civilian government for fear of a military takeover.
By the end of 1977, Daddah faced growing opposition to the war and to his administration. In the military, black recruits from the south, who had joined the army because they lacked other employment opportunities and who formed a majority of the ground troops, had little interest in fighting Polisario guerrillas in the north. Moreover, black civilians resented having to pay a tax to support a war between Arabs. In addition, many Maure soldiers sympathized with the objectives of the Polisario, with whom they shared ethnic ties. Finally, anti-Moroccan nationalists within the PPM opposed the war on the grounds that it afforded Morocco opportunities to expand its influence.
Economic hardship also weighed heavily on the Daddah regime. During 1977, defense expenditures increased as international demand for iron ore (Mauritania's major source of foreign exchange) fell. Drought conditions that devastated crops and herds further strained the economy. Mauritania survived only with the help of grants and loans from Saudi Arabia, France, Morocco, and Libya.
In January 1978, during a special congress of the PPM, Daddah unsuccessfully tried to seek a path out of the Western Sahara war; however, the increasingly isolated leader proved unable to undertake any diplomatic or political initiatives. In addition, relations between Daddah and senior army officers were strained because the president constantly shifted senior officers from posting to posting to guard against a possible coup.
In February 1978, in a desperate move, Daddah appointed Colonel Mustapha Ould Salek to be army commander. In the late 1960s, Daddah had relegated Salek, who was suspected of proFrench leanings, to the reserve corps. (Salek had reentered active duty only in 1977, when he was made commander of the Third Military Region, at Atar, and relations between Daddah and Salek were still strained.) On July 10, 1978, the newly appointed army commander led a group of junior officers in the bloodless overthrow of the eighteen-year-old Daddah government.
Under Salek, a twenty-man junta calling itself the Military Committee for National Recovery (Comité Militaire de Redressement National--CMRN) assumed power. The CMRN was a centrist, moderate, pro-French and pro-Moroccan regime, whose first mandate was to bring peace to Mauritania. The Polisario, which believed Mauritania would withdrew from the war if given the opportunity, declared a unilateral cease-fire, which the CMRN accepted at once.
Salek and the CMRN then directed its collective diplomatic attention to Morocco, whose troops were still thought necessary to protect SNIM operations and thus enable the Mauritanian economy to recover. Following Morocco's lead, the CMRN opposed the creation of a new, independent state in the Western Sahara, although Salek did not rule out the possibility of a federated state with limited autonomy. In the meantime, while Polisario guerrillas and Moroccan troops continued to fight, the Mauritanian Army withdrew from active participation in the war, although the CMRN was constrained from signing a peace treaty in order to placate Morocco. Within a short time, however, Polisario leaders had become increasingly impatient with Mauritania's inability to make a conclusive commitment to peace, and in April 1979 they demanded the evacuation of Mauritanian troops from Tiris al Gharbiyya as a precondition for further talks.
The difficulties facing the Salek government multiplied and soon proved to be insurmountable. His regime failed to overcome Morocco's resistance to any settlement of the Western Sahara conflict. The death of Algerian president Houari Boumediene in December 1978 further heightened tensions. Also, Senegalese president Leopold Senghor, who was displeased with Salek's ties with Morocco, instigated a press campaign that highlighted racial problems in Mauritania. Salek did little to ease the racial problem when, in March 1979, he named eighty-one Maures and only seventeen blacks to his new national advisory committee. Finally, the French government lost confidence in Salek's ability to extricate Mauritania from both the Western Sahara war and Moroccan influence. Isolated and weak, Salek's government was overthrown on April 6, 1979, by Colonel Ahmed Ould Bouceif and Colonel Mohamed Khouna Haidalla, who formed the Military Committee for National Salvation (Comité Militaire de Salut National--CMSN). Salek, however, was permitted to remain in the government as a figurehead president. In late May, Bouceif was killed in an airplane crash; Haidalla was designated prime minister, and Colonel Mohamed Louly was named president.
Like its predecessor, the CMSN sought first to negotiate peace with the Polisario without sacrificing its friendly ties with Morocco and France. In its domestic policies, the Mauredominated CMSN embittered both black and Maure civilians because it refused to share power with either group. In addition, the government insisted on using Arabic exclusively in the secondary schools, provoking a wave of student protests in April 1979.
In July 1979, its patience exhausted, the Polisario ended its cease-fire. Confronted with endless warfare and total economic collapse, the CMSN on August 5 signed a peace treaty in Algeria with the Polisario, according to which Mauritania renounced all territorial and other claims over the Western Sahara. The Polisario, in return, renounced all claims regarding Mauritania. Most significant, Mauritania recognized the Polisario as the sole legitimate representative of the people of the Western Sahara, although in an effort to convince Morocco of its neutrality in the conflict, it did not recognize the Polisario's governing arm, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). The CMSN government also agreed to withdraw from Tiris al Gharbiyya. However, just a few days after the signing of the peace treaty, Morocco occupied Tiris al Gharbiyya, rendering the issue moot and threatening the peace.
In Mauritania, Haidalla was faced with the daunting task of consolidating power. To his credit, in January 1980 he proclaimed Mauritanian neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict and convinced Morocco to evacuate all its troops from Mauritanian soil. From the beginning of his regime, however, Haidalla was viewed with hostility by the southern black population; a native of the Western Sahara, he was perceived by the blacks as an Arab and a northerner. He was also mistrusted by pro-Moroccan political groups because he had signed the peace treaty with the Polisario. To ensure strict Mauritanian neutrality in the ongoing conflict, he reshuffled the top echelons of the government, removing both pro-Moroccan and staunchly pro-Polisario factions. He also assumed the title of president and removed Louly and CMSN vice president Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi from office, thereby eliminating all serious political competitors.
Haidalla initiated several important policy changes to broaden his base of support. In 1980, to further strengthen his position with Mauritania's blacks and to undercut black opposition groups in Senegal, he officially abolished slavery. In December 1980, in the face of growing apprehension among CMSN members, he formed a civilian government, naming Ahmed Ould Bneijara prime minister. He also initiated steps to draft a constitution establishing a multiparty, democratic state.
Among Mauritanians both inside and outside the country, however, political opposition to Haidalla grew. In May 1980, following Haidalla's dismissal of Louly and Sidi, a number of foreign-based opposition movements joined together in France to form an opposition group called the Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania (Alliance pour une Mauritanie Démocratique--AMD). The AMD wanted to restore civilian rule and introduce a multiparty democracy in Mauritania. Its principal political supporter was former President Daddah, who as a result of French pressure had been released from prison in August 1979. Also joining the AMD was former Vice President Sidi. The AMD received financial support from those Arab states of the Persian Gulf that opposed Haidalla's anti-Moroccan leanings--he had moved to eliminate proMoroccan members of the CMSN--and his support of selfdetermination for the radical SADR. The same Arab states also reduced their aid to Mauritania, which only encouraged Haidalla to strengthen ties to more radical Arab countries like Libya and Iraq.
Meanwhile, relations with Morocco continued to deteriorate. Discord between the two countries had been mounting since early 1981, when Morocco accused Mauritania of sympathizing with the Polisario and harboring its fighters. Morocco was also responsible for rumors suggesting that Libya was shipping arms to the guerrillas via a landing strip at Chegga in northeastern Mauritania. On March 18, 1981, pro-Moroccan members of the AMD led by Sidi and former air force commander Mohamed Abdelkader attempted to topple the government. The coup failed, and both were subsequently executed. In April, following the attempt, Haidalla and the CMSN decided to abandon civilian rule and replaced the fledgling constitutional government with a six-member military government headed by Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Ould Taya.
As Mauritania's relations with Morocco worsened, its ties with Algeria improved. Algeria cultivated a friendship with Haidalla and supplied him with sophisticated military equipment, ostensibly to deter invasion from Morocco. In June 1981, in an effort to restore diplomatic relations with Morocco, Haidalla agreed to a summit meeting to be arranged and hosted by Saudi Arabia, one of Mauritania's largest aid donors. At the summit, Morocco's King Hassan II and Haidalla signed an agreement restoring diplomatic relations and prohibiting the transit through either country of forces hostile to the other. This last provision alluded to both the Polisario and the Moroccan branch of the AMD. The reconciliation, however, was short lived. On the one hand, Morocco refused to expel AMD members, and on the other hand King Hassan accused Mauritania of allowing Polisario guerrillas to launch attacks against Morocco from Mauritanian base camps. Subsequently, Moroccan aircraft bombed the Mauritanian city of Bir Aidiat near the border with the Western Sahara, where Polisario guerrillas had taken refuge, and threatened further reprisals against Mauritania.
In February 1982, former CMSN president Salek and former Prime Minister Bneijara, among others, tried unsuccessfully to oust Haidalla. Having survived a second coup attempt, Haidalla relied on his forceful personality, self-discipline, and integrity to gain the respect of many of his countrymen. The eleven-month period between February 1982 and January 1983 gave the regime the opportunity to politicize the population. Haidalla hoped that by establishing a working foundation of civilian politics he could abolish the military regime and be elected to office as a civilian. Accordingly, in 1982 the government organized what were labeled Structures for Educating the Masses (Structures pour l'Education des Masses--SEM), which acted on a range of public issues through elected delegates. Haidalla also pursued his goal of national reconciliation by releasing some of the political prisoners incarcerated since the overthrow of the Daddah regime.
Domestic peace was shattered briefly in January 1983, first when Haidalla discovered a coup plot supported by Libya and, later, when a Moroccan gunboat attacked a Mauritanian garrison near La Guera, the only Western Sahara territory still occupied by Mauritania. Although neither incident caused any casualties or serious diplomatic repercussions, the Moroccan attack demonstrated Mauritania's continuing vulnerability. Haidalla responded to these incidents by strengthening relations with France; the latter had already been instrumental in reestablishing communication between the Mauritanian and Moroccan governments following their 1981 break. The more significant diplomatic movement, however, saw Haidalla develop warmer relations with Algeria and the SADR. During the June 1983 summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Ethiopia, Haidalla joined Senegalese president Abdou Diouf and Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam in drafting a resolution calling for a cease-fire and peace negotiations in the Western Sahara. Morocco failed to comply with the resolution by the end of the year, and Haidalla recognized the SADR in February 1984.
The January 1983 Libyan-supported coup plot had soured relations between Mauritania and Libya; however, Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhaafi, a strong supporter of the Polisario, took advantage of Mauritania's break with Morocco and began a new campaign to reestablish cordial ties with Haidalla. Haidalla's warming relations with Libya, Algeria, and the Polisario, however, alienated the conservative Arab countries on which Mauritania depended for most of its economic aid and also factions in his own government, which favored ties to Morocco, and those who opposed the existence of the SADR. Moreover, Haidalla angered many CMSN members by his decision to recognize the SADR without consulting them.
More ominous was Morocco is movement of troops toward Mauritania's northern border in the aftermath of Mauritania's recognition of the SADR. The presence of thousands of Moroccan soldiers on the Mauritanian border, only four kilometers from Mauritania's key economic center at Nouadhibou, again raised the possibility of another Moroccan attack on La Guera. In addition, Morocco had begun to construct a berm near the Mauritanian border that would restrict Polisario guerrillas to Mauritanian territory for their rear bases, thus providing Morocco with justification for attacking northern Mauritania.
By 1984 the Haidalla regime was under siege not only for its regional policies but also for corruption and mismanagement, especially within the SEMs, which were viewed by the population as vehicles for advancing the president's own interests. Furthermore, upheavals in the military compromised the loyalty of key officers, particularly at a time when the army was being asked to perform the impossible task of protecting Mauritania's vast northern regions from Morocco's attacks across the border. A severe drought compounded the regime's difficulties, forcing much of the population into the country's few urban areas and increasing Mauritania's dependence on foreign economic aid.
In the third ministerial purge in six months, Haidalla named himself prime minister in March 1984 and took over the defense portfolio. Taya, who had held both positions, was demoted to chief of staff of the armed forces. The move infuriated Taya's allies on the CMSN. As chairman of the CMSN, Haidalla was supposed to represent a collective body. Instead, he attempted to amass considerable personal power and alienated many in the top echelons of government. On December 12, 1984, while Haidalla was out of the country, Taya, in a quiet and bloodless coup d'état, became Mauritania's president, a position he continued to hold in late 1987.
Mauritania is generally flat, its 1,030,700 square kilometers forming vast, arid plains broken by occasional ridges and clifflike outcroppings. A series of scarps face southwest, longitudinally bisecting these plains in the center of the country. The scarps also separate a series of sandstone plateaus, the highest of which is the Adrar Plateau, reaching an elevation of 500 meters. Spring-fed oases lie at the foot of some of the scarps. Isolated peaks, often rich in minerals, rise above the plateaus; the smaller peaks are called guelbs and the larger ones kedias. The concentric Guelb er Richat is a prominent feature of the north-central region. Kediet Ijill, near the city of Zouîrât, has an elevation of 1,000 meters and is the highest peak.
Approximately three-fourths of Mauritania is desert or semidesert. As a result of extended, severe drought, the desert has been expanding since the mid-1960s. The plateaus gradually descend toward the northeast to the barren El Djouf, or "Empty Quarter," a vast region of large sand dunes that merges into the Sahara Desert. To the west, between the ocean and the plateaus, are alternating areas of clayey plains (regs) and sand dunes (ergs), some of which shift from place to place, gradually moved by high winds. The dunes generally increase in size and mobility toward the north.
The climate is characterized by extremes in temperature and by meager and irregular rainfall. Annual temperature variations are small, although diurnal variations can be extreme. The harmattan, a hot dry wind, blows from the Sahara throughout most of the year and is the prevailing wind, except along the narrow coastal strip, which is influenced by oceanic trade winds. During the short rainy season (hivernage), from July to September, average annual precipitation varies from 500 to 600 millimeters in the far south to 0 to 100 millimeters in the northern two-thirds of the country. Belts of natural vegetation, corresponding to the rainfall pattern, extend from east to west and range from traces of tropical forest along the Senegal River to brush and savanna in the southeast. Only sandy desert is found in the center and north of the country.
<>Geographic and
Climatic Zones
<>Expansion of the
Desert
Mauritania has four ecological zones: the Saharan Zone, the Sahelian Zone, the Senegal River Valley, and the Coastal Zone. Although the zones are markedly different from one another, no natural features clearly delineate the boundaries between them. Sand, varying in color and composition, covers 40 percent of the surface of the country, forming dunes that appear in all zones except the Senegal River Valley. Fixed sand dunes are composed of coarse, fawn-colored sand, while shifting ("mobile") dunes consist of fine, dustlike, reddish-colored sands that can be carried by the wind. Plateaus generally are covered with heavier blue, gray, and black sands that form a crusty surface over layers of soft, loose sand.
The Saharan Zone makes up the northern two-thirds of the country. Its southern boundary corresponds to the isohyet (a line on the earth's surface along which the rainfall is the same) that represents annual precipitation of 150 millimeters. Rain usually falls during the hivernage, which lasts from July to September. Often, isolated storms drop large amounts of water in short periods of time. A year, or even several years, may pass without any rain in some locations.
Diurnal variations in temperature in the Saharan Zone may be extreme, although annual variations are minimal. During December and January, temperatures range from an early morning low of 0°C to a midafternoon high of 38°C. During May, June, and July, temperatures range from 16°C in the morning to more than 49°C by afternoon. Throughout the year, the harmattan often causes blinding sandstorms.
The administrative regions (formerly called cercles) of Tiris Zemmour in the north, Adrar in the center, and northern Hodh ech Chargui in the east, which make up most of the Saharan Zone, are vast empty stretches of dunes alternating with granite outcroppings. After a rain, or in the presence of a well, these outcroppings may support vegetation. In the populated Adrar and Tagant plateaus, springs and wells provide water for pasturage and some agriculture. In the western portion of the Saharan Zone, extending toward Nouakchott, rows of sand dunes are aligned from northeast to southwest in ridges from two to twenty kilometers wide. Between these ridges are depressions filled with limestone and clayey sand capable of supporting vegetation after a rain. Dunes in the far north shift with the wind more than those in the south.
The Saharan Zone has little vegetation. Some mountainous areas with a water source support small-leafed and spiny plants and scrub grasses suitable for camels. Because seeds of desert plants can remain dormant for many years, dunes often sprout sparse vegetation after a rain. In depressions between dunes, where the water is nearer the surface, some flora--including acacias, soapberry trees, capers, and swallowwort--may be found. Saline areas have a particular kind of vegetation, mainly chenopods, which are adapted to high salt concentrations in the soil. Cultivation is limited to oases, where date palms are used to shade other crops from the sun.
The Sahelian Zone extends south of the Saharan Zone to within approximately thirty kilometers of the Senegal River. It forms an east-west belt with its axis running from Boutilimit through 'Ayoûn el 'Atroûs to Néma, made up of steppes and savanna grasslands. Herds of cattle, sheep, and goats move across this zone in search of pasturage.
The hivernage begins earlier in the Sahelian Zone than in the Saharan Zone, often lasting from June until October. Because farmers and herders depend on annual rains, a delay of one month in the beginning of the rainy season can cause large losses and lead to mass migrations from Hodh ech Chargui and Hodh el Gharbi into Mali. Although temperature extremes are narrower than in the Saharan Zone, daily variations range from 16°C to 21°C. The harmattan is the prevailing wind.
In the northern Sahel, dunes are covered with scrub grasses and spiny acacia trees. Farther south, greater rainfall permits more dense vegetation. Sands begin to give way to clay. Large date palm plantations are found on the Tagant Plateau, and savanna grasses, brushwood, balsam, and spurge cover fixed dunes. Occasional baobab trees dot the flat savanna grasslands of the southern Sahel. Forest areas contain palm trees and baobabs. Vast forests of gum-bearing acacia grow in Trarza and Brakna regions. Farther south, particularly in Assâba and the northern portion of Guidimaka regions, rainfall is high enough to support forms of sedentary agriculture.
The Senegal River Valley, sometimes known as the Chemama or the pre-Sahel, is a narrow belt of land that extends north of the Senegal River. Before the droughts of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the belt ranged from sixteen to thirty kilometers north of the river. By the late 1980s, desertification had reached the northern bank of the river in some parts of the valley. The valley is wider in Guidimaka Region and is completely dominated by the seasonal cycle of the river. Almost all of the valley's economically active population engages in sedentary agriculture or fishing along the Senegal River and its main tributaries--the Karakoro, the Gorgol, and the Garfa. This area supplies most of the country's agricultural production.
The climate of the Senegal River Valley contrasts with that of the Saharan and Sahelian zones. Rainfall is higher than in other regions, ranging from 400 millimeters to 600 millimeters annually, usually between May and September. This rainfall, combined with annual flooding of the river, provides the basis for agriculture. Temperatures are cooler and subject to less annual and diurnal variation than in other regions.
The Senegal is the only permanent river between southern Morocco and central Senegal. From its source in Guinea, it flows north and west 2,500 kilometers, reaching the Atlantic Ocean at Saint Louis, Senegal. From its mouth, the river is navigable as far as Kayes, Mali, during the rainy season and Podor, Senegal, during the rest of the year. Heavy rains, beginning in April in Guinea and May and June in Senegal and Mali, bring annual floods. These floods cover the entire valley up to a width of twenty-five to thirty-five kilometers, filling numerous lakes and sloughs (marigots) that empty back into the river during the dry season. When the waters recede from the bottomlands, planting begins.
The Senegal River Valley, with its rich alluvial and clayey soil, is comparatively abundant in flora. Moreover, higher rainfall, irrigation, and abundant side channels and sloughs tend to produce a lush, near-tropical vegetation, with baobab and gonakie trees and abundant rich grasses. Ddounm and barussus palms are also found here. Much of the flood plain is cultivated.
The Coastal Zone, or Sub-Canarian Zone, extends the length of the approximately 754-kilometer-long Atlantic coast. Prevailing oceanic trade winds from the Canary Islands modify the influence of the harmattan, producing a humid but temperate climate. Rainfall here is minimal; in Nouadhibou it averages less than three centimeters annually and occurs between July and September. Temperatures are moderate, varying from mean maximums of 28°C and 32°C for Nouadhibou and Nouakchott, respectively, to mean minimums of 16°C and 19°C.
Battering surf and shifting sand banks characterize the entire length of the shoreline. The Ras Nouadhibou (formerly Cap Blanc) peninsula, which forms Dakhlet Nouadhibou (formerly Lévrier Bay) to the east, is fifty kilometers long and up to thirteen kilometers wide. The peninsula is administratively divided between Western Sahara and Mauritania, with the Mauritanian port and railhead of Nouadhibou located on the eastern shore. Dakhlet Nouadhibou, one of the largest natural harbors on the west coast of Africa, is fortythree kilometers long and thirty-two kilometers wide at its broadest point. Fifty kilometers southeast of Ras Nouadhibou is Arguin. In 1455 the first Portuguese installation south of Cape Bojador (in the present-day Western Sahara) was established at Arguin. Farther south is the coastline's only significant promontory, seven-meter-high Cape Timiris. From this cape to the marshy area around the mouth of the Senegal River, the coast is regular and marked only by an occasional high dune.
On coastal dunes vegetation is rare. At the foot of ridges, however, large tamarisk bushes, dwarf acacias, and swallowworts may be found. Some high grass, mixed with balsam, spurge, and spiny shrubs, grows in the central region. The north has little vegetation.
The climate has altered drastically since the onset of the prolonged drought in the 1960s, part of a recurrent pattern of wet and dry cycles common to Sahelian Africa. Experts agree, however, that overgrazing, deforestation, denuding of ground cover around wells, poor farming methods, and overpopulation have aggravated the drought. In Mauritania the isohyet indicating annual rainfall of 150 millimeters--considered the minimum for pastoralism--has shifted southward about 100 kilometers to a point well south of Nouakchott. During the 1980s, the desert was advancing southward at an estimated rate of six kilometers a year. Each major climatic zone had shifted southward, and in some cases near-desert conditions had reached the banks of the Senegal River.
By the late 1980s, desertification had fundamentally altered agro-pastoral and human settlement patterns. Loss of ground cover in the Sahelian Zone had driven animals and people southward in search of food and water and had given rise to new fields of sand dunes. The advancing dunes threatened to engulf wells, villages, and roads; they had even invaded Nouakchott on their march to the sea. The government secured international help to stabilize the dune field around Nouakchott and planted 250,000 palm trees to create a barrier against the encroaching desert. To further combat desiccation, the government constructed dams on the Senegal River and its tributaries to increase the amount of cultivable acreage.
MAURITANIA'S NINETEENTH-CENTURY French colonizers envisioned the country as a geographic and cultural bridge linking North Africa and West Africa. In the late 1980s, however, Mauritania bore little resemblance to this vision. Instead, it was a society undergoing profound transformation, torn between two cultural and linguistic traditions. The process of compelling nomads to settle that was begun by the colonial government earlier in the twentieth century was accelerated by the severe drought that began in the mid-1960s. For the next two decades, the rate of urbanization was unprecedented; Mauritania was transformed from a nomadic pastoral society to a predominantly urban one. Large pastoral populations were forced to leave land that could no longer support them. The already-overpopulated cities, almost all of which were located in the far south, were unprepared to receive these displaced populations.
Although partially offset by continuing high infant mortality rates, population growth during the 1970s and 1980s exacerbated problems of urbanization. Combined with a depressed economy, urbanization and overpopulation contributed to a generally low standard of living. In the 1980s, the government used its meager resources to increase investment in education, housing, and health care services, hoping to reduce the effects of widespread poverty.
In the late 1980s, Mauritania's population continued to be divided along ethnic and regional lines. Maures from the north-- whites and black descendants of former slaves who identified with Maure values--made up a traditional elite. The other major group was composed of people of black African ancestry, most of whom lived in the south and identified with African cultural and social values. The legacy of Maure domination and enslavement of blacks had been blurred by intermarriage and assimilation into Maure culture; still, the gap between these two groups remained wide, reflecting the weak basis for social cohesion or national consciousness. Social tensions were evident in frequent clashes over state policy, political appointments, and charges of domination, all based on deep-seated cultural antipathies.
In the late 1980s, ethnic tensions further contributed to an unstable social environment. Even the similarities that linked Maures with peoples of African descent were relatively superficial. Religious unity within Islam, for example, masked wide differences in religious observances among Maures and blacks. Government officials hoped that the nation's rapid urbanization might increase social and cultural interaction and reduce prejudices, but most admitted that the task of developing a true national identity and a unified society promised to be long and difficult.
<>POPULATION
<>ETHNIC GROUPS AND
LANGUAGES
<>RELIGION
<>CHANGING SOCIAL
PATTERNS
<>EDUCATION
<>HEALTH AND WELFARE
Like many developing countries, Mauritania was unable to compile accurate demographic statistics during its first decades of independence. The official census of December 1976 enumerated over 1.4 million people, including a nomadic population of about 513,000. Based on these figures, the 1987 population was estimated at 1.8 million, of which about 50.25 percent were females and 49.75 percent were males. The government estimated annual population growth at 1.6 percent during the 1970s, but United Nations (UN) estimates placed growth at 2.9 percent between 1975 and 1985. The 2.9 percent rate projected Mauritania's population size in the year 2000 to be nearly 2.5 million people. This rate of growth, although lower than that of many other African countries, was expected to rise during the 1990s.
The crude birth rate for the years 1980 through 1985 was 50.1 per 1,000 population according to UN estimates, an increase over the 45.1 per 1,000 ratio observed in 1965. The crude death rate declined from 28 per 1,000 population in 1965 to 20.9 per 1,000 population in 1980. Infant mortality was estimated at 137 deaths per 1,000 births. Life expectancy was 42.4 years for men and 45.6 years for women. Infant mortality was higher and life expectancy lower than the average for Third World countries in the mid1980s . Like many developing countries, Mauritania's population was young: in 1985 an estimated 72 percent was under thirty years of age, and 46.4 percent was under fifteen years of age.
Based on UN estimates, average population density in 1987 was 1.8 people per square kilometer--by far the lowest level in West Africa. The population also was unevenly distributed. The 1976 census showed that 85 percent of all Mauritanians lived south of 18° north latitude--a line running roughly east from Nouakchott. Migration toward the south continued throughout the 1980s. Population density varied from 0.1 per square kilometer in the Saharan Zone to more than 35 per square kilometer in densely settled parts of the Senegal River Valley.
Mauritania's population underwent dramatic changes as a consequence of drought and migration during the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s, pastoral nomads (mostly Maures) and sedentary agriculturists (mostly blacks) constituted more than 90 percent of the population. At that time, urbanization was at a very low level. By the mid-1980s, however, observers estimated that less than 25 percent of the population was still nomadic or seminomadic, whereas the urban population was about 30 percent and the remainder, sedentary farmers or small town dwellers. Many other factors also contributed to this shift in settlement patterns and livelihood, including long-term efforts by colonial and independent governments to settle the nomads and new employment opportunities associated with mining and export industries.
These trends, accelerated in the 1980s, fostered rates of urbanization that the World Bank placed among the highest in Africa. In 1984 observers estimated that at least 30 percent of the population (more than 500,000 people) were urban dwellers, not counting temporary residents displaced by drought. In mid-1985 the World Bank raised this estimate to 40 percent, following a further two-year period of extreme drought. Counting both resident and temporary urban dwellers, some sources in the late 1980s placed Mauritania's urban population at or above 80 percent.
In the mid-1980s, Nouakchott was home to an estimated 400,000 to 500,000 inhabitants. Nouadhibou's population numbered 50,000 to 70,000; Zouîrât's, about 50,000. Other cities, such as Atar, Kaédi, Rosso, and Néma, had doubled or tripled in size between 1970 and 1985.
More than any other locale, Nouakchott illustrated the problems brought about by rapid and uncontrolled urbanization. Originally a small administrative center, it had about 30,000 inhabitants in 1959 and more than 40,000 by 1970. During the 1970s, the city grew at a rate of 15 to 20 percent a year; rapid expansion persisted into the mid-1980s. Only about one-tenth of the city's population had access to adequate housing and services. Water and housing shortages were especially severe. Many of the recent arrivals lived in the kébés (shantytowns) that sprang up around the capital. In 1983 a French researcher calculated that 40 percent or more of Nouakchott's population lived in kébés; by 1987 that percentage had increased.
The Mauritanian government sought international assistance to cope with the population problem. It also attempted to reverse the influx of people to the cities by offering land, seeds, and transport to families willing to return to the countryside and resume farming. A relocation incentive program was launched in 1985, but because of persistent drought its prospects were difficult to gauge.
Despite massive unemployment, a substantial number of foreigners--as much as 15 percent of the modern sector work force--were needed to meet the demand for skilled labor. At the same time, at least 600,000 Mauritanians sought work outside their homeland, mainly in West Africa, the Middle East, and Western Europe. Mauritanian traders, for example, were involved in petty commerce in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire and sometimes traded as far away as Central Africa. Maures sometimes sought employment in the Arab petroleum-producing states, whereas black Mauritanians most often sought work in France. Each year from January to July, when there was little need for cultivators and harvesters in Mauritania, large numbers of workers (mostly blacks) sought jobs in Senegal and Mali.
<>Ethnic Groups and Languages
In 1987 six ethnic groups inhabited Mauritania: one of primarily Arab-Berber (Maure) descent and the others of black African descent. In 1978 the government estimated that 70 percent of the population was of Arab or Berber descent and 30 percent of black African descent. Blacks, however, rejected the government's figures, claiming their number was much higher. In any case, the lack of reliable demographic data and a long tradition of interracial marriage had blurred ethnic boundaries and made attempts at ethnic identification imprecise.
The Arab-Berber population encompassed peoples of North African origins, most of whom were nomadic or seminomadic and who were unified primarily through the use of various dialects of Hassaniya Arabic. Hassaniya is derived from the beduin Arabic spoken by the Bani Hassan tribe, who extended their authority over most of the Mauritanian Sahara between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. Hassaniya is not closely related to other North African variants of Arabic, probably because the Arab invaders of this southwestern portion of the Sahara remained relatively isolated from the great Berber tribes of the northern Sahara. The primary differences among the numerous dialects of Hassaniya are phonetic.
The remainder of the population in 1987 comprised several groups of varied African ancestry. Most were sedentary agriculturists who spoke African languages. Family and kinship groups were the predominant social units. As elsewhere in Africa, kinship groups were preserved by interaction and social support, shared religious observances, and rituals celebrating stages of the life cycle of individuals. The sharing of rituals reinforced group solidarity and the values the kinship system embodied.
Traditionally, one of the most common kinship groups throughout Mauritania was the lineage, or descent group. Lineage organization is based on the belief that relationships traced through males differ substantially from those traced through females. The patrilineage, which traces descent through male forebears to a male ancestor, is the most common unit of social organization in Africa; matrilineages trace descent through female forebears to one female ancestor. Both types of lineages include men and women, sometimes five or six generations removed from the founding ancestor, but the linking relatives are of one gender.
Lineages generally share responsibility for socializing the young and maintaining conformity to social norms. Lineage elders often meet to settle disputes, prescribe or enforce rules of etiquette and marriage, discuss lineage concerns, and preserve the group itself.
Lineage ties emphasize the unity of living and deceased relatives by descent through ritual observances and ceremonies. At times, however, lineages break apart, either because of interpersonal rivalries or because they become too large to maintain close ties. When such fission occurs, related lineages usually maintain some ties and celebrate some occasions together. If their alliance is important enough to be preserved for several generations, the resulting confederation of lineages, usually termed a clan, often includes thousands of individuals and may become a powerful interest group in the context of a nation. In Mauritania, many aspects of lineage behavior and expectation are important, providing lineage members with a sense of history and social responsibility and defining the role of the individual in society.
<>Maures
<>Zenaga
<>Black Africans
<>Toucouleur
<>Fulbe
<>Soninké
<>Wolof
<>Bambara
Maures trace their ancestry to Arab-Berber origins, although many have intermarried among African populations over the centuries. Maures occupy scattered areas across West Africa from southern Morocco to Gambia and from the Atlantic Ocean to Mali. The greatest concentration of this group is in Mauritania, which took its name from this dominant segment of its population.
Maure society's complex social relationships are based on rigid hierarchical social and ethnic divisions. Social distinctions reflect the interplay of heritage, occupation, and race. Broadly speaking, Maures distinguish between free and servile status on the one hand and between nobles, tributaries, artisans, and slaves on the other hand. Non-Maure populations, termed "black Africans" in this context, are not included in this ranking system.
Two strata, the warriors (hassani) and the religious leaders (zawaya), dominate Maure society. The latter are also known as marabouts, a term applied by the French. These two groups constitute the Maure nobility. They are more Arab than Berber and have intermarried little with black African populations. Tributary vassals (zenaga) are below the hassani and zawya in status but nevertheless are considered among the elite. They are descendants of Berbers conquered by Arabs, and their Hassaniya Arabic dialect shows a greater Berber influence. Although these three social strata are termed "white" Maures (bidan), the zenaga have intermarried with other groups to a greater degree than have the hassani and zawaya.
Craftsmen and artisans in Maure society are described as members of "castes" because they form closed groups whose members tend to intermarry and socialize only among themselves. Bards or entertainers, called ighyuwa in Mauritania and griots elsewhere in West Africa, are also considered to be members of a caste. At the bottom of the social order are the socalled "black" Maures, previously the servile stratum within Maure society.
Myths of origin are used to reinforce perceptions of social status and justify elements of this elaborate system of stratification. Craftsmen and musicians in Maure society are said to be of Semitic (Arab) rather than Berber or African ancestry. Imraguen fishermen, a caste group living in the vicinity of Nouadhibou, are thought to be descended from the Bafour, the aboriginal black population who migrated south ahead of the expanding desert. Small hunting groups are considered to be the remnants of an earlier Saharan people and may be of Berber origin.
In Mauritania the warrior and marabout elites have developed a symbiotic relationship. Traditionally, warrior tribes protected the unarmed religious leaders, while the marabouts provided political, spiritual, and moral support for the warriors. Under French rule, most warrior tribes were pacified and became cattle herders and traders. Even though the warriors' role changed gradually from one of physical protection to one of political and economic control, the alliance of traditional warrior groups with associated religious tribesmen survived.
The zenaga, now the descendants of tributary vassals of the nobility, tend to be ethnically and culturally more Berber than the hassani and zawaya. They, too, are divided into warrior and religious tribes; but these traditionally were assistants to the nobles, often as slaves. The zenaga still work for the nobility, raising their livestock and looking after their families.
Traditionally, the zenaga paid both individual and group tribute to their noble patrons. Although the French colonial administration banned tribute (coutume), in some areas payment survived as late as the 1960s. Individual tribute took the form of military or educational services; group tribute was in the form of goods.
The two most prominent occupational castes in Maure society are skilled craftsmen (or artisans) and entertainers (or storytellers). Artisans practice blacksmithing and ironworking, jewelrymaking, woodworking, tanning and leatherworking, potterymaking, shoemaking, weaving, and tailoring. All crafts but weaving and tailoring are performed by men. Although the hassani, zawaya, and zenaga regard artisans as their inferiors, the elite values their products and services, and craftsmen are sometimes allowed to live among the elite on a nearly equal basis.
Entertainers, poets, and musicians constitute a special group. Maure society, like most Islamic societies, places a high value on poetry and music. At the same time, some Maures fear poets and musicians, to whom they attribute occult knowledge and mystical powers that can be physically or politically threatening. Accordingly, noble families often become the patrons of entertainers; thus, the nobles are able to demonstrate their elite status while obtaining both entertainment and protection. Fishermen, salt miners, and nomadic hunters are economically and socially marginal to Mauritanian society and are generally considered outside the caste system.
Black Maures distinguish themselves from "black Africans" to emphasize their cultural affinities with white Maures and their cultural distance from sub-Saharan Africa. In most cases, their forebears were incorporated into Maure society as slaves. Maure society continued to accept the institution of slavery even after independence in 1960, but it customarily distinguished among three types of servile status: full slaves, part-slaves, and former slaves now freed, called harratin (sing., hartani). Conditions of servitude varied from benevolent to callous and cruel. White Maures had full rights over their slaves, including the right to sell or relocate them. Slaves sometimes earned or were granted their freedom.
Slavery has been outlawed several times, most recently in 1980. The term for slave, abd, was officially replaced with the term for freedman, hartani, but black Maures continued to be considered a slave class. Their status and role in Maure society have changed little. Many Maures continued to hold slaves and exercise their traditional prerogatives even after official decrees outlawed these practices.
Islamic law requires Muslim slaveholders to free their slaves by the fifth generation. Freedmen, however, usually remained in the camp of their former master and filled the same servile role. Whether as slaves or freedmen, black Maures tended their masters' animals, acted as household servants, worked in the palm groves or millet fields, or gathered the crop of gum arabic.
The principal Maure kinship group is the patrilineage. Among sedentary Maures, the smallest segment of the patrilineage is a group of related males who, with their wives, sons, and unmarried daughters, constitute the extended family. Among nomadic groups, the significant unit is the camp group, consisting of several related lineage units and their extended families. The clan, the subtribe, and the tribal unit are groups of increasingly greater inclusiveness, each of which in principle is organized on the basis of patrilineal descent.
Marriage is almost always within the same clan, and lineages are endogamous as well. Islamic marriage prescriptions are generally followed, with the preferred marriage pattern between first cousins and strict prohibitions on marriage between other, specified relatives. In general, tradition emphasizes marriage within the lineage first, then within one's social level.
Polygyny is accepted among most Maure groups, but relatively few Maures actually have more than one wife at a time. Successive marriages are common, however, especially among elites. Marriage to a widow or a divorced woman entails a lower bride-price than a first marriage. Although levirate (marriage of a widow to her deceased husband's brother) is permitted, widows generally live with one of their sons rather than remarry.
Of the five major black African ethnic groups in Mauritania, the largest is the Toucouleur, an offshoot of the Fulbe. The Fulbe are the second largest black African group in the country. Other significant black African groups include the Soninké, Wolof, and Bambara. Small groups of other ethnic Africans also live in the far south of Mauritania.
Like Maures, most Fulbe are nomadic. Most other African groups practice sedentary agriculture in the Senegal River Valley. Almost all have kin in Senegal or Mali. They speak Fulfulde or West Atlantic languages within the Niger-Congo language family.
Black African society, like Maure society, is highly stratified. The overall system of social stratification is nearly identical for all black groups. Three classes predominate: nobles, endogamous castes, and a servile class. Further social distinctions are recognized on the basis of livelihood, prestige, and power. Castes of skilled craftsmen are organized on the same occupational basis as among the Maures. Slaves and former slaves compose the servile group, but as within Maure society, they are accepted as part of a family and enjoy relatively humane treatment.
The Toucouleur, also called the Halpularen, differ from the Fulbe primarily in terms of livelihood and dialect. Most Toucouleur live along the Senegal River in Mauritania and Senegal. As founders of the ancient kingdom of Takrur, they incorporated a number of local peoples, including the Wolof and Soninké, into their society. The Toucouleur speak Fulfulde, a dialect of Pulaar (the language of the Fulbe) that includes many borrowings from their neighbors and differs from Pulaar in pronunciation, vocabulary, and syntax. Most Toucouleur are sedentary farmers, in contrast with the nomadic Fulbe.
In addition to nobles, freemen, artisans, and slaves or former slaves, the Toucouleur also recognize social groupings based on age. Called fedde, these age-groups are involved in a number of rituals designed to ensure solidarity and pledges of friendship between families. Descent is patrilineal, and the patrilineage is the most important kinship group. Nonetheless, maternal kin also play important roles at critical points in an individual's life.
The Toucouleur are Muslim, and, like many of their neighbors, they believe in divination and supernatural power (baraka) associated with Islamic holy men. They are members of the Tijaniya Islamic brotherhood.
The Fulbe of Mauritania are part of the larger Fulbe population that inhabits scattered areas across the African savanna from Senegal to Sudan. They are thought to have originated in Senegal and to have slowly migrated eastward to their present locations over the last 800 years. Known by a variety of names, including "Peul" in Senegal and "Fulani" in Nigeria, they call themselves "Pullo" (sing.) or "Fulbe" (pl.) in Mauritania. Their Fulfulde dialect belongs to the West Atlantic subfamily of the Niger-Congo language family. It is a rich and flexible language with a well-developed body of oral literature. The Fulbe are Muslims, but the manner in which they observe Islam varies.
Pastoral Fulbe are famed for their herds of cattle and dairy produce. Much of their culture centers on their pastoral lifestyle . The basic social unit is the nuclear family; the nuclear families are organized into lineages and clans. Descent is patrilineal, and the household unit is usually the patrilocal extended family. Marriage is legitimized by the payment of a bride-price, and great value and prestige are placed upon childbearing.
The Soninké in Mauritania are the westernmost branch of the large and widely dispersed Soninké people (also called the Sarakolé), most of whom live in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire. They inhabit the banks of the Senegal River in southcentral Mauritania, where they engage in agriculture and trading. Their ancestors were the founders of the ancient kingdom of Ghana. Some Mauritanian Soninké speak Azayr, a Soninké dialect heavily influenced by Berber; however, most speak the languages of the peoples among whom they live. They are fervent Muslims.
Soninké society is rigidly stratified, allowing for little social mobility. Descent, inheritance, and succession to kingroup and family authority are all patrilineal, and the household unit is the patrilocal extended family. Polygyny is permitted, but the extent to which it is practiced among the Soninké in Mauritania is not clear. Bride-price is a well-established custom, and folklore and ritual are integral to Soninké life.
A relatively small number of Wolof live in Mauritania. Most live in Senegal, where they are the dominant group. The Wolof language comprises several dialects and has borrowed many words from Arabic and various European languages. Almost all Wolof are Muslims, and nearly all belong to one of several Islamic brotherhoods. Farming and trading are the basis of their livelihood.
Descent is reckoned patrilineally, but close ties also are maintained with maternal kin. The basic social unit is the extended family. Perhaps one-fourth of all Wolof households are polygynous. Social stratification is fairly rigid, intermarriage across ethnic boundaries at the same stratum being far more common than intermarriage across strata.
Only a small number of Bambara live in Mauritania; most reside in Mali. They are thought to be descended from the founders of the thirteenth-century kingdom of Mali. Their language, Mandé-kan, is closely related to nearby languages. Many are Muslims, the number of adherents varying widely by group and locale. Most Bambara are farmers.
The Bambara recognize occupational castes and the institution of domestic slavery, as do their West African neighbors. They recognize patrilineal descent, and they practice polygyny. The normal household unit is the extended family.
Virtually all Mauritanians are Sunni Muslims. They adhere to the Maliki rite, one of the four Sunni schools of law. Since independence in 1960, Mauritania has been an Islamic republic. The Constitutional Charter of 1985 declares Islam the state religion and sharia the law of the land.
Islam first spread southward into West Africa, including Mauritania, with the movement of Muslim traders and craftsmen and later with the founders of Islamic brotherhoods. Although the brotherhoods played a role in the early expansion of Islam, it was not until the nineteenth century that these religious orders assumed importance when they attempted to make religion a force for expanding identities and loyalties beyond the limits of kinship. The relative peace brought to the area by French administration and the growing resentment of colonial rule contributed to the rapid rise in the power and influence of the brotherhoods. In recent decades, these orders have opposed tribalism and have been an indispensable element in the growth of nationalist sentiment.
<>Islam
<>Brotherhoods and
Saints
In A.D. 610, Muhammad, a prosperous merchant of the Arabian town of Mecca, began to preach the first of a series of revelations said to have been granted him by God (Allah) through the agency of the archangel Gabriel. The divine messages, received during solitary visits into the desert, continued during the remainder of his lifetime.
Muhammad denounced the polytheistic paganism of his fellow Meccans, his vigorous and continuing censure ultimately earning him their bitter enmity. In 622 he and a group of his followers were forced to flee to Yathrib, which became known as Medina (the city) through its association with Muhammad. The flight (hijra) marked the beginning of the Islamic Era and the entrance of Islam as a powerful force on the stage of history; indeed, the Muslim calendar begins with the year 622. In Medina, Muhammad continued his preaching, ultimately defeated his detractors in battle, and consolidated the temporal and spiritual leadership of most Arabs in his person before his death in 632.
After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled those of his words that were regarded as coming directly from God in a document known as the Quran, the holy scripture of Islam. Other sayings and teachings of the Prophet, as well as the precedents of his personal behavior as recalled by those who had known him, became the hadith (sayings). From these sources, the faithful have constructed the Prophet's customary practice, or sunna, which they endeavor to emulate. Together, the Quran, hadith, and sunna form a comprehensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of the faithful in most Muslim countries.
Islam in a short time was transformed from a small religious community into a dynamic political and military authority. By the early eighth century A.D., Muslim conquerors had subdued the coastal population of North Africa, but widespread conversion of the nomads of the central and western desert did not come until after large-scale invasions of the eleventh century by beduin tribes from Arabia and Egypt. As Islam spread westward and southward in Africa, various elements of indigenous religious systems became absorbed into and then altered strictly Islamic beliefs. For example, the Islamic tradition includes provisions for a variety of spirits and supernatural beings, as long as Allah is still recognized as the only God. Muslims in Mauritania believe in various lesser spirits apparently transformed from pre-Islamic faiths into Islamic spirits. Mauritanian Muslims, however, do not emphasize the Islamic concepts of the eternal soul and of reward or punishment in an afterlife.
The shahadah (profession of faith, or testimony) states succinctly the central belief, "There is no God but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his Prophet." The faithful repeat this simple profession on ritual occasions, and its recital designates the speaker as a Muslim. The God preached by Muhammad was known to his countrymen, for Allah is the general Arabic term for the supreme being rather than the name of a particular deity. Rather than introducing a new deity, Muhammad denied the existence of the pantheon of gods and spirits worshiped before his prophethood and declared the omnipotence of God, the unique creator. The term Islam means submission to God, and a person who submits is a Muslim.
Muhammad is the "Seal of the Prophets," the last of the prophetic line. His revelations are said to complete for all time the series of revelations that had been given earlier to Christians and Jews. God is believed to have remained one and the same throughout time, but men are seen as having misunderstood or strayed from his true teachings until set aright by Muhammad. Prophets and sages of the biblical tradition, such as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus, are recognized as inspired vehicles of God's will. Islam, however, reveres as sacred only the message, rejecting Christianity's deification of the messenger. It accepts the concepts of guardian angels, the Day of Judgment, resurrection, and the eternal life of the soul.
The duties of the Muslim form the "five pillars" of the faith: the shahadah, salat (daily prayer), zakat (almsgiving), sawm (fasting), and hajj (pilgrimage). The believer prays facing Mecca five times a day. Whenever possible, men pray in congregation at a mosque under direction of an imam, or prayer leader, and on Fridays are obliged to do so. Women are permitted to attend public worship at the mosque, where they are segregated from the men, but their attendance tends to be discouraged, and more frequently they pray in the seclusion of their homes.
In the early days of Islam, a tax for charitable purposes was imposed on personal property in proportion to the owner's wealth; the payment purified the remaining wealth and made it religiously legitimate. The collection of this tax and its distribution to the needy were originally functions of the state. With the decentralization of Muslim religious and political authority as Islam spread to many countries, however, this became an individual responsibility.
The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, celebrated as the time during which the Quran was revealed to Muhammad. It is a period during which Muslims must abstain from food, drinking, smoking, and sexual activity during the daylight hours. Exempted are the sick, soldiers on duty, travelers on necessary journeys, young children, and menstruating, pregnant, or lactating women. The well-to-do accomplish little work during this period, and many businesses close or operate on reduced schedules. Since the months of the lunar calendar revolve through the solar year, Ramadan occurs during various seasons.
Finally, at least once during their lifetime, all Muslims should if possible make the hajj to the holy city of Mecca to participate in the special rites that occur during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar. Upon completion of this and certain other ritual assignments, the returning pilgrim is entitled to an honorific title, Haj (fem., Hajjah).
In addition to prescribing specific duties, Islam imposes a code of conduct entailing generosity, fairness, honesty, and respect for others. It proscribes adultery, gambling, usury, and the consumption of carrion, blood, pork, and alcohol. The proscription of alcohol is irregularly enforced in most Muslim countries, but since 1986 the Mauritanian government has strictly enforced its prohibition.
Muslims traditionally are subject to sharia, which--as interpreted by religious courts--covers most aspects of life. Sharia was developed by jurists from the Quran and from the traditions of the Prophet, and it provides a complete pattern for human conduct. Sharia also serves as a normative legal code.
The religious movement known as Sufism arose in the thirteenth century in reaction to the orthodox emphasis on law and its denial of the mystical or emotional needs of the human spirit. Sufism stressed the intuitive and emotional discovery of Allah by the faithful, and it interpreted the Quran as providing a key to the mystic union or personal friendship of individuals with God. The mystical elements of Sufism also facilitated the blending of Islamic beliefs and pre-Islamic religious concepts. With the rise of Sufi concepts came acceptance of the role of "intercessors" between the individual and God, which led to the formation of brotherhoods (tariqas, or "ways") and recognition of holy men (marabouts). From the thirteenth century, the brotherhoods and the marabouts were perhaps the most important elements in the growth and development of Islam in West Africa.
Essentially stemming from the combination of Sufi mysticism and orthodox Sunni intellectualism, the Islamic brotherhoods have also been important as a unifying cultural and religious force. Because membership in a brotherhood cut across ethnic and tribal lines, it contributed to the development of a broad communal identity.
The brotherhoods are all extremely hierarchical. Each has a chief who initiates all members and delegates certain responsibilities and authority to other leadership levels. Brotherhood members generally live in the secular communities of their tribes rather than in a central location, although they may live in separate communities while they are undergoing instruction. Thus, the religious community is more spiritual than physical for most brotherhood members, even though there is a central territory (zawiya; pl., zawaya) for an order or for its important branches.
The leaders of the brotherhoods are believed to have baraka, a supernatural gift that has been defined variously as "blessing" or "mystical power." In a general sense, baraka is more than a spiritual force or power. It is a complex of positive personal traits--moral, intellectual, and emotional--with which only some men are endowed and which sets these men apart from others in their group. Originally it was believed that baraka was invested only in the descendants of Muhammad. With the rise of Sufism and the growth of the brotherhoods, however, it became a quality that could be transmitted to other religious leaders or to anyone judged particularly worthy.
In the 1980s, two brotherhoods, the Qadiriya and the Tijaniya, accounted for nearly all the brotherhood membership in Mauritania. The Qadiriya and Tijaniya were essentially parallel "ways," differing primarily in their methods of reciting the litanies. Their Islamic doctrines and their religious obligations were basically similar. Two smaller brotherhoods also existed-- the Chadeliya, centered in Boumdeït in Tagant Region, and the Goudfiya, found in the regions of Tagant, Adrar, Hodh ech Chargui, and Hodh el Gharbi.
The Qadiriya is the largest and most highly organized brotherhood in Mauritania. Founded in Mesopotamia in the twelfth century by Abd al Kader al Jilani, it spread to Africa in the fifteenth century. Like all brotherhoods, the Qadiriya includes some emotional mystical elements, but it also stresses learning and Islamic education as the way to find God. All members of the Qadiriya are directed to follow the precepts of humility, generosity, and respect for their neighbors regardless of religious beliefs or social standing.
The Qadiriya brotherhood has had two main branches in Mauritania, the Sidiya and the Fadeliya. Although the Sidiya has been most influential in the vicinity of Trarza--where the family and followers of the brotherhood's founder, Shaykh Sidiya Baba, were centered--it has also been important in Brakna, Tagant, and Adrar. The Fadeliya, founded in the early nineteenth century by Mohammad Fadel, has been centered in Oualâta and Atar.
Ahmed al Tijani, an Algerian Berber, founded the Tijaniya brotherhood in 1781. Its rituals tend to be simpler than those of the Qadiriya, and its members are not expected to pursue Islamic learning to the same extent. Essentially a missionary order, the Tijaniya brotherhood has spread in many areas of West Africa at the expense of the Qadiriya. One explanation for its expansion may be that the simpler and more flexible Tijaniya teachings are better suited for modern life.
Tijaniya precepts include injunctions against lying, stealing, cheating, and killing. These precepts insist that promises and obligations be honored, neighbors be loved, and superiors be obeyed. Members are to deprive no one of his freedom without cause and are to reflect continually on God in prayer. Although the Tijaniya recognizes that everyone sins, it suggests that loyal members of the brotherhood will be rewarded in an afterlife.
The Tijaniya has two branches in Mauritania, the Hadefiste (or Hafediste) and the Omariya. Little is known about the Hadefiste. The Omariya branch was founded by a Toucouleur, El Hadj Omar, in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The membership of the Omariya is largely Toucouleur, but many Soninké, Fulbe, and Wolof also belong to this order. A subdivision of the Omariya, the Hamallya, was founded in the early twentieth century by Sherif Hamallah. The Hamallya emphasizes mystical Islamic beliefs more than most of the other brotherhoods and stresses the equality of all mankind. Drawn from the Fulbe and from mixed Maure groups, Hamallya membership initially included ex-slaves, young people, and women. This group has tended to be extremist, and the main Tijaniya brotherhood claims it is not a true Tijaniya group.
The leader of a brotherhood, called shaykh by the Maures, is often referred to as a marabout. This term, however, is a general title that applies to any religious leader or to any person who performs the functions traditionally associated with Islam. In a religion without formal clergy, the marabout represents the human element in the faith, the intermediary between the people and Islamic theology. The marabout exercises a moral and spiritual influence within the culture and propagates the faith by teaching, proselytizing, and--at least in the past--wielding political influence. Marabouts usually are associated with a brotherhood and, like the leaders of the brotherhoods, are believed to possess baraka.
The functions of a marabout include teaching and promoting Islamic culture; leading religious recitations (including chants in some cases) in community prayer; and performing rites connected with curing the ill, preventing misfortune, and soothsaying. Because illness is believed to have spiritual as well as physiological causes, the marabout is called upon to help cure the sick. The marabout also makes, uses, and sells amulets and talismans that are believed to have mystical powers to protect their bearer from sickness, injury, and other misfortune.
Other functions of the marabout include negotiation, mediation, and activities related to peacekeeping; the granting of protection and asylum to individuals; and the acting as advisers and agents of important tribal leaders. Although the role of the marabout as political adviser to warring tribes or groups has diminished, many of these mediation or arbitration tasks have political overtones.
Source: U.S. Library of Congress
In the 1980s, Mauritanian society was a collection of distinct, stratified ethnic groups that showed little evidence of social cohesion or national identity. The process of creating national institutions or professional classes had hardly begun. For most Mauritanians, loyalty to family, lineage, and ethnic group far outweighed allegiance to the state or to national institutions. Ethnicity, social position, and caste identity remained strong, conditioning the processes of state formation and administration.
During the colonial period, Mauritania's social structure had come to reflect the impact of French administrative preferences. Individuals, families, and dominant clans attempted to use the colonial presence to maintain or improve their privileged status. Among the Maures, for example, the zawaya tribes at first used their control of religious education to dominate economically and politically. This was accomplished at the expense of the hassani, who had made the transition from warriors, raiders, and tribute collectors to pastoralists, traders, and low-level civil servants. However, the French generally employed Wolof and Toucouleur, rather than Maures, as low-level civil servants. By 1960 black Africans were the majority of the colonial administration's civil servants and played a much larger role in the modern employment sector than did either the hassani or the zawaya.
After independence was granted in 1960, Mauritanian society changed faster than it had during the colonial period. This era saw the beginnings of urbanization, the founding of a permanent capital, the establishment of national organizations such as trade unions, and the expansion of education facilities and literacy. It also brought a reorientation away from West Africa toward the Maghrib as the number of white Maures in the government increased. Secular education, heretofore largely the preserve of black Africans, increased significantly among Maures. White Maures attempted to give Mauritania a distinct Arab-Berber character and in doing so often alienated the black population. At the same time, Maures developed a sense of ethnic identity and unity that had not existed before independence.
By the 1980s, the ranks of the bureaucracy and military included both white Maures and black Africans, but the distribution of professionals in these ranks varied widely. In the late 1970s, studies indicated that black Africans generally formed a larger proportion of the salaried professional class than did white Maures, whereas the opposite was the case among wage earners and general laborers. Continuing the colonial pattern, the Toucouleur and the Wolof were well represented in higher and mid-level professional ranks, and the Soninké were beginning to penetrate the lower and mid-level ranks. White Maures and black Africans were almost equally represented at the highest bureaucratic levels.
Considerable tension existed between Maures and black Africans in the late 1980s. Many Maures still viewed black Africans as people who should be under Maure control, a perception especially evident among more traditional Maure tribes of the north. Many blacks, however, considered Maures (especially white Maures) to be ignorant, lazy, and inefficient. They also saw white Maures as slaveholders. Thus, they feared growing Maure political and social dominance.
These attitudes intensified during the 1980s. Despite official denials, many black Africans complained of widespread racial discrimination in political and economic areas. They pointed to the disproportionate number of Arab-Berbers at the top of the government bureaucracy and military command, to Mauritania's close ties with the Arab world, and to the emphasis on the use of Arabic in national life to support these complaints.
Another issue that exacerbated racial tensions during the 1980s was access to land along the Senegal River. As plans for economic development along the river valley progressed, blacks feared that wealthy white Maures would buy up productive land in areas traditionally claimed by blacks. Desertification of once- fertile lands farther north added to the competition for better watered land in southern Mauritania.
As in many newly independent countries with marked ethnic and linguistic diversity, the selection of national and official languages heightened intergroup tensions. At independence, Hassaniya Arabic was given "national" language status, while French remained an "official" language. In 1966, however, the government made Hassaniya Arabic an official language along with French and required that Arabic be taught in secondary schools, a requirement that brought protests from Mauritania's blacks.
In the late 1980s, blacks continued to protest against the compulsory study of Arabic and complained that their lack of proficiency in the language was used to block their advancement in the bureaucracy and military. Blacks could still choose to be educated in French, however, and French retained its status as an official language. The government also permitted primary-level instruction in several of Mauritania's African languages.
Economic development has altered traditional social organization, particularly among groups near centers of modernization. Rapid urbanization has accelerated these changes. The importance of lineage endogamy has declined among Maures, and customary marriage patterns have begun to change. By the late 1980s, urban Mauritanians paid less attention to distant segments of their lineages, and they seldom reckoned their kin-group membership back more than five generations.
Economic functions of the various black African and Maure caste groups were becoming less rigid; social patterns, therefore, also were becoming more fluid. An increasing number of Mauritanians were involved in work unrelated to traditional caste occupations. Although the customary social distinctions associated with traditional stratification patterns remained and individuals were still identified socially as members of particular castes, there were indications that caste designations were becoming less important socially and economically. In addition, government efforts to modernize and commercialize the activities of craftsmen and fishermen resulted in some rise in the social status of these groups.
If the pace of change was slow in Mauritanian society as a whole, it was even slower in the area of slavery. Slavery was abolished in 1960 and again in 1980. Mauritanian authorities acknowledged the continued existence of slavery and took limited steps to eradicate it, but in 1981 observers estimated that at least 100,000 people were still slaves and 300,000 were ex- slaves.
In 1974 a group of escaped slaves formed an emancipation movement known as El Hor (Freedom). By the late 1970s, El Hor began to achieve some notable successes; the 1980 decree abolishing slavery was owed at least in part to El Hor's agitation, as were fact-finding missions by the London Anti- Slavery Society (1981) and the UN (1984). Building on these achievements, El Hor continued to press for specific laws to ensure that emancipation became a reality and that former slaves enjoyed equal rights and treatment.
Factors that conditioned the role of women in Mauritanian society in the late 1980s included the impact of Islam and sharia (Islamic law); West African influences that allowed women substantial independence in some social and economic areas; economic modernization, which challenged customary behavior patterns in some areas; and Mauritania's rapid pace of urbanization, which subjected traditional nomadic customs to new scrutiny. Many women in such urban centers as Nouakchott, for example, were born in the rural interior of the country and found their childhood training challenged by changing urban social conditions.
Girls' education took place primarily at home and emphasized homemaking skills. Some girls attended Quranic schools, but their training was usually limited to learning verses from the Quran and attaining minimal literacy skills. A mother's responsibility toward her daughter traditionally included instruction in household and family affairs and childrearing. In recent decades, fathers were responsible for financing any formal education for their children, but a father's most important responsibility toward his daughters was to prepare them for marriage, primarily by ensuring their physical attractiveness. A widespread practice was forced feeding (gavage). Forced feeding usually involved psychological pressure, rather than physical force, but it often required a family to reserve substantial quantities of food--in most cases, milk--for consumption by its pre-teenage daughters, whose beauty was a measure of a father's commitment to the marriage alliances they would form. Many young women were betrothed or married by the age of eight or ten. Unmarried teenage girls were subjected to severe social criticism.
Divorce was fairly common in Mauritanian society in the 1980s, even among very traditional villagers. A divorced man suffered no social stigma, but a divorced woman could still become an outcast if her family or her former husband's family criticized her behavior. Women traditionally had cared for their homes and worked in limited agricultural pursuits; but by the 1980s, they were beginning to enter professions formerly closed to them, such as commerce, teaching, and a variety of skilled occupations.
By 1985 nearly one-fourth of all girls below the age of eleven attended primary school, a marked increase over enrollment figures just a decade earlier. More women were attending secondary schools and university, and in 1987 Khadijatou Bint Ahmed, Mauritania's minister of mines and industry, became the nation's first female cabinet official.
In the late 1980s, Mauritania was still in the early stages of developing a modern education system. Although Islamic education had long been an important part of life, this religious instruction involved only rote learning of the Quran. Few Mauritanians possessed skills necessary to create a modern nation-state.
The government has consistently stressed the need for improved and expanded education programs and in the 1980s was actively pursuing these goals. While modern, skill-oriented programs were being established to help satisfy the growing needs for skilled workers and technicians, efforts also were under way to expand traditional Islamic education. Expanding Quranic education has been viewed as necessary to preserve Islamic cultural tradition and promote national unity.
Mauritania has long had an extensive but scattered education system consisting of the religious and cultural education provided by marabouts. Indeed, it was largely through the efforts of these teachers that Islam was spread throughout West Africa. Although in the past Islamic education was largely limited to fundamental religious teaching, the children of white Maures often studied Arabic and simple arithmetic as well. Both boys and girls received traditional education, at first within the family and later in the local Quranic schools operated by the marabouts. They usually began their education around the age of eight, the boys studying for about seven years, the girls for perhaps only two.
Traditional Islamic schools were found in the nomadic communities and in settled villages. Because particularly renowned marabout teachers would be surrounded by families who wished their children to learn from these masters, several centers of more advanced Islamic learning developed around the camps of these marabouts. In these centers, students learned grammar, logic, and other subjects, as well as traditional religious subjects. Many of the centers developed sizable collections of manuscripts through the efforts of the great marabouts.
The tradition of religious learning centers continued through the late colonial period. The Institute of Islamic Studies, founded in 1955 at Boutilimit, was the only Islamic institution of higher learning in West Africa. It provided instruction in traditional Islamic subjects and teaching methods. After independence, it was moved to Nouakchott, where it continued to draw upon the manuscript collection built by the marabouts of Boutilimit as well as other libraries of traditional Islamic literature in Chinguetti, Kaédi, Mederdra, Oualâta, and Tidjikdja.
The French colonial administration established a system of public schools in Mauritania. The French schools were largely concentrated in the sedentary communities in the Senegal River Valley. In 1950 the first teacher training school was established at Boutilimit, and in 1957 the secondary school in Rosso also began training teachers. In part because public schools were concentrated in the south, black Africans enrolled in large numbers. As a result, the overwhelming majority of public school teachers were black, and blacks came to dominate the nation's secular intelligentsia.
The few French schools located in nomadic areas had difficulty attracting students. The Maures in particular were reluctant to accept the public schools and continued to favor purely Islamic instruction. Gradually, however, they began to send their children to public schools, as they saw that traditional religious training was not preparing their children for life in the twentieth century. The French also experimented with "mobile schools" after World War II, and in this way they provided public education for a larger number of nomads. In 1954 there were twelve so-called "tent" schools serving 241 students. At least some of these tent schools continued to function after independence.
The independent government viewed secular education as one of the major methods to promote national unity, as well as a necessary step toward the development of a modern economy. It still faced shortages of funds, adequately trained teaching staff, and classroom facilities at all levels. Another teacher training school was opened in Nouakchott in 1964.
School attendance was not compulsory, and in 1964-65 only 19,100 primary-school students and 1,500 secondary-school students--about 14 percent of school-age children--were enrolled. By 1985 an estimated 35 percent of primary-school-age children were enrolled in school, but only about 4 to 10 percent of eligible secondary-school-age children were enrolled. In both cases, boys heavily outnumbered girls.
In 1985-86 primary-school enrollments had climbed to 140,871, and enrollments in secondary and vocational schools amounted to 34,674. The government reported a total of 878 primary schools and 44 secondary or vocational institutions. A total of 4,336 students were enrolled in postsecondary training programs. An additional 448 students were attending the National Islamic Institute (formerly the Institute of Islamic Studies), and some 1,900 Mauritanians were enrolled in various training programs abroad. The public schools employed almost 2,900 primary teachers, 1,563 secondary and vocational teachers (412 of them foreign), and 237 postsecondary instructors, more than half of them expatriates. In 1982 the National College of Administration and the National College of Sciences opened in Nouakchott, and in 1983 nearly 1,000 students began instruction at the University of Nouakchott.
Illiteracy remained a major problem and an important impediment to economic and social development. In 1985 the adult literacy rate was estimated at 17 to 25 percent, approximately half the average for sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, this rate represented an improvement over the estimated 5 percent literacy rate at independence and 10 percent a decade later. Recognizing the need for a better educated work force, in mid-1986 the government launched a major literacy campaign and created the State Secretariat of Culture, Information, and Telecommunications to head the effort. That same year, the government reported that the number of literacy classes had already increased more than ten times over the 1985 number.
At the same time, the cost of education was quite high in comparison with neighboring countries. In the mid-1980s, Mauritania was spending about US$45 million (20 percent of current expenditures) on education every year. Its costs for primary schooling were the highest per student in francophone West Africa, and only Côte d'Ivoire exceeded the cost per secondary pupil. These high costs were due in part to teachers' salaries, particularly those of expatriates, and to a generous system of scholarships. Planned investment in education for the years 1985 through 1988 was set at US$27 million under the Economic Recovery Program for 1985-88, an increase of less than 1 percent over the period from 1980 through 1984.
The French system of primary and secondary schools remained in force into the late 1980s. Over the years, however, some significant changes had been made, and others were planned. In the early 1980s, instruction in Pulaar, Azayr (Soninké), and Wolof was introduced into the primary school curriculum, and Arabic was emphasized at all levels. The official policy of gradually replacing French with local languages and Arabic, adopted in the late 1970s, drew vigorous protests from Frenchspeaking black Mauritanians and was abandoned within a decade.
Mauritania remained critically short of skilled labor. In the mid-1980s, only about 15 percent of secondary-school students were enrolled in vocational education. To redress this situation and to raise the general level of literacy, the government encouraged the growth of private and Quranic schools; most industrial training took place in private institutions. More important, the government also turned to the international community. In 1987 the World Bank agreed to help make Mauritania's education system more responsive to the country's development needs. Proposed changes involved expanding primary education and restructuring secondary schooling. Special attention was to be given to vocational training in areas of particular national need, such as water engineering and fisheries.
Despite the central government's good intentions and some health care planning, health care and medical facilities in Mauritania remained inadequate in the late 1980s. Most Mauritanians, especially those who inhabited rural areas, did not have access to modern health care facilities. Nouakchott and the provincial centers had facilities, but even in these locales health care was rudimentary. Planned public investment in health and social services for the years 1985 through 1988 was projected at only US$2.5 million. While this doubled the amount spent from 1980 through 1984, it was still inadequate to meet the country's needs.
Mauritania's health care infrastructure in the early 1980s consisted of a central hospital in Nouakchott, twelve regional hospitals, a number of health clinics, maternal and child care centers, dispensaries, and mobile medical units to serve the countryside. All facilities suffered from a lack of equipment, supplies, and trained personnel. The ratio of people to hospital beds was 2,610 to one. The ratio of people to physicians was 13,350 to one. This ratio represented an improvement over the 1965 figure of 36,580 to one and was better than that of some of Mauritania's neighbors.
In 1987 Mauritania's largest medical facility was the 500-bed government-run hospital in Nouakchott. Staffed by Mauritanian and expatriate doctors, it lacked supplies and properly maintained equipment. Other facilities included the National Health Center, built in 1977 for the study of disease prevention and methods of public health care education, and the National School of Nurses and Midwives, founded in 1966 to train nurses, midwives, and paramedical personnel.
In general, health standards were quite low, and many infectious diseases were endemic. Contagious diseases (such as measles and tuberculosis) and respiratory disorders were more prevalent in northern arid regions, whereas malaria, guinea worm infection, and schistosomiasis were more common in the Senegal River Valley. The desert tended to be a healthier environment than the more tropical south, but several major diseases were common to all areas of the country. Typhoid, poliomyelitis, hepatitis, and a variety of parasitic illnesses also affected the population. In late 1987, the World Health Organization issued warnings about cholera, and outbreaks of both yellow fever and Rift Valley fever were reported in the extreme southern part of Trarza Region around Rosso. Contagious and infectious diseases were rampant in the kébés surrounding major towns, cities, and villages.
In the mid-1980s, a mass vaccination campaign for children under five years of age was under way. The program, aimed at reducing infection from poliomyelitis, diphtheria, pertussis, and several other diseases, was reportedly meeting with some success. Malnutrition remained widespread, especially in children. The long-term drought and the consequent drop in food production exacerbated this problem during the early 1980s. According to a 1987 report by the United States Agency for International Development, between 40 percent and 70 percent of children under the age of five had experienced moderate to severe malnutrition. The degree of malnutrition varied according to the success or failure of local crops, and some slight improvement was noted in early 1987.
AT INDEPENDENCE IN 1960, Mauritania embarked on an ambitious but ill-conceived development plan to construct large-scale industrial projects in the mining, energy, and manufacturing sectors. The failure of many of these projects left the nation saddled with one of the largest foreign debt burdens in the world in proportion to the size of its economy. In the late 1980s, Mauritania's economy continued to rely heavily on the earnings derived from the export of iron ore and fish. The economy also remained seriously hampered by a structural inability to feed the country's population. Even in nondrought years, large amounts of food aid were needed to supplement domestic production and commercial food imports.
Until the mid-1980s, iron ore mining was the motor of economic development in Mauritania. Exploitation of rich, highgrade iron ore deposits began in 1963. In the 1960s, mining directly provided almost one-third of the gross domestic product (GDP) and contributed more than 80 percent of the country's export earnings. Mauritania also began mining copper deposits in 1973; the mine closed in 1975, however, because of falling world copper prices. The worldwide recession that caused a fall in demand for copper also affected iron exports. Iron mining stagnated during the later 1970s. By the mid-1980s, the mining sector had lost its predominance in the economy, accounting for between 10 and 11 percent of GDP in fiscal year (FY) 1984, and by 1985 export earnings from mining had fallen to around 40 percent.
The waters off the coast of Mauritania are among the richest fishing grounds in the world. Before 1979, however, the government exercised little control over foreign fishing operations, and Mauritanians took little part in fishing. Fishing and fish processing accounted for less than 5 percent of GDP in 1975, and virtually the only revenues obtained were in the form of royalties on fishing licenses paid by foreign fishing companies to the government. In 1979 Mauritania established its New Fisheries Policy and a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The industry underwent rapid growth under the new policy, which required foreign operators to form joint ventures with Mauritanian companies and resulted in the development of a national fishing fleet.
Although in 1984 fishing contributed less than 10 percent to GDP at current market prices, the volume of reported fish exports rose rapidly. In 1983 fishing became the number one foreign exchange earner with some 54 percent of export revenues. Fishing, together with mining, employed about 9 percent of the economically active population.
Through the 1970s, agriculture, including herding, continued to deteriorate. Serious droughts combined with economic neglect to cause a severe decline in farm production. Both herding and agriculture were hard hit by the droughts: their combined contributions to GDP dropped from about 40 percent in the 1960s to about 25 percent in 1986.
In the early 1960s, Mauritania produced about half of its grain needs. After dropping to an all-time low of about 3 to 5 percent of its grain needs during the drought years of 1983-85, production rebounded somewhat to about one-third of need in 1986. Although the vast majority of the people remained attached to the traditional agro-pastoral life of the countryside, this life was becoming extremely difficult. Desertification advanced in some areas at a rate of six kilometers per year. Increasingly, refugees from the countryside began to migrate to urban centers such as Nouakchott. With the exception of a few scattered oases, farming was limited to the narrow band along the Senegal River.
As recently as the mid-1970s, only 20 percent of Mauritania's total population were sedentary farmers. Between 1975 and 1980, their contribution to GDP averaged 3 to 5 percent. During the same period, the pastoral herding sector of the economy constituted about 20 percent of GDP and engaged 60 to 70 percent of the total population. Of the states in West Africa, Mauritania had the highest ratio of cattle to people, a ratio of three to one. The livestock-to-crop ratio of GDP also was the highest for West Africa, as animal husbandry contributed four times as much to GDP as did farming.
The cumulative effects of drought and weak demand for Mauritania's iron exports, along with the heavy expenses of the war in the Western Sahara during the mid-1970s, curtailed the rapid growth of the 1960s that had been marked by an average rise in GDP of 8 percent a year. During the late 1970s and the 1980s, the economy stagnated, and financial instability supplanted an earlier ability to meet foreign debt obligations. From 1974 to 1984, GDP growth averaged 2.3 percent, barely keeping pace with population growth. In 1986 GDP per capita income was estimated at US$410, no higher in real terms than a decade earlier, placing Mauritania at the lower end of low- to middle-income developing countries. Real per capita income for the vast majority of the population outside the small modern sector was much lower, estimated in the range of US$100 to US$150 per year.
<>ROLE OF THE
GOVERNMENT
<>FISHING
<>MINING
<>THE RURAL ECONOMY
<>INDUSTRY
<>BANKING
Since independence in 1960, the government has played the central role in development planning and economic management. In 1963 the government inaugurated the first of a series of fourand five-year development plans. Covering the period 1963-67, the first plan had two primary goals: reducing Mauritania's dependence on external finances (principally French) and foreign personnel and laying the foundation for economic development through a series of basic studies of the country's resources. The plan gave investment priority to processing facilities in the mining industry (30 percent of total programmed financing), urban development (15 percent), and transportation and communications (12 percent). The plan neglected the rural sector, however; only 9 percent of programmed financing was earmarked for agriculture and livestock, nearly all of which went for construction and maintenance of small dams and wells and for meat packing and storage plants. Virtually no money was allocated for improving agriculture and livestock production techniques. In 1963, in pursuit of the plan's first objective, the government requested a halt to French subsidies to the current operating budget. Nevertheless, French development assistance continued and was critical to investment plans that favored the partly French-owned iron mines that opened in 1963.
In the second (1970-74) and third (1976-80) development plans, Mauritania asserted an independent national economic identity and established the framework of the public sector. In 1973 Mauritania withdrew from the French-backed West African Monetary Union (Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine--UMOA) and created an independent central bank and national currency, the ouguiya. In 1974 the government nationalized the mining sector, and enterprises engaged in basic public services and "mauritanized" staff positions throughout the newly expanded public sector. Planners continued to focus on investment in mining and infrastructure (roads in particular). Between 1970 and 1975, mining received 39 percent of a planned total expenditure of UM8.9 billion, and roads received 20 percent. The rural sector continued to lag, as the government allocated to it only 7 percent of total development spending.
The government that came to power in 1978 adopted a fourth five-year development plan (1981-85) and a stabilization program that had International Monetary Fund (IMF) support. The stabilization program called for tighter controls on government spending, more stringent tax collection, and major debt rescheduling. The five-year plan had three objectives: the development of irrigated agriculture, the rehabilitation of the iron mining sector, and the construction of a national fishing industry.
Public enterprises emerged rapidly during the 1970s and by 1985 totaled more than 100 entities. Through these parastatal enterprises, the government brought under national control the exploitation of the country's natural resources and the provision of basic public services--functions that were still largely in foreign hands as late as the mid-1970s. By the mid-1980s, public enterprises generated about 20 percent of GDP and employed some 14,000 people, thus providing about 25 percent of recorded employment in the modern sector. By 1986 the parastatal companies included twenty-five largely government-owned industrial and commercial enterprises, twenty-seven joint ventures with the private sector, and fifty-six decentralized services in administration, research, and education. The largest public enterprise was the National Mining and Industrial Company (Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière--SNIM).
The majority of the larger, wholly government-owned enterprises operated in principle on a commercial basis. Nevertheless, since the late 1970s they have operated at a loss, and many have failed to provide the services for which they were responsible. Direct government operating subsidies to these public enterprises were modest, totaling only 3 percent of government expenditures in 1983. Their losses (in addition to undelivered services) reverted to the government, however, because they failed to pay tax liabilities and the government assumed their debts. In 1986 public enterprises owed 25 percent of Mauritania's total public external debt.
The poor performance of public enterprises had a variety of causes, including a paucity of technical and professional skills among increasingly "mauritanized" staffs, a poor definition of roles and responsibilities, inadequate pricing policies, weak accounting practices, and overstaffing. In 1983 the government launched a program to reform and rehabilitate the public sector, and this program continued under the 1985-88 Economic Recovery Program and the 1987 Structural Adjustment Program agreements with the World Bank. Under the original 1983 program, no new public enterprises were to be established unless they could be economically justified; public enterprises were to be reviewed and nominated for liquidation, privatization, or rehabilitation; subsidies were to be phased out; and pricing policies were to be revised to reflect economic costs. In addition, interlocking relationships between the central government and individual enterprises were to be more clearly defined and enterprise debt arrears settled; excess staff was to be trimmed, hiring of new unskilled staff was to be frozen, and a new salary scale was to be established. Finally, substantial improvements in budgeting, accounting, and auditing procedures were to be introduced.
By 1987 progress in achieving these goals was impressive. The government had implemented selective rehabilitation of five large public enterprises. It also had privatized three others and begun liquidating five more.
The government's plan included privatizing three of the country's eight public financial institutions. In 1984 it settled interlocking debts of fifteen important enterprises through compensation, cancellation, and refinancing. In 1985, under new pricing policies, regulated producer prices paid to farmers by the Commission for Food Security (Commissariat à la Sécurité Alimentaire--CSA) rose by 40 percent. At the same time, the CSA raised the price of subsidized food aid on sale by 50 percent. The National Import-Export Company (Société Nationale d'Importation et d'Exportation--SONIMEX) raised consumer prices for food and basic commodity goods by approximately 30 percent to reflect real costs and to achieve full import parity on grain prices at the Senegalese border. Water and electricity prices rose by 10 percent, and port services fees rose by 25 percent, in part to compensate for the 1985 currency devaluation. The government reduced labor costs at SNIM, where it cut the work force by 25 percent. By the end of 1987, public sector management, wage policies, training, accounting procedures, and policies governing relations between the public enterprises and the central government all were under intensive review by the World Bank and the international donor community.
The waters off the 754-kilometer-long coast of Mauritania are among the richest fishing grounds in the world. In 1986 estimates of the country's potential annual marine resources ranged between 400,000 and 700,000 tons. Mauritanian officials estimated the potential annual catch at 525,000 tons, a level close to that of Senegal, which had the largest fishing industry in West Africa. The actual catch, however, could only be estimated on the basis of export figures from Mauritania, recorded catches of licensed operators, and estimates of unrecorded and unlicensed catches. Unrecorded and unlicensed fishing in Mauritania's waters were believed to be high, perhaps in excess of 100,000 tons annually. In 1983 recorded exports and declared licensed fishing catches were estimated at 450,000 tons. Combining these figures, experts believed Mauritania's waters were close to being overfished. Although these waters had long been commercially exploited by foreign fleets, Mauritanians historically had done little fishing. The majority Maure population consumed little fish, and only the small Imraguen ethnic group fished for subsistence.
Until 1979, Mauritania's efforts to exploit the economic benefits of its fishing grounds focused on licensing foreign operators in territorial waters (confined until 1980 to a thirty- nautical-mile limit). These efforts, coupled with some port and processing development designed to attract fleets to land their catches at Nouadhibou, were only partially successful. The principal benefit came in the form of licensing royalties, calculated on the basis of 10 percent of an operator's reported catch. Because Mauritania had no means of patrolling its waters, many foreign operators were never licensed, and licensed operators consistently underreported their catches. Nevertheless, revenues from fishing royalties were very important to the government and in 1977-78 accounted for almost 20 percent of total budget receipts. In addition, the port and processing facilities were underused. In 1967 only 35 percent of the 52,000- ton annual processing capacity was used. Foreign operators preferred to use the facilities at Las Palmas, in Spain's Canary Islands, where they could avoid the supply, handling, water, and electric power shortages prevalent at Nouadhibou.
In 1979 Mauritania initiated its New Fisheries Policy and established a 200-nautical-mile EEZ. The New Fisheries Policy had three objectives: the formation of Mauritanian-controlled joint ventures, the creation of a national fishing fleet, and the establishment of a Mauritanian-controlled fish processing industry at Nouadhibou.
The first of these objectives led to the replacement of licensing and royalties agreements with foreign operators by newly formed Mauritanian-controlled joint ventures. In principle, such joint ventures implied a 43 percent government share, an 8 percent local private sector share, and a 49 percent foreign share. In practice, Mauritanian control of these ventures was nominal. The foreign partner provided all the capital and equipment and controlled all operations. Government and private shares were to be purchased out of venture profits over periods as long as twenty years. By 1986 the most important of the joint venture agreements that had been established was the Mauritanian- Soviet Maritime Resources Company (Mauritanienne-Soviétique des Ressources Maritimes--MAUSSOV). Between 1985 and 1987, MAUSSOV accounted for about 55 percent of total export tonnage and 20 to 30 percent of the total value of fish exports. The next most important joint venture was the Mauritanian-Romanian Fishing Company (Société Mauritano-Roumaine de Pêche--SIMAR). Between 1985 and 1987, SIMAR accounted for 16 to 18 percent of total export tonnage and 7 to 10 percent of the total value of fish exports. Other significant joint ventures were established with Algeria, Iraq, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea).
The development of a national fishing fleet and processing industry led to the creation in the early 1980s of two public enterprises. The government also participated in and lent support to several privately owned Mauritanian fishing and processing companies. The most important of these was the Mauritanian Commercial Fish Company (Société Mauritanienne de Commercialisation du Poisson--SMCP). Owning no boats or facilities, the SMCP was a marketing board that bought all fish landed at Nouadhibou. By the terms of their agreements, joint ventures were required to land a portion of their catches--in practice, only the more valuable demersal (sea-bottom) fish--for local processing. The SMCP arranged processing and cold storage at port facilities before resale and export. Between 1985 and 1987, the SMCP exported 14 to 17 percent of the total catch and accounted for 71 to 82 percent of the demersal catch, which translated into 75 to 88 percent of the value of demersal exports and 43 to 60 percent of the value of total fish exports. Another public enterprise, the Mauritanian Refrigeration Company (Société des Frigorifiques Mauritaniens--SOFRIMA), operated processing facilities as well as a fleet of fishing boats. Several small privately owned Mauritanian companies also operated facilities or fleets of fishing boats.
Between 1968 and 1974, processing capacity at Nouadhibou rose by 22 percent per year until it reached an annual capacity of around 140,000 tons. Between 1970 and 1979, however, companies landed between 50,000 and 80,000 tons of fish annually for processing at Nouadhibou--far below the port's capacity. During the first years of the New Fisheries Policy (1979 to 1982), tonnage landed dropped to under 10,000 tons. Once joint venture agreements were signed, however, average annual tonnage landed began to rise, reaching about 58,500 tons annually between 1984 and 1986. Joint venture companies built additional processing capacity, and by 1985 the port had an annual processing capacity of some 200,000 tons. Despite government policy requiring certain landings, however, at the rates companies were landing their catches, only 30 percent of the port's capacity was in use.
Because of poor services and high costs, Nouadhibou was unattractive to fishing fleets. Its principle problem was lack of handling equipment for quickly unloading frozen or iced fish from vessels to cold storage. In addition, fish spoiled quickly in the desert heat, and the high cost of electrical power for processing and cold storage (three times the cost at Las Palmas) made landing of any but the most valuable fish varieties uneconomical. In addition, supplies and equipment were not readily available. Many items had to be brought in on an emergency basis by air, further inflating the cost of operations. Local banking facilities were limited, and international communications were difficult and often unavailable. Finally, Nouadhibou--with only two small hotels and scant recreational opportunities--offered little attraction to crews of vessels calling at the port. For the most part, crews who used the port either stayed on ship, went directly to chartered flights home, or took commercial flights to recreational ports such as Las Palmas or Dakar. Thus, the local economy benefited little from their presence.
Compounding these problems, the types of fishing vessels in use and the economics of the international market in fish varieties also made Nouadhibou unattractive for fish processing. The most economical types of vessels in use in the mid-1980s were large trawlers capable of freezing, processing, and transshipping catches independently of any port. The largest were Atlantic- and Super Atlantic-class factory trawlers, built for the most part in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and operated by the Soviets and Romanians. In the mid-1980s, these ships accounted for the bulk of Mauritania's reported catch, including 85 percent of pelagic (open-sea) fish. Between 1985 and 1987, pelagic fish represented about 79 percent of the total catch. The pelagic catch included sardines, herring, tuna, and anchovies. Although it represented the bulk of tonnage caught, the pelagic catch included the least valuable of fish varieties in Mauritania's waters and was fished almost entirely by the Soviet and Romanian joint ventures. From 1985 to 1987, MAUSSOV and SIMAR accounted for 90 percent of the pelagic catch. Because of their size and draft, the Atlantic- and Super Atlantic-class pelagic freezer- factory trawlers could not enter Nouadhibou, and they transshipped their catches to refrigerated carrier vessels anchored outside the port.
The most valuable varieties of seafood in Mauritania's waters were demersals, including cod, sole, octopus, squid, lobster, and shrimp. For these varieties, joint ventures and local operators used demersal freezers and demersal ice boats. The ice boats had to unload their catches for processing at port before export, but the freezers were somewhat less dependent on port processing. In 1983 the government began requiring the landing and processing of all demersal catches at Nouadhibou under the SMCP monopoly. Between 1985 and 1987, the demersal catch was estimated at about 21 percent of the total catch, with the SMCP accounting for 71 to 81 percent of the demersal exports, representing as much as 60 percent of the total value of fish exports in those years.
Despite difficulties, the New Fisheries Policy was partially successful. Its adoption led to the formation of important joint venture operations and the growth of locally owned fishing fleets. Efforts to encourage local fishing brought some opportunity for sales to processors and exporters, estimated at 10,000 tons per year. In the 1983-85 period, 70 percent of the total estimated catch in Mauritanian waters was brought in by joint ventures and ships flying the Mauritanian flag. This activity generated approximately US$150 million in gross export receipts and made fishing the country's most important source of foreign exchange. The remaining 30 percent of the reported catch continued to be fished by companies under older licensing agreements. These older agreements were due to expire by 1988 and included, in particular, operations of the Spanish and Portuguese fleets. A comprehensive fishing agreement covering the operations of these and other European operators that mainly fished for demersals was under negotiation with the European Community (EC) in 1987. To better control the estimated 100,000 tons of fish taken by unlicensed trawlers, the government, the World Bank, and the donor community were considering measures to increase surveillance and reporting. In late 1987, studies sponsored by the World Bank and donor community were under way to determine ways to increase the value-added portion of the industry to GDP.
Mauritania's mineral wealth has been exploited since Neolithic times. Archeological evidence of a copper mining and refining site near Akjoujt in west-central Mauritania dates from 500 to 1000 B.C. Modern exploitation of copper at Akjoujt and the more important iron ore deposits between Fdérik and Zouîrât began after independence.
Plans to exploit the high-grade iron ore deposits at Kedia, near Zouîrât, began in 1952 with the formation of the privately owned Mauritanian Iron Mines Company (Société Anonyme des Mines de Fer de Mauritanie--MIFERMA). With support from the World Bank, the French government, and the Mauritanian government, MIFERMA (owned by French, British, Italian, and West German steel interests) began operations in 1963. By 1966 MIFERMA had invested the equivalent of some US$200 million in mining facilities at Kedia, port facilities at Nouadhibou, and a rail line to carry the ore to port for export.
Iron mining quickly dominated Mauritania's economy. In 1966, after only three years of operations, iron mining contributed 28 percent to GDP and accounted for 92 percent of the value of all exports. The three surface mines at Kedia had a rich ore content of 65 percent. Mined by explosives from the sides of tall rock formations, the ore was loaded on 100-ton trucks for transport to the railhead. There, the ore was also crushed and sorted. The ore was then loaded on the world's heaviest trains (200 cars carrying a total of 20,000 tons, pulled by four locomotives, and averaging two kilometers in length) for transport to Nouadhibou for export. Normally, there was one trip daily in each direction along the 650- kilometer line.
Iron mining provided the income for Mauritania's economic development during the first two decades of independence. Construction of the mine, rail, and port facilities provided wages to thousands of laborers. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the industry employed some 6,000 workers and accounted for about 10 percent of the jobs in the modern sector. Development of the mines and their associated infrastructure took the bulk of investment funds allocated under the first three national development plans. The iron mining industry had a substantial direct and indirect impact on the economy, and many industrial and construction enterprises worked primarily or exclusively for the iron company. By the mid- 1970s, iron operations consumed about 40 percent of the country's imports of fuel oil. At the same time, mining was responsible indirectly for about 25 percent of GDP because of its high consumption of public utilities (power and water), commerce, transportation, and services. Iron also provided nearly 30 percent of all government revenues, thereby making an important contribution to all public sector investment and current expenditures. By the early 1970s, the cumulative effects of the growth of iron mining on national accounts, along with rising demand and good world commodity prices, enabled Mauritania to be recategorized by the World Bank and United Nations (UN) from a "least developed country" to a "moderate-income developing country." This reclassification increased Mauritania's ability to borrow on the international market to finance its ambitious development plans.
The development of the iron mines also contributed directly to the country's rapid urbanization. At independence, the populations of Nouadhibou and Zouîrât were estimated at less than 5,000 each. By the mid-1970s, these two towns had more than quadrupled in size to around 20,000 to 30,000 people each. Mining revenues to the government also helped spur the growth of the administrative capital at Nouakchott, which grew from around 5,000 people in 1960 to over 125,000 people in the mid-1970s.
In 1974 Mauritania nationalized the mining industry as a part of its effort to establish economic independence under the second development plan. With substantial assistance from Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Mauritania bought out the European owners of MIFERMA. Transfer of ownership to the newly formed SNIM was smooth; the terms of the transfer kept the foreign expert personnel and managers on the job and maintained the commercial relationship with the former owners of MIFERMA.
The mid-1970s marked a turning point for Mauritania's economy. Two events adversely affected the mining sector. The first was the onset of the world recession in 1974 and 1975, caused by the sharp rise of world oil prices; the second was Mauritania's costly involvement in the Western Sahara conflict between 1976 and 1978. These events, along with a prolonged drought that began in the late 1960s, reversed Mauritania's iron- based economic growth.
From the beginning of mining operations in 1963, Mauritania's production and export of iron ore rose constantly for a decade. In 1974 ore exports reached their all-time high of 11.7 million tons. In the following year, with falling demand for steel in Western Europe, Mauritania's exports of iron ore declined by more than 25 percent, to 8.7 million tons. Between 1975 and 1987, iron ore exports averaged 8.5 million tons annually. Between 1976 and 1978, attacks on the rail line by the Polisario exacerbated the situation. In 1978 ore exports had fallen to 6.2 million tons. Mauritania's withdrawal from the war in mid-1978 allowed some recovery but did not affect the trend based on continued weak demand for iron ore on world markets.
By the late 1970s, the worsening economic situation created the first in a series of financial crises for the state, whose revenues fell with declining iron ore exports. This decline affected the government's ability to meet increasing foreign debt obligations. An immediate result of this financial crisis was the government's decision to reorganize the nationalized mining sector as a part of an IMF-supported stabilization program. Following nationalization in 1974, SNIM controlled not only iron mining but also copper and gypsum mining, as well as other industries and trading activities related to mining. The most important benefits of this arrangement for SNIM were control over the national distribution of petroleum products through the Petroleum Products Commercial Union (Union Commerciale des Produits Pétroliers--UCPP); control of the explosives industry (with factories in Nouadhibou and Nouakchott); and participation in the Arab Metal Industries Company (Société Arabe des Industries Metallurgiques--SAMIA), which planned and later operated a steel rolling mill at Nouadhibou. Until 1978 SNIM's operations were the direct responsibility of the president of the republic and were administered by a board of supervisors composed of twelve members from the various ministries under the chairmanship of the minister of planning and mines.
The reorganization carried out between 1978 and 1979 led to SNIM's divestiture of many of these operations, particularly those related to copper and gypsum mining and petroleum products distribution. The financial reorganization of SNIM resulted in the sale of about 30 percent of the company's shares to new foreign investors, including the Arab Mining Company, the Islamic Development Bank, the government of Morocco, the government of Iraq, and the Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting, and Investment Company.
The critical importance of iron ore mining to the economy was underscored in the late 1970s by the ripple effects its decline had on the country's ability to meet its debt obligations. Prospects that the industry would continue to decline throughout the 1980s as the older Kedia deposits were exhausted led the government, with World Bank support, to embark on the US$500 million Guelbs Iron Ore Project in 1979. The sale of US$120 million worth of SNIM shares to Arab investors was one means of raising the capital for this massive project. Further support was guaranteed by large loans from the World Bank, the Saudi Fund, France's Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique--CCCE), the Kuwait Fund, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Abu Dhabi Fund, and the European Investment Bank. Smaller loans were secured from the Japan Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, the African Development Bank, and the OPEC Special Fund.
In late 1984, the first phase of the Guelbs project went into operation with the opening of new surface mines at El Rheins, located in the Zouîrât district, about twenty-two kilometers from the Kedia deposits. Because the ore from the new deposits was not as rich as the Kedia ore (38 percent pure iron content as compared with Kedia ore's 65 percent iron content), the project required the construction of concentration and beneficiation facilities to raise the ore content to competitive marketing levels before export. Transportation, water, power, housing, and port facilities were also upgraded at Zouîrât and Nouadhibou to handle what was expected to be increasing ore exports. By 1987, however, world demand for iron ore had not risen as expected, and the 1986 opening of new Brazilian mines increased overproduction worldwide. The Guelbs project was not expected to be cost effective for some time, if ever. Plans for a second-phase expansion were postponed in 1987; the Kedia deposits were still in operation in late 1987 and were expected to continue production into the 1990s.
Since 1975 the decline of the iron mining industry, as represented by its direct contribution to GDP, has been constant. During the 1960s, mining directly accounted for no less than 25 percent and as much as 33 percent of GDP at current market prices. If indirect contributions to related industries are factored in, these proportions rise. By the mid-1970s, with its direct contribution to GDP around 20 percent, mining's total contribution to GDP was still above 30 percent. After 1976 mining's direct contribution to GDP fell, so that between 1980 and 1985 it averaged 10 percent; by 1987 it was only 8.6 percent.
Iron ore was the nation's most important source of foreign exchange for twenty years; the value of iron ore exports relative to other exports fell below 50 percent for the first time in 1983. In that year, exports of fish overtook iron ore exports as Mauritania's most important foreign exchange earner. In 1985 iron ore represented 40 percent of total export earnings, down from an average of 80 percent between 1963 and 1980.
Despite these relative declines, iron mining remained a key factor in the overall economy. In terms of relative export percentages, mining's decline had little effect on day-to-day operations. In the 1984-86 period, levels of tons of iron ore shipped from Nouadhibou were actually higher than in the 1982-83 period. In 1985 SNIM was the country's largest employer after the government and accounted for over 40 percent of the jobs in public sector enterprises. In the 1970s, iron ore contributions to government revenues were estimated at around 30 percent of all government revenues. This percentage probably declined during the 1980s, but in late 1987 statistics were unavailable. Between 1981 and 1986, mining royalties contributed about 5 percent to government tax revenues. The industry's actual contributions were much higher, however, when taxes paid on business profits and wages and salaries, employers payroll taxes, turnover taxes, export taxes, and nontax revenues from public enterprises are taken into account.
In 1967 the Mauritanian government formed a joint venture company with French and other interests to create the Mining Company of Mauritania (Société des Mines de Mauritanie--SOMINA). SOMINA was created to exploit copper deposits at Akjoujt. Operations began in 1973 but closed in 1975 because of the combination of high operating costs (particularly for fuel) and falling world commodity prices for SOMINA's low-grade ore. In 1975 the company was sold to SNIM. SNIM reopened the mine and continued to operate it at a loss until 1978, when the government separated SOMINA from SNIM and closed the mine. In the early 1980s, plans were laid to reopen the mines with backing from the Jordan-based Arab Mining Company of Inchiri (Société Arabe des Mines de l'Inchiri--SAMIN). By 1987, however, SAMIN had abandoned plans to operate the copper mine because of continued low world commodity prices and the high costs of processing the low-grade ore with its high arsenic content. In a related development, SAMIN planned to open a plant at Akjoujt to process copper tailings for gold content. Operations were scheduled to begin in 1988.
In 1973 SNIM began exploitation of large deposits of gypsum located about fifty kilometers northeast of Nouakchott. Total reserves of 98 percent pure gypsum were estimated at 1 billion tons. SNIM's operations during the 1970s entailed the export by road of roughly 17,000 tons per year to cement factories in Senegal. Senegal in turn sold cement to Mauritania on a rebate basis. Rising transportation costs forced a halt to operations in 1981. In 1984 production of gypsum resumed under the newly created SAMIA. SNIM held equal shares in SAMIA with the Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting, and Investment Company. Output in 1985 was 5,470 tons, which were consumed locally in a crushing and bagging operation that imported clinker from Senegal to make cement. Plans in 1987 called for resuming exports of gypsum to Senegal by sea once the new Chinese-built Friendship Port at Nouakchott became operational.
In 1984 a consortium discovered large deposits of phosphates near the Senegalese border. Nonetheless, by 1987 no plans existed to exploit these deposits (estimated at 95 million tons of rock, averaging approximately 20 percent of phosphate pentoxide). The high cost of building the infrastructure and facilities needed to exploit the deposits, estimated in 1984 at US$400 million, made exploitation unlikely for the foreseeable future.
In 1985 seismic surveys conducted jointly by Occidental Oil Company of the United States, the Chinese Petroleum Corporation of Taiwan, and Yukong Limited of South Korea indicated a high possibility of petroleum and natural gas reserves in Mauritanian waters. In 1987 the Amoco Oil Company signed an agreement with the government for a production-sharing contract to conduct offshore explorations in a 920,000-hectare tract west of Nouakchott. The company began seismic acquisition work in late 1987 and planned to drill exploratory wells in 1988.
Located in the Sahelian and Saharan zones, Mauritania has one of the poorest agricultural bases in West Africa. Most important to the rural economy has been the livestock subsector. Between 1975 and 1980, herding engaged up to 70 percent of the population, and sedentary farmers constituted about 20 percent of the population. The vast majority of the population lived in the southern one-third of the country, where rainfall levels were high enough to sustain cattle herding. Farming was restricted to the narrow band along the Senegal River where rainfall of up to 600 millimeters per year and annual river flooding sustained crop production as well as large cattle herds. In the dry northern two-thirds of the country, herding was limited to widely scattered pastoral groups that raised camels, sheep, and goats, and farming was restricted to date palms and minuscule plots around oases.
A major reason for Mauritania's economic stagnation since the mid-1970s has been the decline of its rural sector. Government planners neglected both herding and farming until the 1980s, concentrating instead on development in the modern sector. The rural sector was severely affected by droughts from 1968 through 1973 and from 1983 through 1985, and it has suffered from sporadic dry spells in other years. In the 1960s, livestock and crop production together provided 35 to 45 percent of GDP (at constant 1982 prices). From 1970 to 1986, their contribution to GDP (at constant 1982 prices) averaged 28 percent, with herding accounting for about 20 percent of this figure and with crop production falling to as low as 3 to 5 percent in the worst drought years.
<>Herding
<>Farming
Historically, cattle herding was Mauritania's most important economic activity. In the 1980s, with a cattle-to-people ratio of three to one--the highest in West Africa--herding provided subsistence for up to 70 percent of the country's people. Herding has been dramatically affected by chronic drought and the attendant rapid advance of the desert. These events have forced shifts in patterns of movement, herd composition and ownership, and increased pressures on lands also occupied by sedentary farmers in the south.
Although sources disagree about herd size, it is clear that numbers have fallen since the 1960s. The decline in herd size probably did not reflect a widescale dyingoff of animals so much as an increasingly permanent shift of herds to better watered lands in Senegal and Mali.
The drought also caused shifts in the herding of camels (traditionally located in the drier north) and of sheep and goats (held by groups all across Mauritania). These changes were less dramatic than those for cattle, however, because camels, sheep, and goats are more resistant to drought. Although decreases in sheep, goat, and camel herd size in drought years could be significant, recovery was more rapid and sustained. In the years following the 1968-73 drought, camel, sheep, and goat herd sizes increased to predrought levels or higher. The same pattern seemed evident during the 1983-85 drought and the recovery years of the late 1980s. Indeed, the overall size of camel, sheep, and goat herds may have risen since the 1960s, as these hardier animals have moved into areas abandoned by cattle herds. This pattern seems to have been particularly true for the camel herds.
In the 1960s, cattle herds in Mauritania were composed of two basic types: the lighter, short-horned zebu, or "maure," which made up perhaps 85 percent of the national herd; and the heavier, long-horned zebu, or "peul." The smaller zebu ranged farther north and were owned by nomadic herders. The larger zebu stayed closer to the better watered riverine areas and were owned by sedentary groups who practiced agriculture in addition to livestock raising.
Although traditional herding patterns persist, considerable changes have taken place. Since the 1968-73 drought, precipitation has been below average. Between 1973 and 1984, as the 150-millimeter isohyet line moved south, livestock often were forced to stay year-round in dry season grazing areas nearer the Senegal River and across the border in Senegal and Mali. Thus, the herd populations were compressed into a smaller area, increasing pressure on land resources and heightening competition among herding groups and between herders and sedentary farmers. Overgrazing in increasingly crowded areas and the cutting of trees and shrubs for firewood and fodder (particularly for sheep and goats) contributed to accelerating desertification and posed a threat to crop production.
Patterns of herd ownership also changed with drought and the impoverishment of the rural sector. Increasingly, herds belonged to urban investors (mostly government officials and traders) and were cared for by hired personnel (drawn from the pool of destitute pastoralists who, having lost herds, migrated to urban areas). Herders began to take advantage of access to public wells to graze herds in areas traditionally controlled by tribal groups. The extent of this growing system of "absentee herding" was difficult to assess; but by the mid-1980s, as much as 40 percent of the national herd was thought to be involved.
The Ministry of Rural Development was responsible for livestock and natural resource conservation. The ministry's National Livestock Department (Direction Nationale d'Elevage-- DNE) was responsible for field services and for the annual rinderpest vaccination campaign. Headquartered in Nouakchott, in the mid-1980s the DNE operated eleven field centers in regional capitals and nineteen veterinary field stations, mostly located in the southern third of the country. Used principally in the annual vaccination campaigns, these field stations offered few other veterinary and extension services. The ministry also operated the National School for Training and Rural Extension (Ecole Nationale de Formation et Vulgarisation Rurale--ENFVR) at Kaédi, which since 1968 has trained veterinary field staff.
In 1981 the government established an autonomous state marketing enterprise, the Mauritanian Livestock Marketing Company (Société Mauritanienne de la Commercialisation du Betail-- SOMECOB). This agency had an official, but unenforceable, monopoly over livestock exports and the authority to intervene in market operations to stabilize domestic livestock prices. SOMECOB was also responsible for the Kaédi Abattoir, constructed in 1975 as an export slaughterhouse. By 1986 it functioned for local municipal consumption only, far below capacity, and SOMECOB's exports were negligible. Private exports of live cattle took place without obstruction from SOMECOB. This trade consisted mostly of unrecorded movements into Senegal, Mali, and countries farther south. In the mid-1980s, the most important market for Mauritanian cattle was domestic, centered on Nouakchott, Nouadhibou, and the mining centers.
Although it is a large country, most of Mauritania is desert. In the late 1980s, arable land was scarce, and, except for some oases, crop production was limited to a narrow band along the southern borders with Senegal and Mali. Farmers practiced four types of agriculture: rain-fed dryland cropping, called dieri; flood recession cropping along the Senegal River and its seasonal tributaries, called oualo; oasis cultivation, the least important; and modern irrigated agriculture.
The most important methods, dieri and oualo, were entirely dependent on limited and erratic rainfall and on the annual flooding of the Senegal River and its only perennial tributary in Mauritania, the Gorgol River. Dieri cultivation occurred during the rainy season, from June-July to September-October, in areas receiving sufficient precipitation (400 to 450 millimeters annually) to grow millet and peas. Oualo plantings occurred during the cold dry season from November to March, to take advantage of ground moisture as the flood waters of the Senegal and Gorgol rivers receded. Sorghum was the major crop for this season. Oasis cultivation drew its water from subterranean sources and so was not dependent on rains. Indeed, areas where oases were located might not experience any significant rainfall for years. Modern irrigated agriculture was only partially dependent on annual rainfall. It depended primarily on dams to retain water from the annual rise on the rivers resulting from rains falling upriver. For the Senegal River, these rains fell principally in the headwaters in eastern Mali and Guinea.
The two major droughts of the African Sahel were prolonged in Mauritania by intermittent dry spells. The result was a serious decline in overall agricultural production. In the 1960s, Mauritania had produced about one-half of its grain needs. By the 1983-85 period, grain harvests had fallen to a level that met only about 3 to 8 percent of the country's grain needs. The cereal deficits have been filled through a combination of commercial imports and international food aid, of which the United States has been the principal donor. During the most serious drought years, from 1983 to 1985, food aid accounted for over 61 percent of Mauritania's available supply of grain, commercial imports of rice by the government covered approximately 20 percent, and imports of flour by private traders provided another 13 percent. Local production was able to cover only 5 percent of need. In the following three years, local production recovered sufficiently to meet about one-third of the annual grain need, estimated in 1986 at 260,000 tons. In that year, local production covered 35 percent of need, government imports supplied 30 percent, and food aid met 35 percent.
Although accurate data were lacking, production of all grains in the recovery years from 1985 to 1987 rose to between 68,000 and 120,000 tons, a large increase over the record low of approximately 20,000 tons in 1984. Thus, gross production between 1985 and 1987 attained levels not matched since the mid-1960s. Rising population in the interim meant that, despite this significant recovery, the country remained dependent on imported grains to satisfy its needs.
Millet and sorghum were Mauritania's principal crops, followed by rice and corn. Before the 1980s, millet and sorghum accounted for 70 to 80 percent or more of total grain production. Rice production in the 1970s averaged 5 to 10 percent, and corn made up 10 to 25 percent. In the 1980s, rice production grew in importance, as national planning emphasized irrigated agriculture (which favored rice) and a change in dietary habits.
A few other crops were cultivated. Around 10,000 to 15,000 tons of dates were produced annually in the country's oases, mostly for local consumption. During the 1960s, the traditional production of gum arabic rose to some 5,000 tons a year. By the 1980s, however, production of gum arabic had disappeared. The ill-considered cutting of trees to increase short-term production combined with drought to destroy virtually all of Mauritania's gum-producing acacia trees.
By 1986 farmers working irrigated lands produced about 35 percent of the country's grain crops. Of a potentially irrigable area estimated at 135,000 hectares, only some 13,700 hectares were in production in 1985-86. Most of the irrigated land (about 65 percent) was in large-scale developments (500 hectares or more) centered in Bogué and Kaédi, which were controlled by the government through the National Corporation for Rural Development (Société Nationale pour le Développement Rural--SONADER). The remainder were small-scale operations (less than fifty hectares), developed by a newly active private sector centered mainly in Rosso.
In the 1980s, the government put increased emphasis on developing the rural sector. Government planning strategy under the 1985-88 Economic Recovery Program placed the highest priority on rural development (35 percent of planned investments). Particular attention was to be paid to upgrading existing land and developing new irrigated farming and flood recession agriculture. There were also plans involving Mauritania, Mali, and Senegal to integrate rural development and water and flood control through the Senegal River Development Office (Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal--OMVS) as the massive Diama and Manantali dams became fully operational.
In 1986 the government agencies involved in agricultural production, marketing, and food distribution were SONADER, CSA, and SONIMEX. Created in 1975, SONADER was a public agency under the control of the Ministry of Rural Development. Its general responsibilities focused on planning rural agricultural programs, including building and operating irrigation projects, training farmers in new techniques required for improved irrigation cropping, and providing credit and such inputs as fertilizers and pumping equipment. Organized in 1982 from two other agencies, CSA became responsible for stabilizing grain prices, maintaining a security food stock through market intervention, monitoring production and food deficits, and distributing food aid. SONIMEX began operations in 1966 as a government-controlled joint venture. The company held a monopoly on the imports of basic commodities (principally rice, tea, sugar, and tomato paste), which it resold to private interests for the retail trade. The private sector's role in cereal imports was legally restricted to wheat and flour. Numerous private traders in the marketing chain, however, were not covered (or were covered only partially) by CSA and SONIMEX. There were no precise data on the extent of domestic production marketed by private traders compared with CSA or on the extent of the grain trade across the Senegal River that was outside the control of SONIMEX.
The system of land tenure was in transition in the 1980s. Factors contributing to this transition included government abolition of centuries-old slavery practices involving tribal and ethnic relations between various herding and sedentary communities; government development policies, particularly with regard to land reform and large-scale irrigation schemes; and tremendous shifts in land settlement and herding patterns because of drought.
Historically, landownership and range management were based on tribal relations and ethnic settlement patterns. Rangeland for herding was controlled through tribal ownership of wells; around oases, slave groups worked cultivable plots, although traditional noble clans held ownership of the land. In more southerly settled agricultural areas, ownership varied from region to region and village to village, depending on ethnic settlement patterns. Landownership might be vested in the clan or village chief as representative of the group and land distributed in perpetuity to family units having usufruct. Elsewhere, traditional nobilities might hold ownership of lands worked by formerly enslaved groups, who held traditional usufruct. Although a village chief could not sell land belonging to the clan (which would alienate family groups from the land), traditional noble clans could more easily sell property and effectively displace or disinherit slave groups. By the late 1980s, it was not known to what extent the formal abolition of slavery had affected traditional land relationships among noble and former slave groups. Also unknown was the impact of the government's stated policy of giving priority to former slave groups when lands that might be claimed under eminent domain were redistributed. Of potentially far greater importance in land tenancy was the 1983 Land Reform Act. The underlying first cause of the act was the state's inherent and overriding interest in land development. According to the act, the government could grant title for parcels of undeveloped land-- which apparently included fallow land--to whoever pledged to improve it and at the same time possessed requisite resources. Although the economic necessity of the act was beyond question, the social costs of appropriating valuable Senegal River Basin land hypothetically controlled by blacks and redistributing it to wealthy Maures from farther north could prove unacceptable. It was evident, however, that the situation was in considerable flux.
Large-scale government irrigation projects and plans for integrated development based on regional water management created another set of variables for traditional patterns of land use and ownership. Groups located in areas behind dams or in areas to be either permanently flooded or deprived of annual floods with increased control over flow levels in the Senegal River were undergoing a process of controlled resettlement. The formation of cooperative production groups that were to be settled on the land--often on a first-come, first-served basis--was essential to project implementation.
The bulk of Mauritania's industry was in mining or miningrelated activities. Industry, including fish processing but excluding mining, contributed only 5.3 percent to GDP in 1984. Industrial development was hampered by a limited infrastructure, a small local market with limited purchasing power, and a lack of skilled labor. In the mid-1980s, the labor force engaged in industrial activities numbered about 16,000 to 18,000 workers, of which 10,000 were employed in construction and an additional 4,000 to 6,000 were employed by SNIM. Most construction was related to the activities of foreign-financed projects, including mining. Some workers were employed in road and port construction. Within the small manufacturing sector were two main industries: an oil refinery and a steel mill. The rest consisted of small enterprises such as cement bagging, a perfume manufacturer, blanket fabrication facility, and an American-built sugar mill in Nouakchott that had never used its refining capacity and was limited to packaging imported refined sugar. In 1986 about thirty small enterprises were in operation.
Built in 1976 with West German, World Bank, and government financing, the steel rolling mill had an annual production capacity of 36,000 tons of reinforcing bars and rods. Operated originally by SNIM, the mill, which was located at Nouadhibou, operated intermittently and unsuccessfully before it was closed and sold in 1984 to the Arab Iron and Steel Company (Société Arabe du Fer et de l'Acier--SAFA). Reopened in 1985, the mill continued to be plagued by technical and economic problems; output in 1986 was only 5,300 tons.
At independence, Mauritania became a member of the West African Monetary Union (Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine--UMOA) but withdrew in 1973 to demonstrate its independent economic identity. When it withdrew, the government also relinquished membership in the African Financial Community (Communauté Financière Africaine--CFA), whose currency--the CFA franc--was freely convertible to French francs. Mauritania then created its own currency, the ouguiya, and an independent central bank.
In the mid-1980s, Mauritania's monetary and banking structure consisted of the Central Bank of Mauritania (Banque Centrale de Mauritanie--BCM) and six commercial banks established with the participation of the government or of the BCM. Other major shareholders included various Arab interests, which included Saudi and Libyan participation.
By the early 1980s, Mauritania's banking sector was deteriorating, chiefly because of an accumulation of nonperforming loans that constituted some 50 percent of commercial bank assets. Between 1981 and 1983, government borrowing from the BCM and commercial banks rose to statutory limits. The private sector and public enterprises were thus forced to borrow increasingly from foreign banks to cover their severe liquidity problems.
As a result of this spiral of debt, in 1985 the government, with IMF and World Bank support, undertook measures to restructure the banking system. Measures taken under the 1985-88 Economic Recovery Program instituted a monetary and credit policy favoring the private sector and an austerity program for the public sector. Furthermore, in 1987 the government, in cooperation with the World Bank, adopted a reform program that focused on three areas: reforming credit policies and banking regulations, strengthening the BCM, and restructuring four of the six commercial banks, including the International Bank of Mauritania (Banque Internationale pour la Mauritanie--BIMA), of which the BCM held 91 percent.
In 1986, with IMF and World Bank support, the government prepared its first consolidated budget. Before this, budgetary procedures covered only expenditures financed through domestic resources. The new procedures covered all financing sources used by the government in a budget encompassing both internally and externally financed current and capital expenditures.
Between 1979 and 1984, expenditures on current operations averaged UM10.5 billion. Typically, domestic revenues covered about two-thirds of this amount; the balance was financed by direct external budgetary support. Between 1978 and 1983, the government wage bill (including military salaries) constituted the largest line item of current expenditures. The second largest expenditure was for equipment and supplies.
In addition to current expenditures, the central government budget allocated smaller amounts for capital expenditures, which amounted to the government's contribution to the public investment program. Capital expenditures accounted for only between 8 and 11 percent of the total budget in the period 1979- 83, far less than current expenditures.
Mauritania's domestic revenue base was very narrow and depended on the iron and fishing export industries and the service sector. Total government revenues were derived from taxes and nontax revenues. Between 1981 and 1986, nontax revenues accounted for from 11 to 20 percent of the total and consisted of fish royalties, penalties, and revenue transfers from public enterprises. Tax revenues were derived mainly from taxes on international trade and on income and profits. Between 1981 and 1986, taxes on international trade (of which import taxes were the most important) averaged 41 percent of all revenues, and taxes on income and profits represented 26 percent. Taxes on wages and salaries averaged more than 14 percent of all government revenues for this period.
MAURITANIA'S GOVERNANCE EPITOMIZES a cycle all too evident throughout sub-Saharan Africa. A civilian government, espousing the liberal democratic principles inherited from the colonial regime, came to power on the eve of independence. After it had ruled for nearly a generation, during which time the expectations born at independence remained largely unfulfilled and government became increasingly capricious and corrupt, a military regime toppled the civilian government and suspended the Constitution. In the following years, a succession of military rulers, each promising to end the corruption, abuse of authority, and economic waste of earlier regimes, proved as unwilling and inept as their civilian predecessor at ensuring the territorial integrity of the state, achieving national unity, and fostering economic development in the face of severe environmental challenges. The subsequent ascendancy in 1987 of what appeared to be a reformist government, albeit military, demonstrated for the first time Mauritania's growing understanding of the limits of government as this new regime grappled with the problem of adapting the longstanding cultural values of a very poor society to the needs of a modern developing state.
Prior to independence, Mauritania served as a bridge between the Maghrib and West Africa, with strong cultural links to the former and equally strong economic and administrative ties to the latter. Like Sudan and Chad, which also link Arab North Africa with black Africa, Mauritania suffered internal social and political problems as cultures collided. The potential for conflict was strengthened by the proliferation of particularist-regional political parties before independence. These parties, composed exclusively of either ArabBerbers (Maures) or one of several black ethnic groups and advocating union with Arab Morocco or with black Mali, tended to aggravate existing cleavages.
To overcome the structural problems intrinsic to the Mauritanian polity, its first president, Moktar Ould Daddah, resorted to one-party rule with a strong executive branch. Although the Constitution of 1961 called for some power-sharing between the president and the legislature, the National Assembly, in practice, routinely supported presidential initiatives, and government remained highly centralized. Daddah's ill-fated participation in the Western Sahara conflict and the resulting ruin of the Mauritanian economy led to a military coup in July 1978. Daddah was detained and later exiled, and his government was replaced by the eighteen-member Military Committee for National Recovery (Comité Militaire de Redressement National--CMRN) with Lieutenant Colonel Mustapha Salek as president.
During the next six years, ensuing military regimes failed to resolve the thorny issue of Mauritania's involvement in the Western Sahara and failed to improve Mauritania's dismal economic performance. On December 12, 1984, Chief of Staff and former Minister of Defense Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Ould Taya led a group of dissident officers who staged a palace coup against head of state Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla.
Still in power in late 1987, the military government under President Taya has eschewed ideological labels. Initially, Taya's policies reflected the amalgam of private capitalism and state ownership of industry common throughout sub-Saharan Africa. In his first interviews as president, Taya pledged that his administration would respect human rights, end corruption, and promote national unity. In one of his first acts, he freed thirty-two political prisoners seized by his predecessor. He also promised to hold elections for municipal councils in Mauritania's thirteen largest urban areas before the end of 1986, ostensibly to encourage local initiatives but also to appease ethnically based interests. The elections, whose fairness was acclaimed by independent observers, took place on December 19, 1986, and more were promised for smaller towns. As for a return to civilian rule, Taya insisted in March 1985 that Mauritanians must first develop an understanding of civic participation in order to avoid the divisions and paralysis that characterized the final years of Haidalla's government.
Mauritania has joined the Nonaligned Movement and has sought to establish friendly relations with both East and West. In response to Morocco's irredentist claims through the 1960s, Mauritania appealed for and received support from France and Western and African allies. That support continued as Mauritania's fortunes in the Western Sahara conflict deteriorated in the late 1970s and Morocco's challenges to Mauritania's borders mounted. As its own economy faltered and its dependence on loans and grants deepened, Mauritania improved its ties with wealthier Middle Eastern and Maghribi states at the expense of its relations with black Africa. In a further attempt to find aid, the government has moved away from total reliance on the West and strengthened relations with the Soviet Union and China.
<>POLITICAL
CULTURE
<>GOVERNMENTAL POWER
<>POLITICAL POWER IN
THE MID-1980s
<>INTEREST GROUPS
<>FOREIGN RELATIONS
Attitudies toward the political system in Mauritania were like those found in other developing African countries undergoing a similar nation-building process. Mauritanian society had both a modern sector and a rural, traditional sector. Each nurtured vastly different expectations of the political system, a split that gave rise to two political subcultures. Although these two subcultures were often depicted as polar opposites, membership was not exclusive; in fact, most Mauritanians participated to varying degrees in each. Perhaps what most distinguished modern elites from those labeled traditional was the former's greater reliance on modern technology and its commitment to economic development.
The less educated, subsistence society offered little support to the modern, urban political system. Its members participated only insofar as government welfare programs, taxes, or laws impinged on their lives. To many Mauritanians, national government signified only President Taya and did not imply any further loyalty to government, state, or nation. For this sector, citizenship meant respect for tradition, maintenance of social status, and rigid rules of behavior. Accordingly, traditional injunctions against rising above one's inherited class stifled economic activity among black groups as well as among Maures. Maures of high status often viewed economic activity, such as earning a salary, with disdain. By the same traditions, women were accorded only a minor role in politics.
Although traditional elites dominated local politics in rural areas, a modernizing elite, which constituted approximately 10 percent of the population, greatly influenced national and urban politics. That elite comprised senior military officers, government workers, wealthy businessmen, union members (especially teachers), and students. Insofar as economic development was dependent on national unity and a less rigid social structure, the members of the modernizing elite were also committed to the progressive transformation, with its concomitant dislocations, of traditional society through the agency of the state. Among the modern elite, political consciousness remained high, even if military rule limited opportunities for participation.
The political goals of the modernizing elite were initially articulated by Daddah and were retained in 1987 under the Taya administration. These goals included cultural independence, economic development, and democracy. The conditions for cultural independence, according to Daddah, included bilingualism, a revitalization of Islam through a return to its original precepts, and a more prominent role for women. Cultural independence was not to be construed as a return to precolonial social mores, but rather as an adaptation of Mauritania's unique cultural heritage. Economic independence, according to Daddah, meant "mauritanization" of the labor force, restrictions on the repatriation of funds by foreign-owned firms, and diversification of Mauritania's sources of external aid, most of which came from France. Democracy, the third of Daddah's goals, meant popular participation, especially by women and youth, in the management of public policy.
The military rulers who succeeded Daddah have implicitly adopted his perspective. Since the 1978 coup, Mauritania has imposed bilingualism, incorporated the Islamic legal code, elevated women within the government, made the study of Arabic an educational requirement, borrowed from an ever-increasing list of donors, limited foreign participation in industry while replacing foreigners with Mauritanians, and held elections to promote participation in local politics.
Thus, in Mauritania in the mid-1980s traditional outlooks based on custom, family ties, and Islam were gradually giving way to a more modern set of political views based on codified laws and procedures, achievement, and a national consciousness. More and more, individuals tended to rely on the modern political institutions of society (government, interest groups, police, and the like) to satisfy their needs, rather than on traditional political and religious leaders. This process has been hastened by a protracted drought during the 1970s and 1980s. Over a period of approximately fifteen years, 60 percent of Mauritania's previously nomadic people, who constituted 80 percent of the total population, resettled in urban areas, with many becoming dependent on government aid programs. The resettlement in towns has markedly altered traditional economic patterns and political alliances.
In 1987 the pace of modernization remained slow in Mauritania, where much of the population was closely bound to traditional subsistence agriculture and pastoralism and where literacy in French or Arabic was limited to only about 18 percent of the population. Although the modernizing elite shared with the traditional elite and the Mauritanian masses a common history and religion that prevented the state from collapsing, centrifugal forces competed for scarce economic and political resources. These forces ranged from ethnic groups and tribes to occupational and social classes.
An even greater impediment to development and modernization was the cleavage between the Maures and Mauritania's black population, the size of which has never been precisely ascertained and may be either undercounted or overrepresented, depending on one's perspective. Historically, the Maures have discriminated against the black population, which, well into the twentieth century, continued to be a source of slaves. Different languages and a fairly uncomplicated geographic split tended to reinforce racial differences. Moreover, the black southern portion of the country, which was predominantly agricultural and until independence had generated much of the country's wealth, lost economic and political influence as mining and fishing investments in the Maure northern portion achieved far greater economic importance beginning in the late 1960s. By the mid-1980s, however, the economic pendulum began to swing back again as mining and fishing revenues leveled off or began dropping while the relentless process of desertification had increased the value of black-held lands along the Senegal River. Nevertheless, blacks still complained that the government allocated greater resources to projects benefiting the Maures than to those benefiting blacks.
Mauritania's experiment with one-party democracy ended with the replacement of Daddah's government by the CMRN on July 10, 1978. In April 1979, following the coup that brought Lieutenant Colonel Haidalla to power, the CMRN became the Military Committee for National Salvation (Comité Militaire de Salut National-- CMSN). The Taya government came to power following a bloodless palace coup on December 12, 1984. To justify the reorganization, President Taya and members of the CMSN charged Haidalla with excluding his colleagues on the CMSN from the decision-making process. The CMSN also expressed concern over the impact of the Structures for Educating the Masses (Structures pour l'Education des Masses--SEM), a grassroots network established by Haidalla in 1982 to lobby on behalf of his policies toward the Polisario. Over time, the SEM had become both the center of a personality cult and an alternative political apparatus. Finally, the new leaders pointed to evidence of corruption, which, if not benefiting Haidalla directly, profited family, friends, and the Polisario guerrillas.
<>Constitution
<>Constitutional
Charter
<>Legal System
<>Local Government
<>Local Elections
The military regime that toppled Daddah in 1978 abolished the Constitution that had been ratified on May 20, 1961. Then in December 1980, when he unexpectedly announced a return to civilian rule, Haidalla promulgated a new provisional constitution. That draft constitution provided for a multiparty system and freedom of association, provisions Haidalla hoped would attract support from the labor union movement. Following an abortive coup attempt in March 1981 by former members of the military government, however, Haidalla reneged on his intention of returning Mauritania to civilian rule and scrapped the draft constitution.
The Constitutional Charter of the CMSN, which was promulgated on February 9, 1985, served as a de facto constitution in 1987. The charter unequivocally eliminated any of the pretenses of democracy embodied in the 1961 constitution. At the same time, it pledged adherence to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, in Article 14, presaged a return to democratic institutions and a new constitution that would bear some semblance to the 1961 Constitution.
The 1961 Constitution clearly reflected the influence of the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic in its dedication to liberal democratic principles and inalienable human rights as expressed in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In addition, the Constitution underscored the state's determined quest for independence and unity by proclaiming Islam the official religion. Somewhat paradoxically, freedom of religion was also guaranteed. Strict adherence to both sets of principles would seemingly have given rise to conflict, especially in the area of jurisprudence; however, in practice the government sought with acceptable success to balance the demands of the two.
Under the Constitution, the government was composed of three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. The executive branch was headed by the president of the republic and included ministers whom he appointed and the administrative bureaucracy. The president was elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term and could serve an indefinite number of terms. From 1966 until the coup in 1978, all candidates for the office had to be nominated by the Mauritanian People's Party (Parti du Peuple Mauritanienne--PPM), be at least thirty-five years old, and have full exercise of their political and civil rights. In sharp contrast to its French antecedent, the Mauritanian Constitution strengthened presidential power by combining it with the function of prime minister, while making the National Assembly subordinate. Like a prime minister, the president participated in legislative processes that would otherwise reside in the domain of the National Assembly. At the same time, the Constitution prevented the president from dissolving the National Assembly, and it also denied the assembly the right to unseat the president by means of a vote of no confidence.
In its entirety, the Constitution came to resemble those of other francophone African states that were also adopted under the influence of General Charles de Gaulle's Fifth Republic and in response to the perceived need for strong, centralized leadership. In light of the highly fragmented polities typical of much of sub-Saharan Africa at that time, however, a system of checks and balances was thought to be overly cumbersome for the immediate tasks at hand.
Other presidential powers included commanding the armed forces; appointing civil servants, military officers, judges, and ambassadors; ratifying treaties and other international agreements; initiating or amending legislation; eliciting advisory opinions on proposed legislation from the Supreme Court; and exercising a temporary veto over legislation. Perhaps the president's greatest power lay in his right, in times of peril, to declare an emergency and exercise extraconstitutional authority.
The National Assembly was subordinate to the president. At independence, the assembly numbered forty deputies, all of whom were elected as a slate by universal suffrage for five-year terms. By 1971 the number had grown to fifty and by 1975 to seventy-eight, including the new deputies from the annexed portion of the Western Sahara, Tiris al Gharbiyya. The presidency of the assembly was the second highest position in the government and often the locus of traditionalist opposition to Daddah. Along with three vice presidents and two secretaries, the president of the assembly was elected from among the deputies. The assembly's limited power derived from Article 39 of the Constitution and included the formulation of broad policies on national defense, education, labor, and public administration. The assembly also had responsibility for legislating civil rights and taxation. All other legislative powers, including the implementation of specific policy decisions, fell to the president. In general, Daddah's handling of policy matters underscored the imbalance between the two branches of government. For example, although the president was required to present an annual message to the nation and might also provide supplemental statements to the assembly, he alone determined what information to share with legislators, who could not compel him to be more forthcoming. The president could also bypass the legislature completely by submitting proposed legislation to a popular referendum. Finally, the assembly's relatively short session, fixed at four months per year, limited the amount of legislation it could pass.
Constitutional amendments were permissible if they did not threaten the state or its republican form of government. Either the president or the National Assembly could propose an amendment, which would then require a two-thirds vote in the legislature in order to become law. If the proposed amendment received only a simple majority, the president could submit it as a referendum. In fact, the latter process was never necessary. Two major amendments were passed in the 1960s, one in 1965 institutionalizing one-party government, and a second in 1968 pertaining to local administration, the status of magistrates, and the designation of Hassaniya Arabic as an official language.
Although the Constitution did not provide for a system of checks and balances, the assembly did have three ways to limit presidential power. First, it could refuse requested budgetary appropriations, although the president could circumvent the assembly's budgetary veto by simply promulgating an interim budget based on total receipts of the previous year. Second, if able to muster a two-thirds vote, the assembly could impeach the president or any of his ministers for treason or plotting against the state. The Supreme Court, a body appointed by the president, would judge the charges in such cases. Finally, the assembly could, in effect, override a presidential veto if, after a second reading, the law received an absolute majority in the assembly and was declared constitutional by the Supreme Court.
In fact, the assembly's debates and votes were most often highly symbolic gestures that brought closure to a process initiated and dominated by the executive. In the early 1960s, however, the legislature often challenged the executive, only to be deluged with priority bills that in effect smothered any legislative initiatives. With the institutionalization of oneparty rule in 1965, engaging debate in the assembly was no longer possible, and the assembly's role became promotion of political integration at the expense of individual rights while strengthening party unity and discipline.
Like the Constitution, the Constitutional Charter of February 1985 pledged adherence to principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the charters of the United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the League of Arab States (Arab League). The charter also proclaimed Islam the state religion and sharia the only source of law.
The fundamental powers and responsibilities of the CMSN, outlined in Article 3 of the charter, included establishing the general policies of the nation, promulgating ordinances to carry out policy, monitoring actions of the government, ratifying international agreements, and granting amnesty except in cases of retributory justice and religious crimes. Articles 4 through 10 pertained to the internal organization of the CMSN and presidential succession. Members were nominated to the CMSN by ordinance of that body, and it alone decided the procedures by which it would conduct its business. Included within the CMSN was the Permanent Committee, consisting of all CMSN members posted to Nouakchott. The Permanent Committee met in ordinary session once every fifteen days and in extraordinary session when convoked by the president. The CMSN was required to meet in ordinary session every third month and in extraordinary session when convoked by the president after approval of the Permanent Committee, or upon the request of one-third of the members. If the president were temporarily absent, the president of the CMSN would nominate a member of the Permanent Committee to carry out the routine affairs of state. If the president were temporarily incapacitated, the Permanent Committee would nominate one of its members to manage affairs of state for a period not to exceed one month. In the event of the president's death or a long-term incapacitation, the Permanent Committee would designate one of its members to carry out the functions of president for one week, after which the entire CMSN would appoint a new president from among its members.
Articles 11 and 12 determined the manner in which the president nominated civilian and military members of government. As head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces, the president made all nominations for civilian and military posts and for members of the government. Similarly, he could dismiss an appointee at any time. The final four articles of the Constitutional Charter dealt with maintenance of public order and enforcement of CMSN ordinances.
A second ordinance, promulgated at the same time as the charter, governed the internal organization of the CMSN and supplemented the charter. The preamble to this ordinance unequivocally entrusted the CMSN with national sovereignty and legitimacy, but only until replaced by democratic institutions.
The first three articles established de jure membership and rank in the CMSN and delineated the relationship between members of the government and the CMSN. Members of the CMSN ranked higher than members of the government. Accordingly, no member of the CMSN could be sued, searched, arrested, held, or tried while carrying out official duties. No member could be arrested or sued in criminal cases or minor offenses without authorization from either the full CMSN or the Permanent Committee, unless caught in flagrante delicto.
The second article dealt with the selection and responsibilities of the president of the CMSN, who was chosen in a secret ballot by a two-thirds majority of its members and could be deposed in the same way. The president presided over debates and ensured that the Permanent Committee complied with the charter and the committee's regulations. He also controlled debate and could suspend the session at any time. Internally, the CMSN included five advisory commissions dealing with cultural and social affairs, security affairs, public works and development, economy and financial affairs, and education and justice. The commissions monitored the implementation of policy in their respective areas.
In reality, the CMSN in 1987 was a coterie of officers, most of whom were Maures, representing a variety of sometimes overlapping and sometimes discrete corporate and ethnic interests. Among its members, rank, status and influence varied widely. In debates, which were resolved by consensus, the opinions and positions of the acknowledged "big men" were not likely to be challenged openly by members of lower status, who instead might have engaged in surreptitious maneuvering or plotting behind the scenes. The most powerful member of the CMSN in the late 1980s was Taya, who was often described as hardworking and dedicated and whose achievements were the result of strength of purpose rather than political ambition. The second most powerful figure was the minister of interior, information, and telecommunications, Lieutenant Colonel Djibril Ould Abdallah, who was often described as "Taya's strongman."
The military government operated through a cabinet whose members, both civilian and military, were appointed by the president, presumably after consultation with members of the CMSN. In 1987 approximately one-third of the fifteen cabinet ministers were also members of the CMSN, although that ratio changed with every cabinet reshuffle. Cabinet officers were responsible for implementing policies initiated by the CMSN.
Through the 1960s and early 1970s, Mauritania's legal system bore the imprint of the French legal and judicial system. As the number of legal cadres rose, so did attempts to reconcile secular and Islamic law. In the meantime, Islamic courts coexisted alongside secular courts based on the French model. Neither appellate courts nor courts with constitutional jurisdiction existed. There were few secular lawyers; Mauritania's first French-trained lawyer was Daddah. The 1961 Constitution provided that French laws were to remain in effect until amended or repealed, as were French civil, commercial, and penal codes. The first Mauritanian chief justice of the Supreme Court was not appointed until November 1965, in accordance with a law requiring that a Muslim fill the position. As late as 1968, fully onequarter of Mauritania's judges (including almost all the secular law judges) were French. Only in the early 1970s were new labor and nationality codes adopted, along with new codes of penal, civil, commercial, and administrative procedure.
The sharia Islamic code, which was instituted in 1980, served as the law of the land in civil matters, except in certain socalled modern areas, such as nationality law and litigation involving corporations, automobiles, and aircraft. Sharia also covered such areas of public law as theft and murder. As in French law, no one was presumed innocent; thus an inability to convince the sitting magistrate that the government's charges were erroneous in itself constituted proof of guilt, as did firsthand testimony from a witness or codefendant. Defendants had the right to counsel and could appeal a verdict to the Supreme Court within fifteen days. As in secular courts, circumstantial evidence was inadmissable as proof of guilt. Plea bargaining was also common. Although Mauritanian law guaranteed expeditious arraignment and trial, the slow functioning of the state's inadequately funded judicial system frequently resulted in long pretrial detentions. Under legislation approved by the increasingly isolated President Daddah just prior to the 1978 coup, the state arrogated the authority to detain without trial or appeal anyone judged to be a national security threat. (The Taya government exercised that prerogative in September 1986 when it arrested thirteen blacks from the Toucouleur ethnic group, including prominent educators, politicians, and media figures, on charges of sedition and threatening national security.)
Although nearly all of Mauritania is Muslim, some opposition to the institution of sharia was expressed by blacks and women, who believed that it discriminated in favor of the white, Maure male population. Meanwhile, communal tensions resulting from a strict interpretation of sharia have waned over the years as courts have moderated their interpretation. This moderation has not prevented the government from more fully implementing previously ignored provisions of sharia, however. In October 1986, the government interdicted the introduction and sale of alcohol in Mauritania to all but foreign diplomats and technical assistants working for the government. Punishment for violating the ban was to be forty lashes administered in public as prescribed by sharia.
At the top of the judicial system in 1987 was the Supreme Court, which had six permanent members, including a president, who had to be a jurist in both Islamic and secular law. In addition, court members included two vice presidents, one Islamic and one secular; two ordinary counselors, also one Islamic and one secular; and a financial counselor, who served a two-year term and was selected jointly by the ministries of justice and finance. The six judges did not sit together to hear cases; the number and type of judge (secular or Islamic) depended on the nature of the case. The court had three areas of competence: appellate review, administrative litigation, and financial oversight. The Supreme Court also heard questions on constitutionality.
In judging constitutional cases before the 1978 coup, the court included only five judges: the president, the two vice presidents, and two extraordinary counselors, one of whom was appointed by the president of the republic and the other by the president of the National Assembly; both extraordinary counselors served two-year terms. (Under military rule, both were chosen by the head of state with advice from the CMSN.) The court ruled on the constitutionality of proposed projects, laws, or treaties at the request of the president; determined the eligibility of presidential candidates; adjudicated electoral disputes; and supervised referenda and censuses. The court also closely supervised the normal activities of the National Assembly, ensuring its conformity to the Constitution. As the final appellate court, the Supreme Court heard appeals from the Court of First Instance and the Labor Court or appeals based on the lack of jurisdiction or a violation of due process from any other court. As an administrative court, it had first and final jurisdiction in litigation concerning state-owned property, the status of civil servants, and public administration. In its financial oversight role, the Supreme Court verified public accounts and imposed sanctions on civil servants found guilty of fraud or mismanagement.
The 1961 Constitution kept the highly centralized colonial structure of counties (cercles), subdivisions (souspréfectures ), and administrative posts. Local councils were established in the twelve cercles--the French created eleven cercles coterminous with the old amirates, and the newly independent government created a twelfth cercle, Tiris Zemmour, out of northern Adrar--as representative and administrative bodies to replace the chiefs and councils of notables through whom the French ruled. By 1961 urban and rural communes had been created, and rudimentary representative councils had been established with elected mayors in the urban communes. There were five urban communes modeled after similar bodies in France in Rosso, Kaédi, Atar, Bogué, and Nouakchott. Three experimental communes were established in Nouadhibou, `Ayoûn el `Atroûs, and Fdérik. Although the government attempted to give the councils and mayors of the communes control over communal legislation, the communes failed to fulfill any meaningful function for lack of trained and experienced managerial cadres and for want of resources to support local administration. With the Law of March 4, 1968, the rural communes were abolished, and less than a year later the urban and experimental communes were also eliminated. Local administration reverted to the traditional authorities, who became the links between the rulers and the rest of the population.
On July 30, 1968, the resources and functions of the former communes were transferred to twelve regions and one district (Nouakchott) in sweeping reforms of local administration. Each of the regions, which were generally coterminous with the former cercles, were subdivided into départements, generally coterminous with the former sous-préfectures, and further divided into arrondissements, corresponding to the former administrative posts. A thirteenth region encompassing al Gharbia (that part of Western Sahara claimed by Mauritania) was created in 1976; however, it was abandoned when Mauritania withdrew from the Western Sahara conflict. The state viewed the regions as serving as administrative subdivisions and as independent judicial districts.
Each region was headed by a governor representing the central government. The governor headed the administrative bureaucracy of the region, ensured the execution of laws and regulations, and coordinated state services (except for military and judicial activities). Under his authority were préfets, who administered départements, as well as other civil servants of the region. The governor's staff also included two assistants responsible for administration and economic and social development. The governor and his two assistants were appointed by the president.
Each region had a regional assembly of twenty to thirty members (conseillers) named by presidential decree from a list of nominees presented by the party. The conseillers served with no pay for five years. The regional assemblies had only minimal autonomy. The regional budgets for which they voted were prepared by the government in Nouakchott and included mandatory expenses, such as the cost of administration and maintenance of local roads and secondary airports. Regional assemblies could also levy taxes on certain specified goods and allocate a portion of their budgetary subvention from the central government to discretionary items. In spite of these apparent moves toward decentralization, effective control remained with the central government in the name of forging national unity. Regional assemblies served only to disseminate orders and information from Nouakchott, and not to mediate between local and centralized authority.
Under military rule, the government no longer pursued even the pretense of democracy. Although the office of regional governor was retained, the regional assemblies, like the National Assembly, were eliminated. In addition to a regional governor with responsibility for regional administration, six regions also had a regional military commander responsible for maintaining internal security, a task that included monitoring and controlling political dissent within his region. The two regions classified as autonomous military sectors also had military commanders with responsibilities similar to those of the regular commanders.
To appease the demands of ethnic minorities and diminish the role and obligations of an already overburdened government, Taya's government hesitantly took the first steps toward democratization and decentralization. In December 1986, residents of Nouakchott and Mauritania's regional capitals, by then numbering twelve, voted for candidates for thirteen municipal councils. The municipal councils consisted of either thirty or thirty-six members, depending on the size of the constituency. For example, the Atar council had thirty seats; Zouîrât had thirty-six. The councils assumed responsibility for local economic and financial planning and for cultural activities; however, as in the old regional assemblies, theirs was a limited autonomy. In addition to the elected counseillers and mayor, each council included an agent of the state with the title of secretary general, appointed by the minister of interior, information, and telecommunications. The ostensible task of the secretaries general was to provide managerial expertise to the elected counseillers and mayor, none of whom may have had previous administrative experience. At the same time, however, the secretaries general acted as representatives of the central government and thus fulfilled the Taya government's objective of decentralizing while maintaining national control.
Membership in the municipal councils was determined by popular vote with universal suffrage and secret ballots. Locally based political parties, some of which had ties with parties in other areas and all of which included as part of their name the word union, nominated slates for all or a portion of the seats on the council. Debate dealt exclusively with local issues, and a limit of four candidates represented the four slates contesting each seat. The campaigns and elections in December 1986 were conducted in what has been characterized as a surprisingly decorous manner, with between 48 and 65 percent of the electorate voting. To its credit, the government refused to inflate vote totals as is often customary elsewhere in the Third World. In four of the thirteen municipalities, no slate won a majority during the first round of voting, so a runoff vote was held a week later on December 26, 1986. Once seated, the councils elected mayors who, in every city except Nouakchott, had headed the majority slate in the council. In the capital, Mohamed Ould Mah, who headed the Union for Progress and Brotherhood minority slate, won an unexpected victory over the leader of the majority National Democratic Union slate.
In some respects, the election of municipal councils seemed little more than a repeat of earlier, somewhat pretentious attempts to bring the trappings of representative democracy to a society unaccustomed to mass political participation. But unlike earlier efforts, which were inappropriate copies of the colonial administration, the new councils had organic roots and modest aspirations. In light of the paucity of resources available to the mayors and the councils, foreign observers doubted that this experiment in democracy would resolve Mauritania's profound economic and political problems. Nevertheless, the Taya regime asserted that the elections were but a first step in the longterm process of democratization.
Upon taking office in 1984, Taya pledged to promote political unity and stability by improving the economy, redressing the erosion of civil and human rights, and ensuring Mauritania's strict neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict. During the first two years of Taya's administration, Mauritania's economic performance improved, even though attempts to halt or slow desertification proved ineffectual. Revenues from agriculture, mining, and fishing increased from the depressed levels of the drought years; the rate of inflation decreased; and the World Bank stepped up lending, following a currency devaluation in 1985. In keeping with his promise concerning human rights, in late 1984 and early 1985 Taya freed many of the political prisoners jailed by his predecessor. More important, he successfully organized Mauritania's first elections.
Taya himself, known as a diligent, loyal, disinterested professional, remained a popular figure. At least at the outset, his tenure attracted support from Mauritania's principal constituencies, including harratin, labor, and students, as well as from the exiled, pro-Moroccan Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania (Alliance pour une Mauritanie Démocratique--AMD) based in Paris and the Organization of Mauritanian Nationalists (Organisation des Nationalistes Mauritaniens) formed in Senegal. His general amnesty for political prisoners pleased both domestic and external dissidents, and his ban on alcohol won support from Islamic fundamentalists.
In spite of Taya's successes, internal politics in 1987 remained unsettled. Alternative political choices were still banned, and neither of the two exiled dissident groups chose to return. Corruption, which had flourished under Haidalla, was still a significant problem. The number of nomadic herders dropped from 85 percent of the population to 15 percent, with former nomads settling in Nouakchott and other cities and vastly inflating the number of unemployed or underemployed living in kébés (shantytowns) surrounding Nouakchott. Harratin, who previously had worked for the nomads, also entered the labor market, often in competition with their former employers for scarce or nonexistent jobs. Wealthy speculators exploited the difficulties of the nomads by purchasing their herds at distress prices and then selling them to farmers in the south. The economy, which had rebounded somewhat during Taya's first two years in office, stagnated. The government raised prices for staples and simultaneously devalued the ouguiya. Revenues from mining, fishing and agriculture dropped. To prevent a financial collapse, the World Bank took control of the International Bank of Mauritania (Banque Internationale pour la Mauritanie--BIMA). Finally, southern blacks, and the Toucouleur in particular, charged the Taya government with discrimination and bias, and in frustration they took their grievances to the streets.
Internal divisions based on race remained Taya's most critical domestic problem in 1987, in spite of his insistence that racism was of no consequence in Mauritania. Since independence, some black groups repeatedly had charged the government with discrimination, alleging underrepresentation of blacks in important posts in government, education, and business. Other grievances included supposed favoritism by the state in allocating resources, such as bank loans and scholarships, and a land reform act that seemingly gave Maures preference in the acquisition of irrigated land along the Senegal River. The 1983 Land Reform Act maintained that as the owner of all unimproved and undeeded land, the state had an inherent interest in its development. The act stipulated that in accordance with relevant provisions of sharia, the government was permitted to cede land to those committed to improving it. Although the policy of providing parcels of fallow, irrigable land to those willing to farm it was economically sound, ambiguities surrounding the implementation of the Land Reform Act raised the specter of wealthy land speculators from Nouakchott and Nouadhibou appropriating tracts of rich agricultural land along the Senegal River and displacing blacks whose roots extended back for generations. Complicating the issue was the fact that wealthy blacks from the Senegal River Basin were also interested in assembling large, capital-intensive farms on riparian lands and were very much in favor of the government's efforts on their behalf.
President Taya attempted to deal with racial controversy by creating a national constituency to replace local or regional (often ethnically based) affiliations. To this end, he sought to eliminate racial and ethnic labels. He continued to bring southern blacks and harratin into his government, in mid1987 he named three women to cabinet positions, and he earmarked agriculture along the Senegal River, historically a black enterprise, for heavy investment. Notwithstanding such efforts, local blacks, Mauritania's black African neighbors, and many foreign observers shared the perception that Maures formulated and carried out the political agenda. Moreover, frequent cabinet changes, coupled with the rapid rotation of regional governors and military commanders, have prevented Mauritania's political leaders from acquiring managerial expertise.
In the absence of political parties, in 1987 political demands found informal expression only through the various interest groups within Mauritanian society. Their interaction with the military government provided some indication of the regime's support. Four interest groups offered contrasts in how they related to government: blacks, who questioned the legitimacy of any government headed by Maures; traditional elites, whose importance diminished under the military; women, whose limited political strength has come only at the sufferance of the government; and labor unions. Mauritania's most important interest group was the military, for which the rules of politics were different.
In 1987 the most visible political organization among Mauritania's blacks was the African Liberation Forces of Mauritania (Forces Libération Africaine de Mauritanie--FLAM). Founded in 1983 and outlawed in 1984, the group has developed a complex and clandestine organization based in Dakar, Senegal. It drew its membership primarily from the Toucouleur. Among alleged FLAM members arrested by the government in September 1986 were Ibrahima Sarr, a television journalist; Tafsirou Djigo and Mamadou Ly, former cabinet ministers; Mahmoudi Ould Boukhreiss, a businessman and brother of Colonel Moulay Ould Boukhreiss, a former minister of justice known for his pro-Libyan sentiments; Tene Youssouf Gueye, a writer; Oumar Ba, a noted historian and linguist; and Def Ould Babana, a former diplomat. Several professors and researchers from the University of Nouakchott were also linked to FLAM.
FLAM members have claimed responsibility for distributing a highly articulate, fifty-page pamphlet entitled "Le Manifesto du Négro-Mauritanien Opprime" (The Manifesto of the Oppressed Black Mauritanian), documenting alleged examples of officially sanctioned discrimination. Copies of the manifesto were circulated in Addis Ababa during the spring 1986 meetings of the OAU and during the summer 1986 summit meetings of the Nonaligned Movement in Harare, Zimbabwe. FLAM adherents were also charged with instigating a series of attacks in September and October 1986 against a fish-processing facility in Nouadhibou, a pharmacy and gas station in Nouakchott, and three government vehicles. Although damage from the attacks was minimal, they were the first such acts of sabotage in Mauritania and thus represented a dramatic escalation in political violence.
The government responded quickly and harshly to these attacks. It labeled FLAM leaders as "misled persons" intent on "undermining the values and foundations of . . . society" by sowing "hatred and confusion" with the assistance of foreign enemies, possibly Libya. On September 4 and 5, 1986, army and police units arrested between thirty and forty suspected FLAM members. Twenty of the group were later given sentences ranging from six months to five years. Lieutenant Colonel Anne Amadou Babali, the black minister of interior, information and telecommunications, was dismissed from his post, allegedly for ignoring evidence of FLAM's existence. He was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Djibril Ould Abdallah, who was known for his firmness. Also relieved of their positions were Captain Niang Harouna and Commander Diouf Oumar of the Mauritanian Army, as well as the director of BIMA and other highly placed officials elsewhere in government. Most of those dismissed blacks were replaced by other blacks from Wolof or Soninké groups, and only a few were replaced by Maures. None of the new black appointees, however, supported the FLAM agenda.
With its leadership imprisoned or in self-imposed exile, FLAM's activities through the first half of 1987 diminished considerably; nevertheless, discontent among blacks, and especially among the Toucouleur, simmered. Observers speculated that further outbreaks of violence might erupt if the government attempted to implement its 1983 land reform program on a large scale.
Although originally supported by Mauritania's leading chiefs, the PPM in 1963 made the policy decision to suppress the institution of chieftaincies in order to foster unity and allegiance to a national leader. Accordingly, no replacement was chosen for a chief who died or resigned. Nevertheless, traditional rulers continued to play a significant, if decreasing, role in the political system. At the local level, traditional rulers represented the administration with the peasantry, aided in the maintenance of public order, and mobilized resources for public works projects. Chiefs also collected taxes, and in return the government paid their salaries.
On the national level, traditional rulers were most often coopted and integrated into the party, where they played an important role. Some chiefs or their kin became secretaries of the party committee in their villages; others held civil service positions. Throughout Daddah's stay in office, nearly all his ministers and deputies came from the highest levels of traditional leadership, and especially from marabout castes. Daddah regularly brought new members of the old elite into the government to improve efficiency and to enlarge his base of support. This changed only when the costs of the war in the Western Sahara threatened the economic well-being of the growing class of technocrats--a new elite--at home.
The 1978 military coup brought another group of traditional elites into government, as leaders of what had been warrior castes (hassani) replaced those of maraboutic groups. Of far greater significance for the long term, however, has been the movement of civilian and military technocrats into positions of political leadership. Taya's 1987 cabinet appointments-- such as the new minister of mines and industry, Khadijatou Bint Ahmed, and the new minister of foreign affairs, Commander Mohamed Lemine Ould N'Diayane-- have tended to be young (Ahmed, a woman, and N'Diayane are under forty), well educated, motivated, articulate, and energetic politicians.
During the period of civilian government, women were most successful in fulfilling their political demands through the party. Although the constitution guaranteed equality before the law and full rights of political participation, traditional practices effectively denied women any major role in political life. To elicit the support of women, the PPM created the National Union of Mauritanian Women in 1961. At first oriented only toward such typically feminine issues as health, nutrition, and education, by 1964 it had become the women's political arm of the PPM and was renamed the National Women's Movement (Mouvement National Féminin). The organization of the women's movement paralleled that of the PPM, with local committees, sections, and federations, and was headed by an elected bureau. At each level in the hierarchy, an official of the women's organization participated as an ex officio member of the respective PPM bureau. Although most women were far from achieving political equality with men, they were able to bring about change in response to some of their demands.
Over the years, several political functions helped to improve the lot of women. The PPM party congress at Kaédi in 1964 condemned abuses of divorce and doweries. The congress at `Ayoûn el `Atroûs in 1966 made provisions for the support of dependent children who remained with their mothers following a divorce and created the Superior Council for Women (Conseil Supérieur des Femmes), which operated the National Women's Movement. At the Nouakchott party congress in 1968, women's issues received significant attention. The 300 participants, including 11 women, called for the obligatory registration of marriages and divorces to protect women, the enactment of laws to discourage polygyny, limits on the size of dowries, and a code to protect women's rights. In the 1971 elections, two women were elected to the previously all-male National Assembly, and one, Aissatou Kane, was named minister of health and social affairs, becoming the first woman to serve in the government. She remained in office until the 1978 coup.
The pace of change improved under the military government as more women enrolled in schools and joined the labor force. In May 1987, in what was a remarkable step for Mauritania, President Taya named three women to cabinet-level posts to "correct countless managerial mistakes committed in the past." Khadijatou Bint Ahmed of Boutilimit was appointed minister of mines and industries. Lalla Mariam Bint Moulaye was appointed associate director of the presidential cabinet, and N'Deye Tabar Fall became general secretary of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs.
The Mauritanian Workers Union (Union des Travailleurs Mauritaniens--UTM), created in 1961, was a government-supported federation of all trade unions within the country. Until 1969 the UTM was completely separate from the PPM and the government, although it supported the party and had as many as seven representatives in the National Assembly. Initially, the UTM was conceived as a radical union in a class-oriented society and was pledged to forward the interests of workers as a class. Accordingly, union leadership ruled out integration with the party, as was customary in most other one-party states in subSaharan Africa. Consequently, union leaders were not averse to challenging the state. In May 1968, when news of student and worker demonstrations in France reached Mauritania, iron ore workers at Zouîrât struck to protest the pay differential, amounting to almost 1,000 percent, between the salaries of West Europeans and Africans. The government called on the army to restore order, a move that resulted in the death of eight workers and injuries to twenty-three.
At the fourth congress of the UTM, held in February 1969, party leaders and UTM leadership proposed incorporating the UTM into the PPM. Several member unions of the UTM denounced both the proposal and UTM leadership, which was described as no longer representing the interests of workers. Subsequently, several unions, including the National Union of Mauritanian Teachers, formally opposed integration with the party and voted to withdraw from the UTM. Under the Directing Committee of Mauritanian Workers, the "Progressive" UTM was formed. The new federation argued that the UTM was now under the control of management and could no longer represent the interests of the working class.
The PPM and the government refused to recognize the new labor federation, arguing that there could be no political activity outside the party. Mauritanian students, on the other hand, supported the new federation and in May 1971 challenged police and army units by demonstrating throughout Mauritania. Workers joined students in protest when miners at Fdérik closed the mines in September and October 1968.
Subsequent union activity under the military was marked by conflict and confusion. In 1983 Haidalla imprisoned UTM secretary general Elkory Ould H'metty for allegedly having used the UTM for political purposes and on behalf of Libyan interests. Taking over UTM leadership was H'metty's former assistant, Beijel Ould Houmeit, who had been a faithful Haidalla supporter. In 1985 H'metty was freed by President Taya. Nevertheless, Houmeit only begrudgingly yielded power to the erstwhile secretary general. From 1984 until mid-1987, the administration of the UTM was paralyzed, and union locals atrophied. In an effort to secure worker cooperation during the period of recession, the government decided to reinvigorate the UTM. In mid-1987 local offices were being reestablished in major urban areas, and a general UTM congress was tentatively planned for late 1987.
The historic contradictions and competing interests involved in formulating foreign policy have allowed Mauritania's several heads of state to justify a monopoly on foreign policy decision making. As a result, Mauritania's foreign policy, like that of other developing states, represents at once an extension of the president's personality and the embodiment of an otherwise fragile state. Accordingly, Mauritania's foreign policy over the years avoided ideological posturing in favor of pragmatic responses to domestic and foreign pressures. That was particularly true in the mid-1980s when harsh economic realities and the ongoing conflict in the Western Sahara compelled the Taya government to strengthen its ties to France; continue its balancing act between Morocco, Algeria, and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR); and solicit support from as many donors as would come to its aid.
During the late colonial period, Mauritania had few contacts with the other territories of French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française--AOF). At the time of the independence referendum in 1958, Mauritania's representatives on the Grand Council of the AOF remained neutral, while all other AOF members divided between the African Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain--RDA) and the African Regroupment Party (Parti du Régroupement Africain--PRA). Until Mauritania became independent and Morocco threatened its security, Mauritania did not participate in AOF intraterritorial political, labor, or cultural movements. Only when Mauritania's existence as a state became problematic did it seek international recognition and support.
Throughout the 1960s, Mauritania's main foreign policy objective was preserving its independence in the face of Moroccan irredentism. (Morocco finally recognized Mauritanian independence in 1969.) To that end, the Daddah government insisted on maintaining close ties with France, an effort that included allowing France to station troops on Mauritanian soil. In Africa, Mauritania established ties with the more conservative francophone countries because all the Arab League states (except Tunisia) and the African members of the Casablanca Group (Ghana, Guinea, and Mali) supported Morocco's irredentist claims.
Mauritania applied for admission to the UN in 1960, sponsored by France, but its membership was vetoed by the Soviet Union, which supported the Arab League. For the most part, black Africa and the West favored Mauritania's admission, and the Soviet Union dropped its opposition in 1961 in exchange for a favorable vote on Mongolia's admission. In a final effort to block Mauritania's admission, Morocco brought the issue to the General Assembly, which supported Mauritania's application by a vote of sixty-eight to thirteen, with twenty abstentions. Mauritania was admitted to the UN on October 27, 1961. Mali, Guinea, and most Arab states supported Morocco in the debate.
In January 1962 Mauritania edged away from its previously conservative, pro-French position by extending recognition to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic and refusing to attend meetings of the French-backed Common Saharan States Organization. These tentative displays of independence increased Mauritania's credibility with its more progressive African neighbors and emphasized the country's role as a bridge between Arab North Africa and black sub-Saharan Africa. Mauritania and Mali subsequently achieved a rapprochement with the signing of the Treaty of Kayes in February 1963. Relations with Algeria improved when Mauritania supported Algeria in its dispute with Morocco. Egypt, known at the time as the United Arab Republic (UAR) and the acknowledged leader of the Arab world, also sided with Algeria, and on October 21, 1964, the UAR officially extended recognition to Mauritania. That action encouraged Daddah to undertake an even bolder foreign policy.
In 1963 Mauritania joined the OAU, whereupon Morocco resigned in protest. In 1964 Daddah became the first president of the recently formed Afro-Malagasy Union for Economic Cooperation (Union Africaine et Malagache de Coopération Economique--UAMCE), a loose grouping of francophone African countries pledging technical and cultural cooperation. When the organization was subsequently upgraded to become a political organization in defiance of the OAU charter, Mauritania withdrew from all but the technical committees.
Through the early 1970s, Mauritania continued to play the role of bridge between the Maghrib and sub-Saharan Africa. Mauritania also maintained its commitment to nonalignment while opening relations with Eastern Europe and the radical states of Africa. In support of Arab League and OAU positions, Mauritania did not seek ties with Israel, South Africa, or Portugal. Mauritania finally established diplomatic relations with Morocco in 1969. Close relations with France, on whom Mauritania continued to rely for much of its development aid, remained the cornerstone of Mauritanian foreign policy through the late 1980s.
Spain's withdrawal from the Spanish Sahara and the latter's partition and annexation by Mauritania and Morocco in 1976 inaugurated an eight-year period of conflict and fighting against Polisario guerrillas of the SADR, resulting in military setbacks and stagnating diplomacy for Mauritania. Upon annexation, Mauritania's former ally Algeria severed its ties with the Daddah government in support of the SADR. From 1976 to 1979, Polisario guerrillas increased pressure on Mauritania and launched commando attacks against Fdérik and Nouakchott. As a consequence of the economic and political costs of the fighting, the military successors to Daddah attempted to disengage Mauritania from the conflict; nevertheless, Polisario forces penetrated Mauritania's defenses, often with impunity, to infiltrate fighters into the Western Sahara. Subsequently, relations with Morocco again deteriorated and then finally ruptured in 1981 when Mauritania accused Morocco of backing a coup attempt in Nouakchott. Conversely, relations with the Polisario and Algeria improved. In December 1983, Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The following year Haidalla extended diplomatic recognition and support to the SADR, an action that ultimately led to the downfall of his government. President Taya maintained ties with the SADR, but the link was at best correct and represented little more than Taya's attempt to appease his more formidable neighbors.
Mauritania's principal foreign policy objective in the mid1980s has been to ensure its own territorial integrity. Translated into diplomacy, this has meant pursuing a policy of strict neutrality in the Western Sahara dispute, improving relations with Morocco and Algeria, and seeking guarantees of support from France should ties with Mauritania's northern neighbors seriously deteriorate. Taya's efforts in that area have had mixed results. Although Taya insisted that Mauritania would remain neutral in the conflict over the Western Sahara, Mauritania faced a mounting threat of greater involvement because the combatants themselves continued to encroach on Mauritanian territory. As the Moroccans pushed southward in the Western Sahara behind their highly effective network of sand walls (berms) to within a few kilometers of the Mauritanian border, Mauritanian armed forces were placed in the position of confronting either well-equipped Moroccan troops pursuing Polisario guerrillas, or Polisario commando teams crossing into and perhaps attacking the berms from Mauritanian territory. In either case, Mauritania would probably be the loser.
Taya has also sought to improve ties with other countries to secure trading partners or find new investors. Mauritania's principal benefactors have been Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and France. The list of donors also includes Japan, Iraq, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Romania, the United States, the Persian Gulf states, and China.
Foreign Relations with ...
<>France
<>Morocco
<>United States
Most of Mauritania's developmental assistance in the 1980s was provided by France, which was also the major supplier of private direct investment. Bilateral accords signed with France in 1961 provided for economic, financial, technical, cultural, and military cooperation and aid. Although Mauritania opposed France on Algerian independence, nuclear testing in the Sahara, and French arms sales to South Africa, ties remained cordial through the Daddah term. French citizens worked in Mauritania as technical assistants in the government, administrators, teachers, and judges. Daddah frequently traveled to France, and French development aid flowed to Mauritania. The level of French involvement rose markedly following the outbreak of hostilities in the Western Sahara. Between 1976 and 1979, when Mauritania unilaterally declared peace and withdrew from combat, French aircraft provided air support for Mauritanian troops fighting Polisario forces, and French paratroops were stationed at Nouadhibou.
Activity by Mauritanian dissidents in France, together with Mauritania's gradual policy shift toward the Polisario, resulted in a growing coolness toward Paris. In May 1979, Mauritania asked France to remove its troops from Nouadhibou. France continued to provide a high level of financial aid, although less than requested by the Haidalla government, and this curtailment further strained ties. Following alleged accusations of Moroccan support of a coup attempt in March 1981, Haidalla again turned to France to obtain guarantees of Mauritania's territorial integrity. French president Georges Pompidou and Haidalla concluded an accord in 1981, as Morocco threatened to carry the struggle against Polisario guerrillas into Mauritanian territory. As Morocco's advancing sand walls increasingly obligated Polisario guerrillas to use Mauritania as a staging area, President Haidalla and, later, President Taya sought and received guarantees of French support in August 1984 and June 1987.
Prior to the December 1984 coup that brought Taya to power, the Mauritanian-Moroccan cooperation agency stated that relations between the two countries were on the mend in spite of alleged Moroccan complicity in a 1981 coup attempt and Mauritania's subsequent turn toward Algeria. Representatives from both sides initiated a series of lowlevel contacts that led to a resumption of diplomatic ties in April 1985. For Mauritania, the détente with Morocco promised to end the threat of Moroccan incursions, and it also removed the threat of Moroccan support for opposition groups formed during the Haidalla presidency. Through the agreement with Mauritania, Morocco sought to tighten its control over the Western Sahara by denying the Polisario one more avenue for infiltrating guerrillas into the disputed territory.
Relations between Morocco and Mauritania continued to improve through 1986, reflecting President Taya's pragmatic, if unstated, view that only a Moroccan victory over the Polisario would end the guerrilla war in the Western Sahara. Taya made his first visit to Morocco in October 1985 (prior to visits to Algeria and Tunisia) in the wake of Moroccan claims that Polisario guerrillas were again traversing Mauritanian territory. The completion of a sixth berm just north of Mauritania's crucial rail link along the border with the Western Sahara, between Nouadhibou and the iron ore mines, complicated relations between Mauritania and Morocco. Polisario guerrillas in mid-1987 had to traverse Mauritanian territory to enter the Western Sahara, a situation that invited Morocco's accusations of Mauritanian complicity. Moreover, any engagements near the sixth berm would threaten to spill over into Mauritania and jeopardize the rail link.
Relations with the United States have never been close. The United States recognized Mauritanian independence when it was proclaimed in November 1960, but the first two ambassadors shared accreditation with Senegal and resided in Dakar. A United States embassy opened in July 1962 in Nouakchott and was headed by a chargé d'affaires. Only in 1972 were resident ambassadors exchanged.
Since the onset of the drought in the mid-1970s, Mauritania has cultivated ties with Western Europe and Eastern Europe as possible sources of aid and investment. Mauritania's ties with Spain, which until 1975 were dominated by the fate of the Western Sahara, remained cordial in spite of repeated violations of Mauritania's fishing regulations by Spanish boats. The two countries have formed a joint economic and technical cooperation commission, a move reflecting the importance Spain gave to its aid and cooperation program with Mauritania.
Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. A History of the Maghrib. (2d ed.)
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
Damis, John. Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara
Dispute. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983.
Drysdale, Alasdair, and Gerald H. Blake. The Middle East and
North AFrica: A Political Geography. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985.
Eagleton, William, Jr. "The Islamic Republic of Mauritania,"
Middle East Journal, 19, No. 1, Winter 1965, 45-53.
Gerteiny, Alfred G. Historical Dictionary of Mauritania.
(African Historical Dictionaries, No. 31.) Metuchen, New
Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1981.
------. Mauritania. London: Pall Mall Press, 1967.
------. "Mauritania." Pages 319-31 in James Kritzeck and William H.
Lewis (eds.), Islam in Africa. New York: Van
Nostrand-Reinhold, 1969.
------. "On the History, Ethnology, and Political Philosophy of
Mauritania," Maghreb Review [London], 3, Nos. 7-8,
May-August 1978, 1-6.
Hillings, David, et al. "Mauritania." Pages 671-84 in Africa
South of the Sahara. (16th ed.) London: Europa, 1987.
Legum, Colin (ed.). Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey
and Documents, 1980-1981. New York: Africana, 1981.
------. Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and
Documents, 1981-1982. New York: Africana, 1981.
------. Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and
Documents, 1982-1983. New York: Africana, 1984.
------. Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and
Documents, 1983-1984. New York: Africana, 1985.
Moore, Clement H. "One-Partyism in Mauritania," Journal of
Modern African Studies [Cambridge], 3, No. 3, October
1965, 402-20.
Parker, Richard B. North Africa: Regional Tensions and
Strategic Concerns. New York: Praeger, 1984.
Thompson, Virginia, and Richard Adloff. The Western Saharans:
Background to Conflict. London: Croom Helm, 1980.
Toupet, Charles (ed.). Atlas de la République Islamique de
Mauritanie. Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1977.
(Various issues of the following publication were also used in
the preparation of this chapter: Africa Confidential
[London].)